The speculation over whether Israel will attack Iran this spring is having an unintended consequence: It’s bringing Iranian opposition groups together.

About 50 activists, including university professors, lawyers and students now living outside Iran, met on February 4th and 5th at a snow-covered retreat outside Stockholm. They were the guests of the Olof Palme International Center, a group associated with Sweden’s Social Democratic party with a long history of supporting opposition groups around the world.

I was an observer at this meeting and was struck by how factions who had been at odds for many years – from Kurds to staunch secularists to Green movement leaders – tried to reach common ground.

Most voiced opposition to a military strike against Iran, even though they all agreed that the current government should be toppled. They felt an attack would directly or indirectly harm the population, empower the regime and cause severe instability in the region when Iran retaliates.

Many here believe that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is trying to buy time in order to develop a nuclear weapon and render Iran virtually immune to an attack.

“From the regime’s point of view, there are two scenarios: Libya or North Korea and Khamenei is choosing North Korea,” said one student activist, referring to the fact that North Korean obtained nuclear weapons while Libya stopped its program.

This student expressed anxiety over whether the opposition would be able to destabilize the regime if there were a quick, isolated attack rather than a sustained military operation. “We might not have time to do anything – to mobilize. We need to start getting prepared,” he said.

The activists also agreed to work hard between now and March 2nd when parliamentary elections are held in Iran, to organize a nationwide boycott of the polls.

“We need to encourage people to stay at home that day,” said one well-known activist. A low voter turnout, the activists agreed, would send a message that Iranians do not respect the rigged, opaque electoral process. Already, a governmental body called the Guardian Council has banned many candidates from running in the elections who do not agree with the regime.

The Iranian government considers elections to be critical to convincing the world that the country is democratic. However, after the disputed presidential election in 2009, which returned President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power and sparked millions of Iranians to protest, the regime has lost legitimacy at home and abroad. The opposition hopes to use the March 2nd parliamentary elections to stage more demonstrations and convince the part of the population that still supports the regime to join their cause.

Inspired by the once severely divided Syrian opposition which faces a brutal regime, the activists believe that this first well-organized meeting will be the beginning to uniting with the opposition inside Iran. By the end of the two-day meeting, they had laughed and cried together, sharing their stories of imprisonment, torture and murder of their relatives in Iran for their political activity.

They issued a report at the end of the conference which states: “The cordial meeting was successful in building a consensus on the continuation of dialogue among (the) opposition, the necessity of a broad coalition against dictatorship and any type of discrimination and violation of human rights, achieving democracy based on the separation of religion and state and free elections in accordance with international standards.”

Perhaps it would be interesting to look at the composition of the Iranian nuclear scientist’s bodyguards. Iranian nuclear scientists are currently being protected by a division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, known as the Sepah Hefazate Ansar, Ansar Protection Corps. During my time as a political journalist and the editor of the Sokhangooyeh Do’alat, the official website for the Iranian government, I traveled around with former President Mohammad Khatami and spoke with many individuals belonging to this division. I have also conducted research on the Ansar Protection Corps. I interviewed one of the commanders of this division with the aim of publishing the conversation. However, due to security precautions, the interview was never published.

The Ansar Protection Corps is responsible for protecting the Islamic Republic’s officials. The composition of this division is decided by the country’s National Security Council. This council decides on who needs to be protected and what the level of protection should be.

The number of bodyguards allocated to an individual is a sign of his security ranking. For example, the Interior Minister may have 10 to 15 bodyguards allocated to him, but the Education Minister only has three bodyguards. Following the assassination of a few nuclear scientists, the responsibility for protection of these individuals was also given to the Ansar Protection Corps. After a government directive, the Ansar division of the IRGC was asked to allocate some of its manpower to protecting the country’s scientists.

Nevertheless, there are two reasons behind the failure of the Ansar Protection Corps to prevent the assassinations. The first reason is that the National Security Council has chosen a low level security status for the scientists, and some of these individuals only have one bodyguard. The second reason is the low aptitude of the scientists’ bodyguards. For better understanding the training level of these individuals, we only have to look at the history behind the formation of the Ansar Protection Corps.

During the early days of the Islamic Revolution and following the assassination of some Iranian officials by opposition groups, the decision was made to form a more serious structure for protecting the officials. The majority of the assassinations during those days took place by the hands of individuals who infiltrated the political parties and the Islamic Republic government’s structures. Therefore, rather than focusing on their abilities, the government officials hired bodyguards who they could completely trust. If the weapons, handed out for their protection, fell into the wrong hands, then they might have become the source of their assassinations. Eventually this structure expanded and became an official division of the IRGC.

The Ansar Protection Corps is a separate division from the Vali Amr division, which is solely responsible for protecting the Supreme Leader. Eventually the number of assassination attempts on the Iranian officials decreased and the commanders of the Ansar Protection Corps saw no need for continuing to bolster their training or increasing their manpower. There are of course tactical exercises the Ansar Corps participates in, but the composition of its members is still the same as the beginning of the Iranian Revolution.

So, year after year the ability of this division decreases. At the same time, many of these individuals were either not physically fit for their positions to begin with or became unfit due to injuries sustained during the Iran-Iraq War. Also, military and security officials saw no need to improve the protection corps since all the opposition groups responsible for carrying out assassinations on government officials eventually lost their ability to do so.

Israeli’s ability and desires make them a possible candidate for carrying out such assassinations. Currently, the violent opposition groups inside the country do not have the ability or the desire to carry out such attacks. So, even if the attacks have been carried out by Iranian opposition groups, the plan and support has been provided from a foreign source; possibly Israel.

Therefore, the recent set of assassinations of nuclear scientists is presenting a new challenge for the Iranian commanders. The bodyguards in the Ansar Protection Corps are incapable of acting fast and appropriately. Also, the possibility of replacing these individuals with able forces is not possible in a short period.

The methods of assassinations are also very different than what the military commanders have already experienced and until now they have not been able to find any clues pointing to the sources responsible. Lack of information and inability has made the decision making process very difficult for the Ansar Protection Corps.

Lastly, the location of the assassinations presents another challenge. Following the assassinations in the early days of the Revolution, many officials began to live in protected gated communities. However, no need was identified for nuclear scientists to do the same. Some attempts have been made to relocate the nuclear scientists, but these efforts have not been finalized.

Ehsan Mehrabi is a distinguished Iranian journalist who has written about the Islamic Republic’s military, parliamentary politics, and various other socio-political issues for more than a decade. He has worked as the parliamentary reporter for the reformist newspapers Etemad Meli and Tose’eh, and as a reporter and political editor for Hambastegi newspaper. During his career he has interviewed many Iranian military commanders and officials. He left Iran a few months ago.

Editor’s Note: The following article is based upon interviews conducted with Iranians living inside Iran, but written by an author outside the country. The names stated in the article are pseudonyms in order to protect the safety of those interviewed.

When Iranian state-run television was updating its viewers about the latest developments of the Occupy Wall Street movement, the EU embargoed Iran’s oil. Immediately, the rate of the Iranian currency fell; one US dollar was sold for 21,000 rials. In addition, each government- issued gold coin was sold for ten million rials. The average Iranian’s reaction to the unstable and chaotic market varied from panic to depression to anger.

Reza Javadi, a carpet seller says: “Everything is in a stagnant state. People are all afraid. You can feel the silent before a disaster about to happen. Until yesterday, I talked to people who used to say nothing has happened yet, but following the European Union’s oil sanctions, people are really afraid now.”

Negar Rouhi, author and translator, says: “Every day in my office I translate a lot of documents for university students who are racing each other to leave the country. These days, more than ever, I feel the sense of fear and distrust on their faces. They don’t want to believe that the currency crisis is serious. But with the EU sanctions, it is impossible for the price of U.S. dollar to decrease.”

Soheil, a 35- year-old supermarket owner in central Tehran, is worried about potential food shortages in the upcoming months. “The situation is hopeless. We are reverting back to the worst days of the Iran-Iraq war. I am worried everything will be rationed again. With Iran’s currency problems, the price of meat has already gone up. Given the irresponsibility of Ahmadinejad’s government, the situation will even become more dangerous.”

Zohreh Davari, a worker in a drug factory who makes $400 a month and has four children, says: “I am already feeling the shortages. I don’t care about the price of the U.S. dollar or gold. I have never bought foreign currency or gold. What makes me afraid is the food price increases. Even now with my salary, I can only afford food for my children until the middle of every month. If the prices go up and salaries stay the same, we will die.”

Where are Khamenei and Ahmadinejad?

Mansour, a 30-year-old living in Tehran is afraid and worried after receiving the news of the EU’s oil embargo. He says, “I want to know why Ahmadinejad, who always has something to say about any topic, is now silent? I am sure he is going to say that these sanctions have no impact on Iran’s economy. However, we saw today that just the news of sanctions caused the increase of prices on many products. The sanctions have not even been implemented yet. By the middle of July, these sanctions will cause us to run out of foreign exchange reserves, which will result in more serious pressure on the people. Khamenei should walk out of his house on Palestine Street and explain our fate to us in the coming days.”

Sajdeh Hosseini, a father in Tehran, has a daughter who suffers from multiple sclerosis. He is forced to spend $500 a month on medication, while his entire capital amounts to only $4,000. He says: “This is my question for Mr. Khamenei, why have you let a madman like Ahmadinejad waste the wealth of a nation? What if we become like Iraq and the Food- for- Oil program? What if medicine is sanctioned and we cannot produce medicine for the sick? What if there is a war?”

He continued: “With sanctions, poverty, and a government that knows nothing but force, the condition of our society will only get worse. We will witness more drug addicts, thieve, and depressed people in the country. I am very worried about the dark days ahead of the Iranian people. I know the regime will save its own political demise with the help of its friends, China and Russia. But, the people and the structure of the society will erode from within. At the end, no one will be held accountable just like in the days of the eight-year war and the years after.”

Iranian Facebook users from inside the country were absorbed with the news of the EU oil sanctions. Maryam, a senior student at the University of Tehran, writes about her fear of sanctions: “I am afraid that one day we will be in dire need for our most basic needs such as food and clothing. Taxis have already increased their fairs.”

Mona, who works at the Shahid Beheshti Hospital, wrote on her Facebook page: “Now, I know how the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus felt after they woke up and realized their money is worthless. The only difference is that they slept for 300 years, but we have that feeling every morning we wake up.”

Parvaneh Vahidmanesh is a journalist and researcher of Iran’s contemporary history. She often writes about human rights issues in Iran. Vahidmanesh left Iran in 2009. She currently works for Freedom House as a Program Officer in Washington DC.

The evidence of Khamenei’s belief can be found in his public speech in Qom on January 9, “The current conditions in Iran are the same as Badr and Kheybar, and not Shaab-e-Abu Talib,” Khamenei said.

According to Islamic history Shaab-e-Abu Talib is a region in Saudi Arabia, where during the early days of Islam, the Prophet Mohammad and his followers were forced to live under an economic and social blockade for three years. According to Islamic literature, the situation was so bad that “they had to tie rocks to their stomachs” in order to alleviate the pain resulting from prolonged hunger.

Similar language emerged in an unprecedented statement by Mahmoud Bahmani, head of Iran’s Central Bank, announced on December 21, 2011, “We have to manage the society in a way to survive for two years. Just like if were trapped in Shaab-e-Abu Talib.”

Khamenei dismissed the head of the Central Bank’s statements, but by recognizing the situation similar to Badr and Kheybar, he has indirectly confessed that the Islamic Republic is isolated domestically, regionally, and internationally.

However, he believes, just like the Prophet of Islam, he should face his opponents with the small army at his disposal.

The Battles of Badr and Kheybar were two important battles fought by the Prophet of Islam against the enemies of the newly-established religion. He fought the enemies, despite the small size of his army, and was victorious in both battles.

Despite the current harsh economic conditions, this history indicates Khamenei is hopeful that by adopting the policies of “patience and endurance” and “threats against threats,” he and his supporters could stand against the United States and the West.

The threats coming from Iran, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz, influencing Arab states in transition, publishing reports about capturing U.S. spies, and increasing the levels of domestic oppression are all tactics used by Iran in order to deal with the internal and external crisis.

By threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz, the clerics in Iran are hoping to force the United States and the West to take a step back. They also hope to intimidate the regional countries and demonstrate Iran’s military might in order to improve their shaky legitimacy internally.

Iran has welcomed the recent developments in the Arab world with this strategy. The Islamic Republic is trying to convince its people that the citizens of the Arab world have chosen the same path as Iranians chose thirty-two years ago.

In the meanwhile, the Islamic Republic is trying to exploit its deteriorating relationship with the United States. Iran is holding the United States responsible for the majority of its own flaws, shortcomings, and internal problems. The regime has also tried to connect the members of the opposition to Western governments in order to legitimize the harsh repression against activists fighting for change.

His devotees, only one day after the storming of the British embassy in Tehran, confessed that they were “deceived” by a seven-member council whose members belong to the student basij (affiliated with the IRGC) in Tehran universities.

After two years of silence, Hassan Alaei, former IRGC Navy Chief, in a controversial op-ed published in Ettelaat newspaper, a publication under the direct supervision of Khamenei, implicitly advised the Supreme Leader to learn from Mohammad Reza Shah, who was toppled in the 1979 Islamic revolution. Alaei suggested that the oppression of the regime’s critics should be stopped.

For more than 10 months, a great number of Khamenei’s supporters have been clearly declaring that the Supreme Leader’s personal support for Ahmadinejad was a mistake. They believe that Ahmadinejad “deviated” from the political mainstream and plans to force the clergy from the country’s power structure.

In the meantime, after the implementation of the first phase of the subsidy reform program and the recent set of sanctions, Iran’s economic situation is more dreadful than ever. According to Asadollah Asgar Oladi, the head of Chamber of Iran-China Commerce, the inflation rate is close to 40%. Asgar Oladi warns that if the situation continues during the next six months, the country may face supply shortages.

The international sanctions on Iran, imposed due to the country’s defiance of UN Security Council resolutions on its nuclear program, are expanding day by day.

After nearly six years of establishing sanctions against Iran due to its nuclear program, Fereydoun Abbasi, Head of Iran’s Atomic Energy, admitted that some Iranian nuclear scientists are not willing to cooperate with Tehran on nuclear projects due to risks of sanctions.

Despite all the internal and external problems, the Islamic Republic has reacted to the recent set of Western sanctions with the “threats against threats” strategy.

Iran’s actions and statements show us how worried the government is of internal opposition and a threat of external wars.

Contrary to what the Iranian government claims, the foundations of its legitimacy have been shaken due to the crackdown of the protesters following the 2009 presidential election. Threatening the United States and the West and repressing the people domestically is not a sign of bravery. These actions are signals of an internal fear expressed in various forms by the Islamic Republic.

Behnam Gholipour is an Iranian journalist with more than 15 years of experience. He has written for various Iranian publications such as Abrar, Tose-eh, and Etedal. Gholipour also worked as a political analyst and reporter for Radio Zamaneh. He is currently the chief editor of the Digarban website.

This council was formed abroad following the disputed 2009 presidential elections. In its statement, the Coordination Council commended that reformists and other political opposition groups  boycott  the upcoming parliamentary election in March. The statement was first published  on  January 17 on Kalameh website, an online reformist publication close to Mir Hossein Mousavi.

As reported by BBC Persian this statement declared, “Different parts of the Green Movement… have demonstrated good capacity for transforming the ninth parliamentary election into a decisive civil struggle against tyranny.”  The statement did not offer any specific means to organize or combat the ruling regime in Iran.

The Coordinating Council believes the Iranian government will use the upcoming elections to bolster its declining legitimacy. The statement adds: “The government hopes to advertise the competition between its own inner circles among various social groups. In this theatrical manner, [the government] will implement a seemingly competitive elections.”

“The authorities are trying to use all their propaganda, political, security, and police forces to force the people into participating in the elections,” the statement adds.

The statement also accuses the Iranian regime of trying to stay in power by all means. “In order to stay in power, [the Iranian government] disregards the country’s national and security interests. Therefore, it should not be surprising if until the Election Day we witness the implementation of various scenarios, which will result in the escalation of tensions and foreign threats. They [Iranian government] will use such events for propaganda purposes in order to provoke the patriotic sentiments of the people during elections.”

The Coordination Council has asked the members of the Green Movement to “play an important part in exposing the “theatrical and forced” March elections.” The statement also asks supporters to expose the government’s common scenarios designed for “fooling the people.”

In its statement, the Coordination Council of the Green Path of Hope has declared the period between February 15 until the Election Day, March 3, as an appropriate time to revitalize the protest movement in Iran. They called on all supports, especially the youth and university students, to “pursue the prospects of this movement during this time.” They have not provided any additional details.

Q: Obama recently signed the defense authorization bill that sanctions Iran’s central bank. What is the main impact on Iran’s economy and what part of the economy is affected the most?

A: When you impose sanctions, in this case sanctioning the central bank of Iran, its effectiveness depends on the follow through. How will the United States take action against anyone who deals with the central bank? This is an open question. Will the US in fact fine and sanction an entity that deals with the central bank of Iran? The answer depends on the country that defies this particular bill. If it is China, the US would be much more reluctant, but if it is a small country like Greece, yes, the US would be more likely to take action and thus make the sanction bite.

The main impact of these sanctions on Iran’s economy is the following: Basically what these sanctions do is make it very difficult for banks and other entities to deal with the Iranian central bank. The US is saying if you deal with the central bank of Iran we are going to impose fines on you, we are not going to let you come into the US market, and, of course, for most countries the US market is much more important than the Iranian market. So as a result most countries would be much more reluctant to deal with Iran. However, if they still decide to deal with Iran, they will have to hide it from the United States or they will tell Iran we will deal with you but on more preferable terms for us because of the attendant risk of a US fine.

So what this means practically is that when Iran receives monies for its oil and when it needs to issue letters of credit for its imports, these transactions will be more costly. If a country cannot pay Iran for its oil, it will say we can keep this money and do a barter deal and this will increase the cost of Iran’s imports (or reduce the value of its oil exports) and require more foreign exchange. The main impact is it will put more pressure on Iran’s foreign exchange both on the side of revenues and the side of expenditures and so it will squeeze Iran’s foreign exchange reserves. That will be the major effect.

Q: According to reports inside Iran, Iran’s currency has dropped 10 percent in a span of a day or two. What is the reason behind the sudden depreciation of the rial?

A: Let me back up a bit. If you look back over last two years, the rial has depreciated almost 100 percent. Iran is its own worst enemy. The main reason Iran is in this dire economic situation is Iran’s economic policies, which I should list. Iranian economic mismanagement is very sad. Iran does not have good economic institutions, such as the rule of law, to give people confidence to invest in Iran.

The Iranian government controls the markets, so that markets are not free, such as the labor market, financial markets and some of the goods markets. And also much of Iran’s GDP is controlled by the government and semi-government entities; for example, one of the major economic entities in Iran are the foundations, which basically undo some of the government’s economic policies. Corruption is pervasive throughout the economy. Also macroeconomic polices are inconsistent and inappropriate. The president wakes up in the morning and declares what the interest rate should be. You just cannot dictate interest rates because many things affect interest rates. Those things cannot be changed over night.

However, it is undeniable that sanctions have had an impact. These sanctions much more recently – the financial sanctions –have had an impact. I think the depreciation is worse than 10 percent. People are losing faith in the Iranian economy and in Iran’s ability to redeem rials for dollars. They want to take money out because of bad policies and sanctions. They realize that the rial could plunge much more and that they might not be able to get much for their rials. So it is the beginning of a financial panic, and when a financial panic starts the sky is the limit. I do not know where the Iranian rial will end up. No one can answer that question. What we have seen could be a blip in what may follow and the rial could go into a free fall.

Q: What is the reason for the government’s inaction in dealing with the currency depreciation? Is there a segment of the population, which benefits from the economic turmoil?

A: The classic way a government would try to stop the outflow of financial resources is to increase interest rates. But this has been tried in European countries and what you have to do is increase overnight interest rates dramatically to 40 or 50 percent and adopt other harsh policies to restore financial order. Iran cannot do that because this will increase all prices, especially of imports, overnight and people will panic more and it might in fact backfire both financially and politically.

Another point is that Iran is of course an Islamic country and it would look bad if interest rates were jacked up to 50 percent just to stop the outflow of funds. But as I said earlier, this could backfire for the government because the price of goods are going up, increasing inflation, fueling inflationary expectation and encouraging hoarding even more. I do not know if the government is capable of managing what may follow.

So, I believe Iran is at the beginning of a very difficult financial and economic cycle. Iran cannot say the sanctions are hurting and this is why they have turned it into another issue, which is the Strait of Hormuz. By its military rhetoric, the Ahmadinejad government is trying to divert attention from its economic failures and the effect of sanctions.

Q: What are the immediate economic challenges for the government in the next six months?

A: I think first and foremost inflation is going to pick up. Interest rates will go up whether the government likes it or not and there will be much more hoarding of imported goods that will be a hedge against further rial depreciation.

All these things are going to put further pressure on Iran’s foreign exchange reserves. Iran has to persuade Iranians living inside and abroad that the government has enough foreign exchange to redeem rials for dollars and they are going to keep the exchange rate within a certain rate. I am not sure if they are in a position to do that. Once the market loses faith in Iran’s central bank ability to be able to redeem rails for dollars, I have no idea where the exchange rate will go. I think the danger for Iran is that a truly financial panic will set in. Such panic may cause the exchange rate to change really dramatically every day. Exchange instability and depreciation of the rial will become Iran’s financial problem and this will in turn affect the real economy, adversely affecting economic activity for some years to come.

Q: Can Iran survive the sanctions?

A: Iran’s economic policies have been a mess for many years and you cannot achieve an economic turnaround overnight; it will take time. Iran needs fundamental economic reforms. The only way I see that it will get relief is if the sanctions are rescinded by the United States and if something occurs such as a country like China helps Iran out of its mess. In other words, a miracle! So I do not see any way Iran can avoid this short-run economic turmoil. There needs to be rational, fundamental reforms that they will stick to, which will in turn give the market confidence. It will take political courage and change economic policies. There is no quick fix.

Q: Do you think the overall policy of the United States sanctioning Iran has so far been successful?

A: From the Iranian perspective, and in fact from a humanitarian perspective, what happened during the Iran-Iraq war was wrong. It was a mistake for the United States and a number of European countries to support Iraq, especially with outlawed chemical weapons. Understandably, Iranians do not want to be so vulnerable again. This is why the Iranian people support the government’s policies to develop Iran’s nuclear capabilities. For sanctions to have a better chance of success, you want the broad citizenry to favor a change in the policy targeted by sanctions. The United States has made a mistake. It picked the wrong policy (to be changed by the regime in Tehran).

The nuclear issue is a popular policy. What the United States should say is we are going to impose sanctions until you hold free elections, respect human rights….This would have much force within Iran and with a change in regime, then the nuclear issue could be better resolved. The issue the US has picked (the nuclear issue) will not rally the people against the regime. Sanctions are aimed at hurting the government and forcing the regime to change its policies, or squeezing the average citizen to turn against the regime. It hurts the average person. This is sad, but inevitable, fallout of sanctions that cannot be helped.

While they refuse to use the term “election boycott,” they recognize that participating in elections is in effect useless, which is essentially a boycott. Therefore, we can predict that the regime will be faced with an electoral crisis. History has shown that widespread voter turnout is important to the regime; Iran’s leaders believe great voter participation lends legitimacy to the elections, which as neither fair nor transparent.

We have long witnessed the confrontation between the reformist and principlist (conservatives) fronts in the political structure of the Islamic Republic. This confrontation is a revisionist conflict between the people in support of the status quo and individuals arguing for reforms. The reformists were removed from politics after the fraudulent 2009 presidential election due to the solutions they presented to bringing about positive change in Iran. They proposed ideas, such as détente with America, an open economy, human rights, and the accountability of the Supreme Leader. However, these proposals were not acceptable to the principlists.

After the reformist front was completely removed from the equation, the principlists fractured into three groups: those who supported President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; traditional Principlists led by hardline Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi; and those led by Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani.

Ahmadinejad is aware of the deep hatred of the traditional principlists toward him. If his faction can win the upcoming parliamentary elections, he can be hopeful that his camp could do well in the future presidential elections in 2013. A dominant presence in the parliament would ensure that the traditional conservatives would not take revenge upon him.

The disagreement between ayatollahs Mahdavi Kani and Mesbah Yazdi is over their attempt to control the parliament and potentially the presidency through their supporters. However, more importantly, their difference lies in their attempt to secure a position for themselves as the next Supreme Leader after the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. They both believe they are qualified and worthy of this position. Mahdavi Kani and Mesbah Yazdi are both senior members of the Assembly of Experts.

The principlists want to preserve the status quo. The challenge for the principlists is how to achieve this without addressing several political and economic crises facing the country. The answer has three components: force, wealth, and deception. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp is their tool for applying force. The bazaar is a tool under their control for managing wealth, and the clergy is used for deception. Fundamentally, the power structure in Iran is based on these three pillars. In the 2005 presidential election, when the principlists and reformists faced off, Ahmadinejad was victorious because he succeeded in capturing the support of these three groups.

In the fight amongst the principlist factions, Ahmadinejad has left the circle of traditional principlists due to the fact that he has lost the support of two important components; the clergy and the IRGC no longer support him. Since he is still in charge of the executive branch, he has access to petroleum revenues, but his support among the Bazaaris is also dwindling.

Therefore, among the prominent politicians vying for power, the Larijani family and their circle of supporters are the best possible option for taking over the parliament. The Larijani family and their supporters have the most connections with the three pillars of politics. As the son of an influential cleric, Ali Larijani enjoys a great relationship with the Bazaar, and he was also a senior member of the IRGC. The Larijani family is also close to Khamenei.

Ali Larijani and Sadegh Larijani are in charge of the Iranian Judicial and Legislative branches of the government, respectively. Another Larijani brother also holds influential positions in the government. Some call them the Iranian Kennedys, even though they do not possess the degree of prestige the Kennedy family has enjoyed in the United States. We should not forget that Ali Larijani was also presidential candidate in 2005, and lost the election.

Khamenei’s favorite list for the parliamentary elections, which Mahdavi Kani has been chosen to structure, possesses the aforementioned components –the clergy, IRGC, and Bazaar. Constructing such a list of candidates will not be possible unless the Guardian Council disqualifies candidates and steals the election. Therefore, what is likely to happen should be called “selections” and not elections.

It is clear that when the government chooses to ignore the crises facing the country and follows the path of tyranny, the level of participation among the people decreases. The despotic government is therefore forced to steal the elections and stage a cover-up. The 2009 presidential election was one example of this phenomenon. The upcoming parliamentary polls in March are likely to be another example of authoritarianism triumphing over free elections.

Hossein Alizadeh is the former Iranian charge d’affaires at the Iranian embassy in Finland. He resigned after the contested 2009 presidential election.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, one of the greatest failures of the country’s leadership has been the inability to make a promised transition from a monarchy to republican rule. In fact, since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei began his tenure as Supreme Leader twenty-two years ago, he has centralized power further in his own hands, creating what can be called a clerical monarchy.

Now, Khamenei may be completing the circle and entirely eliminating any notion of a “republic” by turning Iran into a fully blown theocratic and authoritarian state.

Last month, Khamenei made a short statement, which has sparked an intense debate. The 72-year-old Iranian leader hinted at the possibility of dissolving the post of president, one of only two institutions in which the populace has a say.

During a visit to Kermanshah, a western Iranian province, Khamenei announced, “In the country’s current political system, there is a president who is directly elected by the people. This is a good and an effective method. However, if someday in the distant future, it is decided that the parliamentary system is a better way to elect the head of the executive branch, there is nothing wrong with changing the current mechanism.”

So why has the Supreme Leader decided to suggest eliminating the position of the presidency in Iran? What does he have to gain from this dramatic political shift? The most obvious explanation is his determination not to repeat the disputed 2009 election and its aftermath. Elections in Iran historically have offered the population rare opportunities to express their grievances with the regime. The protests in 2009 and 2010, which drew millions of Iranians to the streets, not only seriously threatened Khamenei’s ability to govern, but exposed his unpopularity.

In recent years, beginning with the victorious election in 1997 of Mohammad Khatami to the presidency – an outcome conservatives and hardliners did not expect or want – the regime has faced a dilemma over whether the benefits of elections outweigh the costs. The presidential and parliamentary elections – the two polls in which a sizeable number of the electorate are allowed to participate – provide a façade that the country is somewhat of a republic, even though a body called the Guardian Council vets candidates long before voters ever get to the polls.

But the 2009 election and its aftermath inspired a poplar rebellion unprecedented in Iran’s post-revolutionary history. And now that uprisings have swept the Arab world, it is not surprising that Khamenei is so worried about public reaction to Iran’s scheduled 2013 presidential poll that he prefers to eliminate it entirely.

In addition, electoral seasons in Iran inspire some degree of euphoria within society. It is often a time of lively public debate over politics, women’s limited rights in Iran, the economy and Iran’s place in the world, which generally produces widespread criticism of the regime. Khamenei might believe now that the regime is too weak to withstand such intense public scrutiny.

Should Khamenei eliminate the post of president and instead create a parliamentary system, the power to govern would be even more concentrated in the office of the Supreme Leader and this has been Khamenei’s long-term objective.

In recent years, he has moved to acquire influence over three central branches of government. He effectively controls the judicial branch of the government by personally choosing its head. He maintains control over the legislative branch through the supervisory power given to the Guardian Council. This council consists of 12 jurists who determine the compatibility with the Shari’a (Islamic law) with the laws passed by the Parliament. If the laws do not pass the necessary requirements, the Council refers them back to the Parliament for revision. This effective veto power gives the council the de facto role of a parliamentary upper chamber. Six individuals on this 12-member body are directly elected by the Supreme Leader and the other half by the parliament from the jurists nominated by the head of the judiciary.

Khamenei will further control the legislative branch with the recent approval of the “Parliamentary Supervision over Members of Parliament” bill. On Tuesday, September 27, the Iranian Parliament approved Article 4 of the “Parliamentary Supervision over Members of Parliament” bill, which specifies a method for Parliament to expel certain MPs from the body. Based on one of the provisions in this bill, if the Council of Supervision votes to expel a certain member, he or she is not able to file a legal objection through the judicial system. The bill completely removes the legal immunity of members of the parliament in fulfilling their role as representatives.

This provides Khamenei or his aides with the ability to eliminate any parliamentary member deemed to be a trouble maker. By eliminating the position of the presidency, the Supreme Leader effectively dissolves a semi-independent branch of the government whose head is directly chosen by the people, after the Guardian Council vets the candidates seeking to run in the election.

It appears that discussion about eliminating the position of the president has been underway for a few months. According to Fars News, a semi-official news agency, a powerful deputy in the parliament, Mohammad Dehghan, revealed that the office of the Supreme Leader had assigned a group of legal experts to study the feasibility of a shift in the political structure of the country.

According to Dehghan, “This team has studied tens of articles in the constitution and they have identified some issues.” Dehghan reiterated that this team has been functioning under the supervision of the Office of the Supreme Leader and their findings have been sent to that office. Dehghan is referring to the constitutional articles related to the executive branch of the government.

There are many regime insiders who are worried about the future identity of the Islamic Republic. According to Aftab News, on October 25, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Head of the Expediency Council, protested the possibility of eliminating the presidency in Iran. He warned that the decision will further restrict the political environment and cautioned that this decision would “be contrary to the Constitution and would weaken the people’s power of choice.”

According to Rafsanjani’s official website, “Republicanism and Islamism are the two unalterable elements of the Islamic Republic,” and changing these pillars will ultimately alter the nature of the regime.

Grand Ayatollah Mousavi Ardabili, an important marja’ (source of emulation for Shiite Muslims) who is close to Iran’s opposition movement, also criticized such a possible move. In a meeting with a group of journalists, the Grand Ayatollah said, “Changing the political system and selecting the president [or prime minister] by the parliament will decrease people’s participation [in the national affairs of the state].”

Whether or not Khamenei decides to eliminate the presidency, there is little doubt he will continue to consolidate more power in his office. These days, the words of the late Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri ring more true than ever. Following the regime’s intense crackdown on political opposition in 2009, Montazeri declared that “The Islamic Republic is neither Islamic nor a Republic.”

Mohammad Dehghan, a member of the Iranian parliament’s leadership board, announced that it is possible there will be no presidential election in 2013, which would significantly alter Iran’s political structure.  He made these comments in response to the Supreme Leader’s recent statement about a potential shift from an executive presidency to a parliamentary system of government.

In mid-October, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei spoke about the government’s decision in 1989 to abolish the position of the Prime Minister and how the possibility of altering the current structure of the executive branch still exists.

During his visit to Kermanshah, a western Iranian province, Khamenei announced, “in the country’s current political system there is a president who is directly elected by the people. This is a good and an effective method. However, if someday in the distant future, it is decided that the parliamentary system is a better way to elect the head of the executive branch, there is nothing wrong with changing the current mechanism.”

The Supreme Leader’s statements have sparked an intense debate among various political figures in Iran. The time table, feasibility of the plan, and its potential implications are topics of intense discussion and a cause of concern for many Iranian policy makers.

According to BBC Persian, on October 29, Mohammad Dehghan stated that the timing of this decision depends on the Supreme Leader’s opinion. He added, “after the 9^th parliamentary elections in 2012, if the Supreme Leader declares that the constitution must be reviewed,  we could do so, and finish the job by holding a referendum.”

According to Dehghan, a committee selected by Khamenei will be tasked with reviewing the Constitution and the decision will be made after holding a public referendum.

The time frame of the potential changes is a contentious issue. Hamid Reza Katouzian, a member of the parliament, recently predicted that the changes could take place during the next few years, while others emphasize the words “distant future” in Khamenei’s remarks and argue for more deliberations.

According to BBC Persian, Mohsen Gharouyan, a political theorist whose analysis is often approved by Khamenei, has also made comments supporting the idea of abolishing the post of president by 2013. Mohamad Dehghan has declared that during the same time frame the role of the Expediency Council and a potential dissolution of this body could be reviewed as well.

According to Aftab News, on October 25, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Head of the Expediency Council, protested the possibility of restricting the political system and warned that this decision would “be contrary to the Constitution and would weaken the people’s power of choice.”

According to Rafsanjani’s official website, “Republicanism and Islamism are the two unalterable elements of the Islamic Republic,” and changing these pillars will ultimately alter the nature of the regime.

Other political institutions in the country have also weighed in on the potential change in the country’s political structure. According to Fars News, on Oct. 29, Guardians Council spokesman Abbas Ali Kadkhodaei said that a change from a presidential to a parliamentary system “would not in any way undermine the republican character” of the Islamic Republic.

Ali Larijani has also declared his support for the plan by stating, “the president could be elected by the parliament. Just like how the Supreme Leader is indirectly elected by the people via the Assembly of Experts.”

In an interview with Mehr News, a semi-official news agency, on October 22, Larijani added, “When the president is chosen by the parliament, the parliament can work with him more comfortably and some of his powers could be limited.”

According to the first constitution of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the post of the Prime Minster was deemed necessary in the structure of the government. However, due to many disagreements between the president at that time, Ali Khamenei, and the Prime Minster, Mir Hossein Mousavi, the decision was made to abolish the position of the Prime Minster in 1989 by amending the constitution.

Despite the deceptive brevity of his words, Khamenei’s statement is in actuality an extremely significant threat against the pro-Ahmadinejad faction. Ahmadinejad and his supporters have been targeted and marginalized for repeatedly pushing against the Supreme Leader’s directives and supporters, as well as espousing what the traditional conservatives in Iran’s government consider to be heterodox views on Iranian history, Islam, and social norms. The constant rebelliousness has convinced Khamenei that even the highly circumscribed powers of the presidency are too much to share, and that the stability of the government is compromised if the presidency struggles against the Supreme Leader.

In the context of such a heated and fractious political climate, the Supreme Leader’s comment carries great implications and is by no means empty hypothesizing or idle discourse. Rather, the Islamic Republic–already plagued by criticism surrounding the contentious and disputed elections of 2009 and the rigorous vetting procedures that ensure only pro-regime candidates are allowed to run–may well be taking yet another step away from its stunted democratic institutions.

Weeks before Khamenei’s statement, anti-Ahmadinejad MPs were already discussing the feasibility of switching to a parliamentary-based system with a prime minister. This system would favor traditional conservatives and Khamenei loyalists, who currently form a significant majority in the legislative branch. Parliamentary Deputy Hamid-Reza Katouzian stated on September 20, almost a month before Khamenei’s comment, that “some [prominent] political analysts are pondering the lack of necessity for a president in a country like Iran blessed with velayat-e faqih (supreme clerical rule) and a great leader [like Ayatollah Khamenei].”

Arguing for a system whereby parliament would be more dominant than the executive, Katouzian noted that the idea is “currently under debate by members of parliament who have a greater political clout.” Katouzian firmly believed the plan to be feasible, saying, “If representatives have greater supervisory authority on this arrangement then the idea will without doubt have a positive impact on the country.”

Following Khamenei’s astounding assertion that the presidency could easily be switched to a parliamentary system, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani–himself an inveterate foe of Ahmadinejad–expressed support for the idea. Larijani claimed that constant parliamentary oversight would ensure no executive could gather too much power, and that the system could promise greater efficiency by consolidating and coordinating the legislative and executive branches.

Khamenei’s faction has repeatedly thwarted all attempts by the president and his supporters to build or maintain political momentum. Iran’s legislative branch constantly threatens investigations of the president’s actions and those of his associates, while the judicial branch has pursued a $2.6 billion corruption case against officials and businessmen very close to the president’s innermost circle.

Presidential elections loom in 2013, and parliamentary elections arrive even sooner, providing more urgency to an already fierce battle. Ahmadinejad’s faction will seek to muster support and make gains against Khamenei’s faction. However, the repeated discussion of the abolition of the presidency is certainly intended at least in part to be a signal to Ahmadinejad from the Khamenei loyalists, saying that they would rather completely alter Iran’s governmental structure than endure another presidency like his.

Voicing concerns about the removal of one of the Islamic Republic’s most important offices, former president Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani made a public statement against the idea, saying it would “be contrary to the Constitution and would weaken the people’s power of choice.” The fact that Rafsanjani is concerned enough to speak out against the idea of removing the presidency indicates more than ever that within Iran’s elite circles, Khamenei’s statement was taken less as a passing threat against Ahmadinejad and more as a potentially serious idea.

Nevertheless, at this point the only person with a degree of certainty as to the ultimate fate of the executive branch is the Supreme Leader himself.