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Sanctions: The Unexpected Losers and Beneficiaries

insideiran — Tue, 27 Jul 2010 20:59:02 +0000

Shayan Ghajar

The European Union approved the most hard-hitting sanctions against Iran to date July 26, in an attempt to compel Iran to accede to Western demands to halt its nuclear enrichment. The sanctions, more damaging than those passed by the United States as a result of Europe’s greater economic involvement with Iran, specifically target Iran’s two sectors most vulnerable to European nations: banking, and oil.

Of the two, measures against Iran’s oil industry will prove to be the most damaging for the Iranian government, as it derives over half its revenue from oil exports. Until recent months, during which the mere mention of future European sanctions drove many companies to seek their business elsewhere, much of Iran’s foreign direct investment, especially in energy projects such as refinement facilities and oil drilling projects, came from European companies such as Dutch Royal Shell and OMV.

What makes Iran’s oil industry a particularly inviting target for European sanctions is Iran’s lack of refinement equipment—ironically, though Iran has some of the largest oil and natural gas reserves on earth, it is unable to refine enough for its own domestic supply and relies on imported refined gasoline to meet the nation’s needs.

How will the newest European sanctions affect Iran, how will they fall short, and what strategies will Iran pursue to circumvent sanctions or minimize their impact?

What the E.U. Sanctions Will Accomplish

The European Union’s sanctions will undoubtedly have an immediate impact on Iran’s oil industry.

The language in the E.U. resolutions forbids European involvement in almost any sector of Iran’s oil industry, banning investment, shareholding, joint ventures, equipment sales, and loans, as well as merely the use of equipment owned by individuals or corporations subject to European Union authority.

A great deal of Iran’s foreign investments aimed at expanding current oil fields, such as the major South Pars projects currently underway, come from European corporations. However, European sanctions discussions slowed investments in expanding oil field capabilities, and now, such investments are halted altogether. This, in turn, has halted or slowed development in many of Iran’s nascent expansion programs, such as several phases of the South Pars, Iran’s largest oil and natural gas field.

Iran’s oil industry has, until now, relied on the use of European equipment for a wide range of projects aimed at increasing oil output and refining capabilities. Drilling rigs, for example, have often been purchased or contracted out from European companies. Refining technologies for the processing of unrefined petroleum will also fall under these restrictions, a significant blow to Iran’s hopes to reduce its gasoline imports from their current level at 40%.

Sanctions pose an additional obstacle to Iran’s gasoline imports, as maritime insurance companies such as Lloyds of London refuse to insure any ships heading to Iran. Reuters reports that only three gasoline shipments have arrived in Iran in July, enough to supplement only 7 or 8 days of domestic consumption. China’s Sinopec and Turkey’s Tüpraş continue to send shipments, though insurance issues have interfered with Turkish shipments. Venezuela, too, ships gasoline to Iran, but the costs for Iran are significantly higher due to the distance.

How the E.U. Sanctions May be Ineffectual

As InsideIRAN reported last week, many of the voids left by European pullouts are being filled by Chinese and Russian firms, as well as an increasing number of Turkish companies.

Russia denounced the European Union’s new sanctions July 27, saying they devalue the United Nations and go too far in restricting trade with Iran. Russia recently announced its intent to greatly expand contracts in exploiting hydrocarbon projects with Iran, and indicated it may ignore American and European sanctions when convenient or profitable. Gazprom and a number of other Russian companies have signed or renewed multi-billion dollar contracts with Iran in recent months. Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko declared, “No sanctions will hinder our cooperation in hydrocarbons. It does not contradict either the U.N. Security Council sanctions or international law.”

China, too, has much to gain by ignoring European sanctions—though, as many Chinese energy corporations do not do business in Europe, they would not be subject to E.U. sanctions to begin with. Iran has typically been China’s third largest source of energy imports, though aforementioned difficulties for Iran in expanding and maintaining production due to sanctions have decreased its export to China. China, too, is a major source of energy for Iran, comprising the bulk of its gasoline imports. Sinopec, China’s largest oil company, is also increasingly involved in investments and contracts abandoned by European companies in Iran, as is Malaysia’s SKS, which already has several multi-billion dollar contracts in Iran.

Turkey continues to support continued negotiations and opposes sanctions, attempting to pick up the pieces of its hard-won Tehran Declaration. Turkish Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek declared Turkey will not abide by European sanctions: “We will fully implement U.N. resolutions, but when it comes to individual countries’ demands for extra sanctions, we do not have to [follow suit].” Turkey’s Tüpraş, second only to China’s Sinopec in supplying Iran’s gasoline imports, stepped in after pullouts by European companies.

Iran’s Adjustments to Circumvent Sanctions

Meanwhile, Iran continues to utilize a number of tactics honed over decades of American sanctions to evade the more stringent measures taken by the European Union. These range from smuggling gasoline through Iraqi Kurdistan to meet domestic needs, to considering using a different currency for oil-related transactions, such as the Chinese Yuan or Emirati Dirham.

In the meantime, however, as more European companies pull out of Iran’s energy sector, Iran’s most significant stopgap measure has been to shore up its own industries with the government’s own oil money, investing over $46 billion in refining facilities to jumpstart the nation’s bid for energy independence. PressTV quotes a report from the Energy Market Consultants firm saying that Iran will, if its planned upgrades are successful, be a net exporter of refined gasoline by 2015. While this leaves a five year gap in which Iran will need to scramble to keep its gasoline supply steady, Iran appears to be already compensating—as mentioned above—by importing additional Chinese, Turkish, and Venezuelan gasoline.

The Wall Street Journal opines that pressure on gasoline imports, and greater demand than supply, “could raise the domestic political pressure on the Tehran government.” However, InsideIRAN’s analysis indicates otherwise, with a significant number of Iranians blaming the sanctions only on foreign governments rather than their own. Hardships caused by pressures on basic necessities are very unlikely to lead to a popular uprising, as even prominent Green Movement figures such as Mir Hossein Moussavi decry sanctions of any kind as needlessly harmful to the average Iranian.

Iran has also begun engaging in a drive to get more investors, shareholders, and bond buyers involved in the oil program. As the Washington Post story linked earlier mentions, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps company previously involved in critical phases of the South Pars field pulled out amidst fears its military affiliation could scare away investors, due to sanctions on Iran’s military. Despite this, Iran claims that investment has risen 120% since the Iranian New Year (which started March 21) and the government has also issued $3 billion in participation bonds to help make up the shortfall left by European and IRGC pullouts.

Sanctions, it seems, will have an immediate effect on Iran’s oil production capabilities, though time will tell if the gaps left by European flight are to be filled by superpowers such as Russia and China, and it is impossible to tell if Iran’s adaptations to sanctions will successfully minimize the damage.

Sanctions Open Iran to Russian, Chinese Firms

insideiran — Wed, 21 Jul 2010 21:04:08 +0000

Shayan Ghajar

As Western nations wait to see if sanctions are having the desired effects on Iran’s economy and foreign policy, India’s Petroleum Secretary S. Sundareshan announced that recent U.S. sanctions would hamper state-controlled Indian firms’ attempts to invest in Iranian energy projects.

Sanctions, thus far, have complicated the economic dealings of many U.S. allies or friendly nations, even some of those which voted against Iran in the U.N. Security Council. Many nations in Asia and elsewhere are beginning efforts to circumvent sanctions to invest in Iran’s energy sector–especially three of the four members of BRIC, namely India, China, and Russia.

Mr. Sundareshan told the Wall Stree Journal that India has much to gain with investing in Iran, and much to lose should it fail: “There are unexplored frontiers in gas, which provide immense opportunities for [India]. We would certainly like to utilize these opportunities without sanctions.” India’s Foreign Minister has also complained about American sanctions publicly, saying they would endanger India’s “energy security and our attempts to meet the development needs of our people.”

India relies on Iran for about 14% of its crude oil imports, which would not be affected by sanctions, according to the WSJ. However, India also has plans to link itself to Iran via a pipeline through Pakistan. Discussions on pricing and construction will resume soon, the two nations say. Sanctions regarding the pipeline do not seem to concern any of the nations involved, despite the billions of dollars involved in such a project. India’s ever-expanding economy requires increasing energy imports to sustain itself, and Iran, with the world’s second largest natural gas reserves and geographical proximity to India, is the nation’s best option. While sanctions have given Indian companies pause in committing to investments, they have not affected India’s multi-billion dollar future dealings with Iran’s energy sector, as India seems more worried about its energy security than potential friction with the United States over Iran.

China, too, may undercut Western efforts at economically alienating Iran. China only agreed to U.N. sanctions, apparently, when language restricting deals with Iran’s energy sector were excised. Consequently, China has no legal obligations to avoid large-scale investments or cooperation in Iran’s energy industry. Coupled with new restrictions on Western companies resulting from American, European, and a multitude of unilateral sanctions from nations such as Australia and Canada, Iran’s market is invitingly open to Chinese business free of Western competition. The L.A. Times quotes an anonymous American diplomat as saying China “has given no commitment not to take up the slack” when these sanctions-wary companies back out of Iran. Even non-Western nations aligned with the United States and Europe on Iran, such as Japan, have seen the vacuums left by their corporate pullouts filled by Chinese firms.

China may utilize other methods to engage in lucrative business deals with Iran, according to the article, such as laundering petroleum exports to Iran by rerouting them through other nations in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, many Chinese firms have no need to be circumspect in their deals with Iran, as they do no business whatsoever in the United States and would not be subject to American sanctions. Chinese trade with Iran, Tehran estimates, will reach $50 billion within the next few years, a process accelerated, no doubt, by the lack of Western competition.

China’s conditional support for U.N. sanctions indicates their awareness of the economic advantages Iran’s isolation would provide Beijing.

Russia, too, is showing signs of undermining American sanctions efforts. According to the New York Times, Russia’s Energy Minister announced a plan of broad cooperation with Iran’s energy industry. Russia has been vocally opposed to unilateral sanctions beyond the scope of the Security Council’s restrictions on economic involvement in Iran, with its latest invitation to Russian companies to invest in Iran’s oil industry overtly flouting the Obama administration’s recent sanctions bill. Russia has spoken of forming bi-national banks and energy conglomerates with Iran, though the timetable for such projects has yet to be established.

The Times article cites Russia’s opposition to any measures increasing Iran’s internal political turmoil by affecting the population economically as one of its reasons for ignoring American sanctions. If true, Russia would be intentionally shoring up the Iranian government economically to help it withstand the domestic threat posed by the Green Movement–a serious breach with American and E.U. foreign policy efforts.

Iran itself is engaging in a variety of strategies to evade the obstacles posed by recent sanctions. The Wall Street Journal reports that a bank in the European Union, EIH, based in Hamburg, acts as a go-between for the Iranian government in Europe. The bank has done over a billion dollars of business with Iranian companies involved in defense contracts ranging from conventional military purchases to ballistic missile testing programs. The bank evades E.U. sanctions by virtue of its non-inclusion on the list of blacklisted companies.

Iran also uses less conventional methods to evade sanctions. According to the BBC, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s shipping line has registered ships with the Isle of Man, a British dependency, to skirt around potential searches and seizures of Iranian vessels. The ships, under the Isle of Man’s flag, would not be subject to U.N. restrictions on Iranian trade and shipping.

Sanctions, it seems, are making Iran’s economic transactions inconvenient but by no means impossible. While Iran may need to pay higher prices to its BRIC supporters for energy imports, it is clear that sanctions have not driven businesses away from Iran. On the contrary, nations that supported limited sanctions may have done so precisely because it would open greater markets for them in Iran’s energy sector by driving away competitors.

Shahram Amiri: Defection or Kidnapping?

insideiran — Tue, 13 Jul 2010 20:35:25 +0000

Shayan Ghajar

While little is known about the disappearance of Iranian scientist Shahram Amiri in June 2009 in Saudi Arabia, a great number of conflicting reports surfaced today attempting to explain precisely what has transpired with the Iranian national in the last 13 months. Some give the United States the benefit of the doubt, arguing that Amiri defected willingly and, for any number of hypothetical reasons, seeks to return to Iran.

Others disagree, pointing to Amiri’s claims of abduction in YouTube videos as evidence that the scientist was kidnapped by American and Saudi intelligence units while on Hajj. A third viewpoint contends that Amiri was a false defector, purporting to divulge sensitive information to American intelligence agencies while actually gauging precisely how much the United States knows about Iran’s program.

The controversy surrounds three videos aired in June 2010, each purporting to be Shahram Amiri. In the first video, the man introduces himself as Amiri and alleges that he was kidnapped by American and Saudi intelligence agents while in Medinah, then tortured and pressured to say he had willingly defected. A second video was posted to YouTube shortly thereafter, with what appears to be the same individual, claiming to be safe and happy in the United States, pursuing higher education and uninvolved in any security issues. In the second video, the man can be clearly seen reading from a script. A third video emerged later in June, reiterating that he had been kidnapped and wanted release back to Iran. In the third video, Amiri also claimed to have temporarily escaped CIA agents in Virginia.

The BBC has posted a timeline of events in the Amiri saga, which highlights the dramatic inconsistencies, and demonstrates the difficulty in verifying any of the following scenarios.

Scenarios in which Amiri defected

The BBC’s Jon Leyne advanced one possible scenario in which Amiri may have defected, then decided to return to Iran. If Amiri defected, Leyne argues, it is possible–though there is, as yet, no evidence to substantiate the possibility—that his wife and child, still in Iran, may have been used to pressure him to return. The tactic is well-known to Iranian exiles abroad, many of whom have reported threats against their families still in Iran as a means of pressuring them to cease activities against the government. If Amiri defected, and his family was subsequently threatened as a result, it is plausible that he would seek to return to keep them safe. The Financial Times agrees with this analysis.

The BBC quotes unnamed intelligence officials in the Obama administration as saying that after Amiri defected, he became concerned for his family still in Iran and decided to return home. Nevertheless, many questions would remain should the American version of events prove to be true. Amiri’s videos pose one of the difficulties in fully accepting the White House’s version—why, if Amiri was free, was there a two month gap between the filming of the first video, in April, and its posting to the internet, in June? Another unanswered issue is the second video, in which a visibly nervous Amiri, reading a script or cue card above the camera, states he came to America by choice simply to continue his education. Were Amiri a willing defector, and concerned for the safety of his family, it is inconceivable he would willingly endanger them by publically confessing to defecting to Iran’s greatest nemesis.

The Guardian, too, referenced the possibility of Amiri’s family being threatened. Citing unnamed “analysts,” the Guardian says that at one point Amiri was calling his wife in Iran on Skype, when Iranian intelligence agents interrupted the call and threatened to torture her if Amiri did not return. Aside from the complete absence of substantiation for this claim, the Guardian is also apparently ignorant of Skype’s famously impervious encryption, which renders it all but impossible to crack even for the National Security Agency, which has for some time offered an as-yet unclaimed reward of billions of dollars to anyone capable of cracking the code. Additionally, Amiri’s wife has repeatedly emphasized she had no contact with her husband and was desperate to talk to him.

Other scenarios in which Amiri defected are not so much concrete reasons for his desire to return than rebuttals of his claims to have been kidnapped. The official White House statement on the issue, from Press Secretary P. J. Crowley, is that Amiri would not have been allowed to publish YouTube videos if he had been kidnapped and secured in intelligence facilities.

Scenarios in which Amiri was kidnapped

The official Iranian story is that Amiri was kidnapped in Saudi Arabia as his first YouTube video alleges, and through personal heroics managed to post his videos. The second video, Iran claims, was made under duress. The Iranian state-owned or affiliated news agencies have had multiple inconsistencies in their stories, reporting at various times that Amiri escaped to the Pakistani embassy, or that he was escorted by CIA agents who intended to expatriate him. Even his time of arrival at the embassy has been inconsistent in the Iranian media, with one article stating he arrived at 6:30PM on Monday, and another at 10PM. In the past few hours, most agencies in Iran have amended their stories to say Amiri was released by the CIA: “Analysts believe that the US administration was forced to hand over the abducted Iranian scholar following intensive intelligence and media efforts by the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Fars News reports.

This version of events has its own inconsistencies, however. As P.J. Crowley pointed out, it is unlikely that Mr. Amiri would have been able to escape heavily armed and highly trained guards multiple times to produce his videos, and unlikelier still that if he were actually abducted, he would have been allowed any contact with the outside world. It is not impossible, however, that Amiri, through luck or skill, did manage a few times in his 13 months under guard to evade his captors, if he was in fact abducted.

A third possibility

The Voice of America has advanced a third scenario, which would explain much of the inconsistencies if true—though absolutely no evidence to substantiate it has yet surfaced. In this alternate scenario, VoA argues, Amiri may be a false defector, sent by Iran to offer little substantive information to American intelligence agencies while attempting to gauge precisely how much the U.S. knows about the Iranian nuclear program. Amiri would have had to divulge some substantive information about the program to establish trust with American agencies, though not enough to compromise Iranian efforts. During the process, by taking note of the questions asked of him by intelligence agents, Amiri would gain an idea of just how much or how little America knows about Iran’s program. This scenario would explain the dramatically conflicting videos, as well as Amiri’s decision to return to Iran. Again, however, no evidence is forthcoming to substantiate VoA’s theory, and, should it be true, it is unlikely will anytime soon.

At this point, it is impossible to know precisely what Amiri has been involved in for the last 13 months.

Iran, EU Mull Over Possibility of Renewed Nuclear Talks

insideiran — Thu, 08 Jul 2010 18:49:56 +0000

Shayan Ghajar

Responding to an invitation to continue nuclear talks from EU High Representative Catherine Ashton in mid-June, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili responded early July 7 in a letter to the EU representative agreeing to open the possibility for renewed discussions starting September 1.

Jalili’s letter, excerpts of which are available here, delineates specific requirements set out by the Iranian government before any dialogue may begin, and harshly criticizes the current dual-track approach of pressure and negotiations currently pursued by the P5+1. The Security Council’s efforts at using pressure via sanctions as an incentive for Iran to engage in negotiations, Jalili said, has made Iran highly suspicious as to whether or not the P5+1 actually desire discussions to succeed in reaching a compromise.

“It is very interesting that in spite of efforts made by Brazilian and Turkish foreign ministers for resumption of talks, you have been reluctant [to negotiate] in the past three months, but, immediately after passing the resolution 1229 at the Security Council against Iran, you have voiced readiness to resume talks,” Jalili complained. Jalili termed the use of sanctions on Iran after the fuel swap agreement to be signs of a “dictatorship,” in which the escalation of pressure is intended to coerce Iran into cooperation.

Regarding altering Iran’s behavior or increasing the motivation for dialogue, sanctions seem to have achieved the opposite effect. On June 28, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared a freeze on all nuclear talks for two months in retaliation for the passage of United Nations sanctions on Iran, and threatened to retaliate if any Iranian ships are boarded for inspection. U.N. sanctions even appear to have angered prominent opposition leader Mir Hossein Moussavi, the de facto leader of the Green Movement, who called them “oppressive,” and described them as a move against the Iranian nation which would harm all Iranians rather than exclusively the government.

Furthermore, Iran listed three contentious questions in Jalili’s letter that must be answered prior to the resumption of dialogue in September. First, Jalili asks, will the tenor of the meetings be one of mutual distrust and antagonism, or “cooperation and working towards mutual understanding?” Second, the letter inquires as to whether or not the nations involved commit to dialogue without the threat of punitive actions against Iran. And finally, and the requirement most likely to prove problematic, Jalili demands all nations involved in negotiations to inform Iran as to their specific policies regarding Israel’s “stockpiling of nuclear weapons.”

In response, Ashton offered qualified hopes for the dialogues, insisting that dialogues are an absolute imperative but that Iran must show additional signs of goodwill to encourage substantive progress by freezing its uranium enrichment activities and becoming more transparent to the IAEA. Meanwhile, the European Union will continue to move forward with sanctions this month, a measure Ashton described as intended “to say, ‘We’re serious, we need to talk,’” according to the New York Times–apparently in spite of Iran’s clear statement that any more such sanctions will be viewed as a sign of the futility of negotiations in what they feel is an unalterably hostile environment.

Meanwhile, Iran has no intention of halting its enrichment activities, according to Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast. According to the Iranian spokesman, any negotiations in September will be from the basis of the Tehran Declaration, brokered by Brazil and Russia and announced in May. Under the Tehran Declaration, Iran retains its right to enrich uranium to meet its domestic needs but will swap low enriched uranium in Turkey with uranium enriched to higher levels by an approved third party, eventually negating the need for Iran to enrich its own materials. Iran has the right to enrich uranium under the Non-Proliferation Treaty; however, its refusal to stop enrichment activities has caused Western nations question its goodwill in future discussions.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, seeking to end the impasse resulting from the strong mutual distrust prevalent between Iran and the P5+1, stated that the best way to move forward was to give Iran’s proposals and perspective the Security Council’s full attention. Ryabkov emphasized “we believe the Iranian proposals [...] should not be evaded,” according to Russian news service RIA Novosti. He continued, “everything proposed by both sides should be discussed.”

Until High Representative Ashton’s response to Jalili’s letter is delivered, it remains to be seen how the EU will address Iran’s preconditions for dialogue, which will present the first obstacle to any dialogue between the Security Council and Iran.

Turkey and Brazil Feel Fallout, After New UN Sanctions Highlight Competing Diplomatic Strategies with U.S.

insideiran — Tue, 22 Jun 2010 20:48:32 +0000

Shayan Ghajar

From Turkey’s vantage point, the Tehran Declaration brokered by Turkey and Brazil on May 17 was an unprecedented breakthrough in diplomatic efforts to gain any token of cooperation from Iran regarding its nuclear program. Turkey and Brazil’s heads of state hailed the compromise as a victory for diplomacy and a sign of the changing structure of international politics. For the first time since the 1979 Islamic revolution, they say, Iran has compromised with the West over its nuclear program.

For these reasons, Turkey and Brazil believe U.N. sanctions on Iran were a great betrayal to their exhaustive diplomatic efforts with Tehran. The sanctions, passed just three weeks later, stole the wind from Brazil and Turkey’s sails, leaving the two nations to consider their next moves, as they seem torn between their commitment to the Tehran Declaration and a new style of international relations on the one hand, and the risks of fully embarking on a course that antagonizes the powers-that-be in global politics on the other.

Turkey and Brazil’s leaders still seem to be taken aback at the complete disregard for what one Turkish daily termed their “diplomatic coup.” Both nations deliberately intended their success in brokering the deal to shake up the traditional methods of international conflict resolution and highlight what their governments feel is the outdated and undemocratic structure of the U.N. Security Council.

Brazil’s Foreign Minister Celso Amorim published an op-ed in the International Herald Tribune June 14 delineating Brazil’s goals and sentiments regarding the Tehran Declaration and Iran’s nuclear program. To Brazil, Amorim makes plain, the way the United Nations has dealt with the Iranian nuclear program highlights the inequality inherent in international decision-making bodies, which “remain the exclusive territory of a small group of countries.” The success of Turkey and Brazil where Western nations failed, Amorim says, precipitated a jealous reaction from the P5+1, whence came the 4th round of sanctions.

Amorim continued this train of thought in statements made on June 21. The Security Council, Amorim declared, is based on a 65- year-old model of international power and no longer reflects the changing world order and capabilities of newly ascendant nations. “The reform is inevitable. If you ask me [when it will occur], I will not be able to say, but it is not plausible to keep it the way it is,” Amorim stated.

Turkey has gambled much more than Brazil on the Tehran Declaration. As Iran’s neighbor, Turkey has vested long-term strategic and economic interests in keeping the possibility of dialogue open between Iran and the P5+1. Under Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s leadership, Turkish foreign policies have been geared towards “friendly relations with neighbors,” aimed at fostering regional cooperation in both economic enterprise and security issues.

Turkey has much to gain from these initiatives, as trade with Iran grows exponentially and multi-billion dollar energy deals are signed between the two nations in increasing numbers. The two nations also share similar security concerns, ranging from Kurdish separatists to the instability of the nascent Iraqi government.

Additionally, Turkey’s growing economy brings with it increased global and regional influence. Its geographic centrality in the Middle East and the fact that Turkey straddles two continents, both culturally and physically, have cemented the importance of acting as an intermediary in Middle Eastern affairs. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has integrated this awareness into his policies, using Turkey’s growing momentum to forge a stronger reputation for himself and Turkey, both domestically and abroad. According to George Friedman, chief of STRATFOR, “The Turkish economy is growing very rapidly, Europe is weakening now and the U.S. is withdrawing from Iraq[...] so the relative power of Turkey is growing independent of any policy.”

Mediating the nuclear fuel exchange deal with Iran was one of Turkey’s major attempts at utilizing its regional and international influence. With so much at stake for Turkey—it’s diplomatic reputation, months of efforts, and economic and strategic interests in its region—this dismissive response has caused a great deal of re-evaluation for Turkey’s highest officials regarding their foreign policy.

Turkey shares many common interests with the West: a non-nuclear armed Iran, resolution of the Middle East conflict, a stable Iraq, and energy security. And while the West continues to ignore Turkey’s efforts in pursuing these shared goals, Turkey will continue to pursue these goals on its own terms and seek, like Brazil, influence in international bodies not dominated by a select few nations’ interests.

At the same time, however, Turkey faces the unenviable task of balancing its regional interests with those of its strategic ally, the United States. Nowhere is this more exemplified than in Turkey’s continuing efforts to pursue the Tehran Declaration and maintain its legitimacy despite heightening tensions between Iran and the West. In this regard, Turkey is aware it must maintain the Declaration to preserve its diplomatic reputation, and is likely pressuring Iran to continue its support for the agreement as a result.

And while the diplomatic fallout from the fourth round of UNSC sanctions on Iran continues, Iran is getting ever more disenchanted with making even token efforts at compromise, and has sent an increasing number of signals that it believes its enemies will pursue direct military confrontation in the near future.

Persistence, Not Protest, Marks Election Anniversary

insideiran — Sat, 12 Jun 2010 17:47:45 +0000

Shayan Ghajar

Anyone who expected massive demonstrations in the streets of Tehran on the one-year anniversary of the controversial election that brought millions of Iranians into the streets to protest in numbers unseen since 1979, will be sorely disappointed. Tehran’s streets, by all accounts, are largely empty of overt signs of resistance. Police numbers are overwhelming, as multiple videos purportedly taken June 12 show, and protests remained sporadic, small in numbers, and primarily confined to universities. Tehran police claimed the arrest of 91 demonstrators, according to the Iranian Student News Agency, a government-affiliated news site.

Authorities were so anxious about the potential protest, according to a New York Times reporter in Tehran, that mass texts were sent to cell phones in the capital reading, “Dear citizen, you have been tricked by the foreign media and you are working on their behalf. If you do this again, you will be dealt with according to Islamic law.”

The Green Movement, however, is by no means crushed.

Tactics appear to be shifting in the Green Movement away from overt confrontation with authority to more passive forms of resistance. On the night of June 11, the eve of the election’s anniversary, signs of discontent remained ubiquitous in Tehran as much of the population stood on rooftops screaming protest slogans. InsideIRAN’s contacts in Tehran indicate that these screams of protest were heard in a socio-economically diverse variety of neighborhoods across Tehran.

The Green Movement’s methods of political expression are more variegated and subtle than just shouting from rooftops or attempting to march in demonstration, recent months show. The crackdowns in public on signs of protest or social dissent have driven Iranians to less obvious expression of dissent, such as writing anti-government slogans on banknotes, discussing sensitive political issues in private meetings of friends or family, and circumventing firewalls with programs such as Tor and Haystack to access forbidden sites.

As an acknowledgment of the potential for these grassroots methods of communication, both digital and interpersonal, opposition leader Mir Hossein Moussavi issued a statement on the night of June 11 stating that the Green Movement’s tactics will be changing. In the statement, posted on Saham News, a website affiliated with Moussavi’s political ally Mehdi Karroubi, the opposition leader emphasized the need for better organization, saying the Green Movement needs to expand “real and virtual social networks,” and garner momentum by increasing the number of websites and uploads of grassroots media, such as the well-known videos on YouTube capturing regime violence against peaceful protesters. The statement was, in essence, an acknowledgment that the crackdowns on mass protests have forced a change of tactics from disorganized, centralized demonstrations to organized, decentralized social groups.

Expression without action will not be enough. On the other hand, recent economic and political trends within Iran are gradually drawing two extremely important categories of Iranians into the fold of the government’s harshest critics. If these trends continue, it will be a major asset for the Green Movement’s ability to pressure the government.

Economically, the Ahmadinejad administration’s poor management of the nation’s various industries, as well as oil wealth, have left unemployment around 25% nationally, with numerous industries reporting the government has defaulted on its debts. The recently passed 4th round of U.N. sanctions will compound troubles further for average Iranians. As a recent interruption of an Ahmadinejad speech by protesters demonstrates, economic pressures are galvanizing opposition to his administration every bit as much as desire for civil liberties. The protesters in the video are shouting only one word to interrupt his speech, “bikari”—unemployment.

Another group whose support is essential to the Green Movement’s success is the military. While the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is often portrayed as a fanatical, monolithic entity in Iranian politics, a just-released brief documentary by the Guardian reveals that even within the strictly-guarded intelligence units of the IRGC, dissent is finally beginning to manifest itself and fragment the Guards.

Thus, while the absence of organized protests seems a defeat for the Green Movement, many long-term trends indicate it is just starting to build momentum. A top-ranking IRGC commander, Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Jafari, said just yesterday that the Green Movement was a greater danger to the nation than Saddam Hussein had been during the 8-year Iran-Iraq War.

As the saying goes in Iran, there is “fire beneath the ashes”— the frustration of the Iranian opposition continues to simmer despite the inability to protest. The government’s actions and words—whether it is busing thousands of police into the capital, or the aforementioned comparison of the dangers posed by the Green Movement to the war with Saddam Hussein— give every indication they feel the Green Movement remains a very substantial threat.

Iran Triumphs in Flotilla Disaster

insideiran — Wed, 02 Jun 2010 19:45:13 +0000

Shayan Ghajar

The bloodshed resulting from a clash between Israeli Defense Forces and pro-Palestine activists in international waters is nothing short of a diplomatic miracle for Iran.

The violence, which left at least 9 activists dead, immediately precipitated unprecedented tension between former allies Israel and Turkey, as the majority of activists killed or arrested in the altercation are Turkish citizens. Turkish-Israeli tension is also further straining relationships between the two nations and the United States, which has had numerous diplomatic disagreements with both Turkey and Israel in recent weeks regarding the Peace Process, nuclear proliferation, and Iran.

Iran, the sole beneficiary of the fiasco, has much to gain and little to lose by using the incident as diplomatic leverage for gaining even closer ties to Turkey, allowing to fallout to serve as a delay to forestall U.N. sanctions and discussions of the nuclear program, and propaganda capital to spend on winning hearts and minds in the Middle East and abroad..

The most immediate result of the Gaza blockade fiasco is the ever-widening rift between Turkey and its Western allies, as well as the increasing appeal of reorienting its interest in partners eastward, to Iran and other states nearby. The reaction of the United States to the Israeli raid greatly disappointed Turkey, with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan responding, “Dry statements of condemnation are not enough [...] There should be results.” Erdogan continued in an even stronger vein, saying Israel would not behave so rashly if it didn’t have the protection of a powerful nation–a thinly veiled reference to the United States.

Turkey’s NATO membership also puts the United States in a very difficult position. Paul Wachter of Politics Daily asks, “Does the United States Have an Obligation to Declare War on Israel?” Under Article V of the NATO charter, any NATO member that is attacked in Europe or North America may call on all other NATO members to declare war on the attacking nation. At present, Wachter points out, Turkey is threatening to provide naval escorts to any ships attempting to break through the Gaza blockade, an act that would likely lead to military confrontation between Turkey and Israel and potentially escalate the crisis into outright war.

This would leave the United States in the unenviable position of either deciding to declare war on its longtime ally Israel, or essentially invalidating the practical purpose of NATO by refusing to heed the call of one of its members. NATO has already issued a statement calling on Israel to release all of the activists, and citing the need for an impartial investigation.

Either option will be a victory for Iran. If the United States tacitly supports Israel by refusing to condemn its actions, Turkey will be alienated and NATO’s reputation will suffer. If the United States, unlikely though it is, were to condemn Israel, the recent tension between Israel and the U.S. would become wider than ever. If Turkey is alienated from its Western allies, Iran will certainly step in to fill the void, as the two nations have already been strengthening relations to levels unprecedented since Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979.

An Israeli/American fallout would also serve Iran, as it would be an opportunity for Iran to tout its long anti-Israeli stance and actions, as well as providing momentum for greater pressure on Israel to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and distracting from Iran’s nuclear program. Pressuring Iran while shoring up the Middle East’s sole nuclear-armed state will prove extremely unpopular in the region, as has already been shown by the wrangling over the Brazilian and Turkish-brokered nuclear fuel exchange agreed to by Iran.

Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-Israeli political analyst, points out that the flotilla incident will likely galvanize greater pressure from Arab states for focusing on Israel’s nuclear weapons rather than singling out Iran. TodaysZaman, a Turkish daily with close ties to the AKP, agrees with this assessment fully: “Obama must make one thing clear: if the US is to confront Iran with sanctions or a military threat, both which will require international cooperation, there must be significant progress, if not a full agreement, on the Arab-Israeli track.”

Iran welcomes the flotilla crisis for another reason: it distracts from the Iranian nuclear issue. As InsideIRAN’s Arash Aramesh points out, a report from the IAEA describing numerous instances of Iranian opacity in expanding nuclear operations slipped under the media radar yesterday amidst the coverage of the ongoing Gaza blockade crisis. Iran featured the IAEA report in only one article in its state-affiliated press services, whereas literally dozens of articles on the Gaza aid flotilla raid were published. The lone article showed little concern with the IAEA report, saying only that it was invalid because it failed to discuss the Tehran Fuel Swap Declaration.

Glenn Kessler of the Washington Post agrees that the crisis will delay any action against Iran’s nuclear program. The Security Council, he points out, will likely be more than busy dealing with the massive diplomatic fallout from the flotilla raid. Iran’s nuclear program, scheduled to have been the primary concern of the Council’s meetings in coming weeks, will take second stage.

Less quantifiable, however, is how Israel’s actions will lead to greater popularity for Iranian leaders in their near-abroad, the Arab world and Turkey. Iran’s anti-Israeli stance, the most unwavering and publicized anti-Israeli government in the Middle East, has won it many supporters in neighboring states with populations angry at their leaders’ perceived complacency in the face of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The latest incident will provide Iran with ample propaganda ammunition to trumpet “Told you so!” at every opportunity. Just two weeks ago, Iran proposed to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), a large body of predominantly Islamic nations, an independent body for investigating Israeli war crimes. The OIC has already passed a resolution condemning Israel’s raid on the flotilla–another propaganda victory for Iran amongst Islamic nations.

Iran’s political capital in the region for taking the hardest stance against Israel, and for the longest time, is soaring. And whether the United States reprimands Israel, or ignores Turkey’s rage over the flotilla bloodshed, Iran will be celebrating.

Iran Sends Declaration to IAEA While Rifts Widen Between Turkey, U.S.

insideiran — Mon, 24 May 2010 20:35:46 +0000

Shayan Ghajar

Now that Iran has formally sent a letter of declaration to the IAEA regarding the Tehran Declaration brokered by Turkey and Brazil, the negative reactions from Western states have intensified. The letter, from Ali Akbar Salehi, a vice president of the Islamic Republic as well as its nuclear chief, outlined Iran’s main goals in the Declaration Monday as well as affirming its commitment to deposit 1200kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) into Turkey’s safekeeping.

Western reactions to the Tehran Declaration remain utterly dismissive. Consequently, many countries welcoming the Tehran Declaration are criticizing Western policymakers for ignoring the opportunity for dialogue and reacting as if the Tehran Declaration were the extent of Iran’s willingness to negotiate, rather than a starting point. This rift shows most prominently in Turkey’s current friction with the United States, and may indicate a more global trend in which regional politics and interests supersede the importance of good relations with the United States.

Salehi’s letter to the IAEA specifically lists the goal of avoiding confrontation in two of its five subsections. In section two, Salehi hopes that the Declaration will lead to a “positive, constructive non-confrontational atmosphere leading to an era of interaction and cooperation.” In section five, he alludes more directly to Western threats of sanctions, asserting the declaration will help in “avoiding all kinds of confrontation through refraining from measures, actions and rhetorical statements that would jeopardize Iran’s rights and obligation under the NPT.”

Indeed, Iranian Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani said Sunday that Iran will withdraw from the Tehran Declaration if sanctions are approved by the U.N. Security Council. Sanctions, it is clear, would not only sabotage the first major concession Iran has made since the nuclear program was uncovered, but would unlikely alter or delay Iran’s program. The choice the United States faces is a between a symbolic gesture of punishment towards Iran, or a substantive engagement that may lead to greater progress in alleviating Western fears about Iran’s nuclear program.

Roger Cohen of the New York Times, reflecting what is becoming a view among progressives, argues that it is time for President Obama to bite the bullet and engage Iran diplomatically, with the Tehran Declaration as a starting point for dialogue. America may be a world superpower, but its ability to dictate the rules in international games of diplomacy is on the wane in an increasingly “post-Western world.” Cohen points out that America is already committed to two conflicts in the Middle East, which have shown the limits of its power in the region. As a result, “The West’s ability to impose solutions to global issues like Iran’s nuclear program has unraveled.”

President Obama, Cohen argues, should have taken the Tehran Declaration as a sign that his dual-track policy of pressure and openness to dialogue worked—Iran agreed to the declaration to prevent sanctions. With this success in mind, the Tehran Declaration marks a chance for the U.S. “to be prudent, given past Iranian duplicity, but this is progress. Isolation serves Iranian hard-liners.” By using a stick without indicating any willingness to give a carrot also, Cohen concludes, Obama has damaged other nations’ trust in his much-vaunted openness to dialogue without preconditions.

Cohen’s conclusion highlights another major consequence of ignoring the Tehran Declaration: Turkey, a NATO member and longtime ally of the United States in the region, feels snubbed, patronized, and frustrated. By dismissing the major gamble Turkey made in brokering the agreement, and by extension the unexpected success where European attempts to gain a similar compromise failed, the United States is adding yet another grievance to a long list of sensitive issues between the two nations, ranging from Israel’s recent war in Gaza to the controversy over the vote in Congress to accuse Turkey of perpetrating genocide after World War I.

Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey’s most prominent English-language daily, featured three articles discussing Turkey’s reaction to the West’s dismissal of the Tehran Declaration. The most detailed analysis of Turkey’s sentiments regarding the lack of support following the Declaration is a piece by Mustafa Akyol, aptly titled “America is unwise to dismiss the Tehran deal.”

Akyol explains that Hilary Clinton’s token praise for Turkey’s efforts came across as patronizing, and implied that the Declaration was a failure rather than, as Turkish officials termed it, a “historic” first in the nuclear discussions. Akyol also highlights an oft-ignored yet extremely relevant point: while the U.S. claims 1200kg is too little to be a relevant exchange, it was President Obama who urged the Turks to haggle for that quantity of LEU in the first place.

Dismissing or marginalizing Turkey’s efforts also belies a forgetfulness on the West’s part as to why Turkey succeeded where the West failed. Turkey, Akyol points out, has credibility in the Middle East, while the West, after two recent wars and the ever-contentious support of Israel’s right to nuclear weapons, does not. To ignore Turkey is to ignore the greatest force for negotiation in the nuclear dispute, the sole source of confidence for both sides.

An article in the Washington Post indicates there are already signs of a major shift in the relationship between Ankara and Washington as a result of the past week’s nuclear negotiations and talk of sanctions. The Post quotes a senior official in Washington as saying, “We’re always going to have important issues with Turkey that we’re going to cooperate on. But, of course, on a matter so important to us, it will inevitably have an impact on the way Americans and Congress and the president will interact with Turkey.” Such rhetoric was unthinkable even months ago; yet because Turkey is willing to stand up to its most powerful ally for its interest in maintaining regional peace and border security, Washington seems ready and willing to downgrade such a previously healthy relationship.

While the past cooperation between Turkey and the West was highly beneficial to both parties, Turkey is basing its stance regarding Iran on legitimate security and economic concerns. Geneive Abdo and Gönül Tol highlight Turkey’s numerous concerns in the event of sanctions or military attack on Iran in an article on the Huffington Post. Turkey and Iran have increased their symbiotic relationships in their energy sectors, border security, and trade. The two nations seek to increase trade to $30 billion per year this year. In the energy sector, Iran supplies much of Turkey’s natural gas and has numerous deals with Turkish companies for the transport of energy to Europe. With regards to regional security, the two nations share a border and a common enemy on their frontiers: the Kurds. In short, sanctions on Iran would significantly damage Turkey’s economy as well, and any instability resulting from a Western strike, or an insecure Iran with its back to the wall, would certainly spill over into Turkey’s border.

The choice President Obama faces is simple. He can pursue sanctions, thereby giving Iran every reason to pull out the stops in its nuclear program, and simultaneously alienating America’s most important ally in the region, Turkey, or he can live up to his promise to prioritize dialogue over threats and confrontation.

Iran Hopes Deal Will End Conflict; United States Moves Defiantly Toward UN Sanctions

insideiran — Mon, 17 May 2010 20:56:00 +0000

Shayan Ghajar

Iran’s press agencies are universally celebrating the widely reported deal between Iran, Brazil, and Turkey to hold exchanges of Iran’s enriched uranium on Turkish soil. State- owned or affiliated news services, ranging from the Islamic Republic News Agency to PressTV and Fars News, all laud the deal as an effective compromise between the West’s anxieties about Iran’s nuclear program and Iran’s insistence upon its rights according to the NPT. Iran’s exuberance also stems from the diplomatic victory the deal represents, which complicates the West’s push for sanctions by indicating, at least symbolically, and perhaps substantively,a willingness to compromise. On the other hand, reactions from Europe and the United States have been utterly dismissive, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton submitting proposals for sanctions to the U.N. Security Council Tuesday morning.

Coverage of the nuclear deal in the Iranian press has been universal and extensive, more so than any other topic in recent months, indicating that the Iranian government has placed all of its hopes in avoiding a more direct confrontation with the West.

Iran’s Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali-Akbar Salehi, stated today that the deal indicated Iran’s “good will,” and he hoped the West would react to Iran’s overtures “with wisdom.” Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said Monday that Iran expects a “positive reaction” from Western nations,Fars News reports. “Confidence should be built for all sides and we are optimistic that this will, God willing, be put into practice.”

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, speaking as if the nuclear deal had already resolved all international friction regarding Iran’s program, said, “The experience of the tripartite talks in Tehran indicates that if cooperation is based on amity and respect, problems will not arise between nations and countries.”

Iranian press services also widely covered statements made by Turkish and Brazilian leaders against sanctions in light of the new agreement. “My expectation is that after this declaration there will not be a need for sanctions,”Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said yesterday. The Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim issued a similar statement earlier, saying, “The agreement gives a guarantee to the West to continue talks and that imposing sanctions on Iran by the West has no basis anymore.”

The wording of the nuclear deal itself corroborates that making the deal was one of the major goals of Turkey, Brazil, and Iran. The signatories state their goal as the “positive interaction and cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities replacing and avoiding all kinds of confrontation.”

The Iranian government has been uncharacteristically upfront regarding its hopes that the nuclear fuel swap deal would preclude the need for sanctions. Reuters quotes Iranian Nuclear Head Salehi as explicitly stating on national television that the agreement was aimed at “stopping sanctions.” Salehi also said the nuclear deal eliminated the West’s “excuses” for calling for more sanctions by providing greater transparency and cooperation, PressTV reports. The title of the PressTV story also highlights the almost confrontational tone of Iran’s compromise: “Iran throws ball into West’s court.”

The reaction from Western powers has been entirely dismissive of the new nuclear fuel swap agreement, as sanction proposals have been submitted to the Security Council on Tuesday, the day after the deal was struck. In a press release, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs pointed out Monday that “Iran said today that it would continue its 20% enrichment, which is a direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions and which the Iranian government originally justified by pointing to the need for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.”

The Washington Post asserts that the current agreement would only concern 50% of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles, which leaves a great deal of uncertainty about the security and oversight of the other half of Iran’s enriched materiel. Moreover, the Post argues, the sanctions being discussed are a reaction to Iran’s recently revealed secret facilities, which it kept hidden from IAEA oversight.

Secretary of State Hilary Clinton has also gone on to say that Iran’s compromise will not slow sanctions. Tuesday morning, Secretary Clinton declared, “We have reached agreement on a strong draft with the cooperation of both Russia and China,” according to the New York Times. As long as Iran continues enrichment, it seems, the nuclear fuel swap agreement is not germane to American-led discussions about sanctions. Not only did the United States decline to consider the Iranian proposal, if anything, the process to sanctions seems to have sped up. Clinton also claimed to have the support of China and Russia, despite an earlier statement from China welcoming the diplomatic progress made by Turkey and Brazil as a sign negotiation, rather than confrontation, would work. Russia, on the other hand, made it clear they consider the deal inadequate.

After Turkey’s enormous efforts in negotiating the breakthrough deal, its government has expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the West’s reaction to Iran’s concession. Turkish Foreign Minster Ahmet Davutoğlu made a public statement severely castigating the West for its response to the deal. “If reaching an agreement on the swap was not important, why would we spend so much time and energy on the issue?” he asked. “This is the first indirect deal signed by Iran with the West in 30 years.” Davutoğlu’s tone was clearly one of hurt surprise. “The discussions on sanctions will spoil the atmosphere and the escalation of statements may provoke the Iranian public,” he argued. The Foreign Minister speculated that the West’s reaction was so confrontational because they hadn’t actually expected the talks to work.

It seems that Iran’s attempt to forestall or prevent efforts for sanctions from the West has come to naught. However, Iran still may declare the deal a limited victory: both Turkey and Brazil, rotating members of the U.N. Security Council, have declared openly they are entirely against sanctions, despite U.S. pressure. China, too, seems to be on the fence about sanctions, regardless of the Secretary of State’s rhetoric. The final outcome of the sanctions vote is far from definite, and it remains to be seen how debates in the Security Council will affect the votes of the member nations.

Ahmadinejad’s Speech: Confrontation or Compromise?

insideiran — Tue, 04 May 2010 19:02:49 +0000

Shayan Ghajar

Many commentators characterized Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference yesterday as “confrontational,” angry and defiant, saying Ahmadinejad used the occasion to “lash out” at the West. In almost any other speech by the controversial Iranian president, these descriptions would certainly ring true. Yesterday’s speech, however, was anything but bombastic when compared to previous rhetoric against the West. In fact, Iran viewed it as nothing short of conciliatory.

As always, Ahmadinejad’s speech has received much coverage in the Iranian press. Unusually, however, the emphasis in its coverage is focused not on criticizing the West, but rather on ways to reconcile Iran with other members of the NPT.

PressTV, Iran’s state-owned English language news service, published an interview and analysis regarding Ahmadinejad’s speech with Abolfazl Zohrevand, Deputy Head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. As the interview is featured on a state news agency, and features a high-ranking security official, it represents nothing short of an official statement, and accurately portrays the intentions of Iran’s government at the NPT conference.

Zohrevand says Iran views Ahmadinejad’s speech as a “turning point” in Iran’s approach to the NPT Conference. Ahmadinejad’s attendance, rather than that of a foreign minister, was a signal that Iran takes the NPT very seriously, says Zohrevand. Disagreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, he indicates, are a result of Iran’s frustration rather than apathy. Iran feels that “the international system has become a hierarchical system, and you see that [Western] countries consider themselves to be superior to others due to their possession of a nuclear arsenal.”

This perceived double standard formed the basis for Ahmadinejad’s speech (full transcript) to the NPT Conference. “Nuclear weapons states enjoy exclusive rights and privileges at the highest international decision-making body and in the IAEA,” Ahmadinejad argued.

Rather than intending this as an excuse to dismiss pressure from the IAEA, as in the past, Iran now seems to be trying to play to the rank-and-file members of the NPT by calling for more transparency and equality. Appealing to developing nations’ potential disenchantment with the hierarchy of international relations, Ahmadinejad said, “None of the non-nuclear states has ever been able to enjoy its inalienable and legal rights for the peaceful use of nuclear energy without facing pressures or threats.”

Zohrevand directly admits that this is an appeal for support from nations in the Non-Aligned Movement. Iran is appealing to concerns by nuclear or aspiring nuclear nations such as Brazil, Algeria and Indonesia, that are anxious about their future treatment in light of the pressures on Iran.

There are already signs that this approach may be working in Iran’s favor. Egypt, one of Iran’s regional rivals, and a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, has spoken out against the double standard in NPT implementation with regards to Israel. “If major countries wish to address Iran’s nuclear dossier, they can do that by bringing Israel and Iran to the negotiating table,” said Egypt’s ambassador to the United Nations, Maged Abdelaziz. Egypt has traditionally been a regional ally of the United States.

Indonesia, another member of the Non-Aligned Movement, and also a country that has warm relations with the United States, has made the same argument. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Raden Natalegawa, stated: “Nuclear proliferation threats, wherever their source, must be effectively addressed without discrimination and double standard on the basis of multilateralism and international law.” In an apparent jab at the United States, Natalegawa said Indonesia finds it difficult to rationalize nuclear energy cooperation with states already possessing nuclear weapons.

Marwan Bishara of Al Jazeera posits that many Non-Aligned states are responding positively to Iran’s arguments, or at least negatively to the perceived nuclear double standard. The closer a nation’s ties with the United States, Bishara argues, the less pressure it is subject to regarding proliferation despite violations of the NPT. Bishara, too, cites Israel as a significant obstacle to America’s credibility, as well as India and Pakistan’s preferential treatment relative to Iran and North Korea. Bishara argues for nuclear-free regions, especially the Middle East, as the most unbiased and productive way to promote global nuclear safety.

Ahmadinejad made one more gesture to non-Western nations and the IAEA on Monday, re-affirming Iran’s agreement with the terms of the proposed fuel swap. The fuel swap would outsource Iran’s enrichment to nations such as Russia, providing a way to ensure no nuclear material is enriched enough to be weapons-grade. “Iran had accepted the deal. Now, we announce once again that we agree with it,” Ahmadinejad emphasized.

In coming weeks it will become more apparent whether Iran has genuinely accepted a compromise, or if it simply throwing up another smokescreen.