insideIRAN » Foreign Relations

Turkey’s Warm Ties with Iran: A Brief History

insideiran — Wed, 17 Mar 2010 14:10:06 +0000

Gonul Tol

WASHINGTON—The 1990s were marked by hostile relations between Iran and Turkey, which was the direct outcome of Turkish foreign policy elite’s conviction that Iran was supporting the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and had a campaign to export Islamic revolution to Turkey.

Iran was perceived as posing an existential threat to the survival of the organizing ideology of the state, secularism, and the territorial integrity of the country. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, there has been a notable softening in Turkey’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran. Since it came to power in 2002, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has adopted a new policy approach, which aims to minimize the problems in Turkey’s neighboring regions and develop political and economic relations to foster peace and stability in the region. Under the current government, the trade between Turkey and Iran has increased more than six-fold, hitting $7.5 billion in 2007.

Bilateral relations have flourished on the political front as well. Turkey is playing a facilitator role between Iran and 5+1—the permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany. In November 2009, Iranian and Turkish officials held talks on a proposal put forward by Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for Iran’s uranium to be sent to Turkey for temporary safekeeping. In late December 2009, after Iran previously stated that it would only accept a nuclear exchange with the West on its own territory, Manouchehr Mottaki, Iran’s foreign minister, stated that Iran would be willing to swap nuclear material with the West in Turkey as a counteroffer to the UN-drafted deal.

The change in Turkey’s foreign policy toward Iran is due to political transformation that has been taking place in Turkey, mainly as a result of the European Union accession process. Turkey has been going through a process of democratization, which accelerated after Turkey’s official recognition as a candidate country by the European Union in 1999. This reform process initiated changes in Turkey’s national security priorities and a shift from bureaucratic-authoritarian tradition of the 1990s to civilian and societal foreign policymaking.

Turkey’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran in the 1990s was directly tied to security concerns, which identified Kurdish irredentism and political Islam as the main threats Turkey was facing. Turkish foreign policymakers held Iran responsible for giving support to Kurdish separatists and Islamist groups. The European Union accession process and concomitant steps toward democratization at the domestic level have triggered a change in perceptions through which securitized issues such as minority rights start to be downplayed. Since 1999, there have been more open discussions on Kurdish rights, which had previously been perceived as a threat to the state. In 2009, the ruling Justice and Development Party announced a new initiative to give more rights and freedoms to the country’s Kurdish citizens, further signaling the changing political climate in Turkey.

The prospect of EU membership also has transformed the civil-military relations, giving the former the upper hand in foreign policymaking. The reforms undertaken since 1999 shifted the balance of power in the National Security Council (MGK) in favor of civilian members. A civilian secretary general was appointed for the MGK and the Turkish Armed Forces were brought under the complete judicial control of the Court of Accounts. These changes promoted a decline in the role of the military in the securitization of political issues, paving the way for narrowing the range of “others” both at domestic and international levels and redefining friends and enemies in the region. Within this redefinition, Iran no longer poses a threat to Turkey but is considered as an important regional actor that should be engaged rather than isolated.

The Turkish establishment’s representation of Iran in the 1990s was tainted by its tendency to see all Islamists and Kurds as “others” in domestic politics. The EU membership process and the accompanying democratization have altered the established understandings of national security and the place Islam and ethnic minorities occupy within this understanding. As Turkey finds a new modus vivendi between the previously excluded segments of its socio-political mosaic, Turkish foreign policy has become less defensive, thus more confident. Within this new foreign policy paradigm, past hostilities have given way to strategic partnerships, changing the strategic landscape of the region. Turkey is not the Turkey of the 1990s. With its new foreign policy vision and the friends it has made in the region in the past decade, Turkey is more crucial to U.S. interests than ever. Turkey-Iran rapprochement should be seen from this view—not as a threat, but an opportunity.

Dr. Gonul Tol is Director of Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC.

Iran: Sanction, or Not?

insideiran — Tue, 12 Jan 2010 22:15:19 +0000

Hossein Askari

WASHINGTON—Absent a miraculous turnaround on the part of the regime in Tehran, President Obama is poised to tighten the screws on Iran. Not only has Tehran reneged on a deal it tentatively accepted in Geneva, it has said that it intends to construct ten more secret enrichment sites and that it would abandon its nuclear drive only when the United States and its allies do the same.

Obama should stop reaching out to Tehran for a nuclear agreement. The regime will not, and cannot, deliver what it promises, because there is no general agreement in Tehran on how to proceed with the relations with the United States. The regime has lost its religious legitimacy and is on its way out, although that could still take some time.

Obama should support the aspirations of the Iranian people and negotiate with a legitimate government once it emerges. The only viable option for Obama is economic sanctions and related initiatives—weakening the Tehran regime without interfering in Iran’s internal struggle.

The route of sanctions requires the administration to consider three broad questions. First, what sanctions could weaken the Iranian economy, when sanctions largely have failed over the past thirty years? Second, would sanctions merely hurt the Iranian people and turn them against the United States? Third, even if the Iranian economy is impaired, or, even better, if the financial wellbeing of regime insiders is threatened, will the regime be toppled? The first two questions are largely economic, and the third requires familiarity with the social and political fabric of today’s Iran.

Yes, sanctions so far have failed to impair the Iranian economy. Iran can still sell its oil, and buy most of what it needs, albeit at a slightly higher price. The only sanctions that have been somewhat effective are those spearheaded by the U.S. Treasury; these essentially aim to cut off Iran from the global financial system. But there is much more that can be done along these lines if the U.S. Treasury is given a free hand and gets presidential backing in lobbying U.S. allies.

The central bank of Iran could be sanctioned. European allies, the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, and Malaysia could be compelled to terminate all financial transactions with Iran; and, as a specific strategy of cutting off business with Iran, all significant (say over $1,000,000) bank and investment accounts of Iranian officials and Iranian citizens living in Iran could be frozen around the world—to be unfrozen only once the protestors demands are met or the regime is overthrown.

Commercial banks around the world already are increasingly reluctant to do business with Iran, because they have seen the record fines recently imposed on Credit Suisse by the United States for defying U.S. sanctions. Europe and the countries in the Persian Gulf increasingly are afraid of an emerging regime controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. Cutting off the central bank and all Iranian banks basically would increase the cost of Iranian imports, because Iran could not use letters of credit, but rather would have to rely either on cash to buy what it needs or on barter deals. The cost of trade would soar. This would, in time, cripple the Iranian economy and demonize the regime.

Many are recommending the adoption of financial sanctions—the freezing of accounts—on only the Revolutionary Guards. This would do little. This initiative would only affect senior members of the Guards. More importantly, the Guards could have bank accounts under assumed names or may have access to the accounts of regime supporters. Freezing bank accounts, not only those belonging to Guards and key regime figures but also those of all rich Iranian merchants and businessmen living in Iran, would threaten the financial interests of all who benefit from and support the regime. The bazaar strike was the key catalyst to toppling the regime during the 1979 revolution. Some would once again turn against the regime to regain access to their financial accounts.

While it would be best to have these financial initiatives adopted on a multilateral basis by the United Nations Security Council, the U.S. administration could immediately and unilaterally adopt them, with follow-up at the UN.

Simultaneously, and in addition to sanctions, there are targeted U.S. initiatives that could further threaten regime insiders and supporters and that would, in time, damage Iran’s economy. The U.S. Treasury could spark a panic by motivating Iranians, as well as expatriates residing in the United States and worldwide, to liquidate their assets in Iran and to withdraw their money from Iran by enforcing existing U.S. laws that call for the payment of taxes on all foreign sources of income and the prohibition of investments in Iran (requiring a license from the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control).

The U.S. Treasury could give individuals an amnesty from prosecution and from loss of permanent resident status, say for six months, if holdings are declared, taxes paid, and funds repatriated (ironically this also requires a license from the Treasury). Such an announcement would spark a panic, not only within the expatriate Iranian community, but also in Iran. The wealthy would rush to liquidate their assets in Iran and take their money out, fearing a collapse in asset prices and in the value of the rial. The regime would have no choice but to block the outflow of funds from Iran; the black market exchange rate would jump; import prices and eventually inflation would soar.

All these measures—the various financial sanctions and initiatives—should be simultaneously adopted in order to have the maximum effect; adopting them one by one would not inflict the needed level of pain on the regime and its supporters.

Some, especially Iranian Americans, have counseled against any tightening of the sanctions, or indeed any added pressures on Iran, because Iran’s economy and internal conditions are so fragile that further economic pressures, they predict, would impose unbearable pain on average Iranians. There are a number of answers to this. First, the primary impact of the above initiatives would be on regime insiders and their backers in the bazaar (frozen bank accounts, decline in asset prices and in the value of the rial) and not on average Iranians; many will abandon the regime as their wealth is threatened; and they may join the opposition to get their financial accounts returned and business interests restored.

Second, the impact on the average Iranian would be through higher food prices and the elimination of food subsidies; although this will cause short-term hardship, it would also erode support for the regime among the poor—something the regime would try to avoid. Thus, the poor may not be affected, and if they are affected, it would speed up the regime’s downfall.

While I have advocated focused enhanced sanctions and policies to bring economic pain on the regime and its backers since the June 12 elections, some legitimately ask: Would economic collapse necessarily lead to regime collapse? This question cannot be answered either way with certainty. But in my opinion, these measures would speed up the overthrow of the Tehran regime. Regime members will fight each other to save their ill-gotten financial gains; wealthy businessmen will turn against the regime and potentially go on strike, as they did in 1979; average Iranians would turn against a regime that cannot even deliver on the bare necessities of life. The goals and reasons for new sanctions, if adopted, should be explained in detail by President Obama to the Iranian people. This would go along way in assuring Iranians that the United States is acting in support of their long-term interests.

Hossein Askari is the Iran Professor of International Business and International Affairs at the George Washington University.

Iran Tries to Stop Protests in Europe by Threatening Dissidents Living Abroad

insideiran — Tue, 01 Dec 2009 14:02:09 +0000

Keyhan Kasravi

BERLIN—Widespread protests against the disputed June 12 presidential election are not limited to large cities in Iran. Many dissidents around the world use every tool available to cast doubt on the legitimacy of Iran’s government.

The Iranian government, fully aware of the effectiveness of these protests, tried to reduce the reach and the range of these demonstrations by making threats and terrorizing dissidents and protestors living outside Iran.

In mid-October, a documentary was aired on Panorama, a program on the German ARD channel, which showed the Iranian government identifying dissidents in major cities in Germany, including Hamburg and Berlin.

Manfred Muck, a senior security official in Hamburg, was featured in this documentary. Muck said the Iranian government was trying to take advantage of its security forces outside Iran to identify dissidents and pressure them. According to this security official, the Iranian government has repeatedly asked the German government to take measures limiting the scope of these protests. This obviously meant violating the right to free speech and assembly.

What is most important to these dissidents is the safety of their families inside Iran, who are often harassed by the government. In order to remain anonymous, many protestors covered their faces, even though doing so is against German law. The German government made an exception and allowed them to cover their faces. If identified, the government could prevent them from entering the country. Sometimes, the Iranian government forces some dissidents to cooperate with them by showing them pictures and proof of their anti-government activities abroad.

Tracking dissidents is not only limited to identifying them in protests. Iranian security forces monitor the activities of Iranians on social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter. After the election, these activities caused many problems for a number of Iranians trying to return to the country.

Sending threatening letters, disrupting Internet access, and eavesdropping on phone conversations of dissidents are among the many strategies taken by government security forces stationed abroad. They are trying to send a signal to dissidents that the government is always monitoring their actions and will try to prevent their political activities.

The Panorama television documentary, which was aired on Persian networks and Iranian social sites, caught the attention of many Iranians. Many articles were published condemning the information-gathering methods of the government.

A few weeks later, on November 5, the pro-government Fars news agency, which has close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and the state-run IRNA news agency published a story that confirmed these suspicions. They even went further by claiming that dissidents inside and outside Iran will be identified and dealt with at the right time. IRNA and Fars quoted IRGC Brigadier General Masoud Jazayeri, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an interview with Kayhan on the eve of November 4, Jazayeri called the supporters of the Green Movement abroad “foreign extensions of a soft coup” and said, “So far, a large number of the infantry of the enemy has been identified. The Islamic Republic will not allow the extensions of a soft coup to act on another sedition and if necessary, the government will make them face serious challenges.”

These threats failed to prevent the masses from participating in the November 4 demonstrations in support of the opposition movement, but making such threats was unprecedented in recent years. So far, no Iranian military official has threatened the dissidents in such a tone.

But there is a precedent in post-revolution Iran for the government to monitor, if not assassinate, activists outside Iran. In the years following the Islamic revolution, several dissidents were assassinated in Western countries. This chain of terror began with the assassination of Shahpor Bakhtiar, the Shah’s last prime minister, in Paris, and continued with the assassination of Abdurrahman Qasemlou, the leader of the Kordestan Democratic Party, in Vienna, and ended with the assassination of four Kordestan Democratic Party activists in Berlin. This led to a period of tense relations with Europe in the 1990s.

Now, in reaction to these threats made by the IRGC, the network of young Iranians in Berlin in charge of organizing many demonstrations wrote a letter to the German Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the European Parliament, and asked all European governments to take these threats seriously and ask the Iranian government for clarification on threats to commit crimes on European soil.

Despite the government’s tireless efforts to threaten dissidents abroad, evidence shows that such threats do not have a real impact on the scope of the protests.

Keyhan Kasravi is an Iranian activist living in exile in Berlin.

Iran and Iraq: A Marriage of Convenience in the New Middle East

insideiran — Thu, 08 Oct 2009 19:17:03 +0000

Jasim Husain Ali

TEHRAN/BAGHDAD—Iran wields a great deal of influence in Iraq, extending beyond their long common border, for two primary reasons: both countries have few friends in the region, and they reap great benefits from their close relationship.

Evidence of the rewards for both sides abounds: Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad paid an official visit to Iraq in 2008. He ended his trip with a $1 billion loan offer. Unlike numerous neighboring countries, Iran maintains a full-fledged embassy in Baghdad, plus several consulates, the latest of which opened in Najaf in September. Iran also has kept its diplomatic mission in Baghdad open, notwithstanding the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and repeated attacks by Iraqi insurgents.

One of the primary ways Iraq benefits is from the influx of millions of Iranian pilgrims to the holy Shiite shrines in Najaf, Karbala, Baghdad, and Samarra. As part of a deal between the two countries, hundreds of Iranian pilgrims are allowed to enter Iraq weekly to visit the holy shrines. Iranian pilgrims, some of whom speak Arabic, find at the Iraqi Shiite shrines a means of spreading Shiite teachings in a society that lived through restricted religious freedoms during Saddam Hussein’s rule, particularly constraints on the Shiite population.

In addition, Iranian consumer products are widely available in Iraq, particularly in the religious cities of Najaf and Karbala. Again, the availability of Iranian products partly provides economic opportunities for Iraq, which is short of all sorts of goods following years of economic hardships and boycotts. However, not all Iraqi officials are pleased with the availability of Iranian products due to security risks. A top Iraqi official told me when I visited Iraq in September, as part of a Bahraini delegation, that he found little sense for the imports of dairy products from Iran into Iraq—even though there is a shortage for such products inside Iraq. He feared that Iraqis would become dependent on the dairy products and then one day Iran might decide to restrict the supply.

Considering Iraq’s hostile relations with its other neighbors, it is not surprising that Iraq needs Iran. For example, Syria is accused of failing to control its borders from the flow of militants into Iraq. Also, Damascus serves as a refuge for Iraqi Baathists, who fled the country following the fall of Saddam Hussein. When our delegation met on September 4 with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (in part to offer condolences for the death of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council), he stopped short of directly accusing Syria of being involved in the attack on Iraq’s Foreign Ministry and Finance Ministry on August 19, a day known in Iraq as “bloody Wednesday.” Twin truck bombings went off, wounding 600 people. Iraq blamed the attacks on former Baathists loyal to ousted leader Saddam Hussein. As in Iraq, the Baath Party has historical ties with Syria. Another neighbor, Turkey, continues to anger Iraq by sending troops into northern Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish rebels in violation of Iraqi sovereignty. As a result of these troubled relationships, Iraq needs Iran.

Iran’s ever-growing influence in Iraq was put on display in July after Iraqi authorities decided to oust, or at least contain, the activities of members of the People’s Mujahedeen Organization, a leading Iranian opposition group, through a raid on their primary location, Camp Ashraf in Diyala province. The timing of the raid was significant because it took place not long after the United States transferred full responsibility of security in the cities to Iraqi forces on June 30. The raid served as a clear message to the People’s Mujahedeen that it is not popular with Iraq’s new leaders, some twenty years after settling in the country at the height of tensions between Iraq and Iran during the rule of Saddam Hussein.

Yet, the raid uncovered the good intensions of Iraqi rulers toward Iran. A good number of Iraqi authorities took refuge in Iran during years of exile, and undoubtedly found in the People’s Mujahedeen an opportunity to return the favor. The U.S. government had extended protection to members of the group during its control of Iraqi security following the 2003 invasion.

Dr. Jasim Husain Ali is a member of the Parliament in Bahrain and travels regularly to Iran and Iraq.

How to Talk to Iran? Ask Pugwash

admin — Tue, 22 Sep 2009 19:27:14 +0000

ROME — In 2008, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs held four meetings in Europe that included some Iranian officials as well as some Iranian experts from the West and a few countries from other regions. The scope of the meetings was to address ways to develop discussions with Iran that could bring about a more constructive climate and possibly yield some positive results.

This brief contains informal observations and suggestions on a future U.S.-Iran or EU-Iran dialogue, based on the experience of these four meetings. It should be stressed, though, that this brief reflects solely the opinions of the author. No participant in any of these meetings shares any responsibility for what is written here, since the purpose of the meetings, as is the case for any Pugwash meeting, was not to reach a formal consensus among the participants but rather simply to explore options.

From this experience, I offer some specific observations about negotiations with Iran. These points take into consideration what I perceive as significant concerns on the Iranian side more than the so-called Western concerns or Western redlines, as the West’s position already is well known. The aim here is just to see if compromises may be possible.

1. There is a general philosophical approach by the Iranian political leadership that should be understood. This approach deals with some basic principles, such as justice, on which an agreement is possible, even if opinions can differ on conclusions and implications.

2. A logical conclusion of the basic principles would be the rejection of nuclear weapons (NW) as an acceptable instrument of warfare. Any statement or agreement aimed at rejecting NWs as a legitimate instrument of warfare would be considered positive and important.

3. The specific nuclear problem could be fruitfully addressed if some basic principles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are recalled, assumed, and implemented. The Iranians will stress mainly the principle of “no extra discrimination,” in addition to the (already discriminating) distinction between Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. In particular, there is nothing in the NPT that forbids uranium enrichment. If Iran wants to enrich, the argument goes, it should be allowed to do so. On the other hand, regulating the enrichment capability on a mutually agreed basis, strengthening the international monitoring regime, and implementing multinational fuel cycle units or consortiums are all topics that easily could be discussed, and where a consensus should be possible. The ensuing framework should be reassuring enough for those who are concerned about the risks of Iranian nuclear proliferation.

4. The additional protocol Iran signed in 2003 with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be implemented (even if the ratification procedure will take time). The relationship between Iran and the IAEA is a positive one and could be made better if the additional protocol will be ratified. There should be no obstacle to continuing the review of past Iranian nuclear activities (if continuing such a review will be needed). Of course there is also the possibility of Iran giving up uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication inside Iran, provided that it receives absolute guarantees of a nuclear fuel supply. This is the preferred opinion of many people in the West, and economically it makes sense. Iran, though, seems not to be ready, at this stage, to agree to this option. But is should be pointed out that, if future talks focus on “enrichment in Iran yes versus enrichment in Iran no,” the talks will go nowhere. From the point of view of preventing proliferation, what really matters is monitoring and international control.

5. The argument that monitoring cannot prevent the possibility of secret enrichment facilities is true, but it is also a misleading argument. Nothing can exclude the existence of secret facilities in any country, unless a full-scale military occupation of that country by foreign forces and/or the destruction of its industrial infrastructure is carried out. Forcing Iran to declare that it will no longer enrich will not provide an absolute guarantee against secret enrichment facilities.

6. Isolating Iran will neither improve the situation, nor will it eliminate the risks of proliferation. On the contrary, multiplying opportunities for business, cultural, and scientific cooperation could facilitate confidence-building across the existing dividing lines and enhance mutual understanding.

7. The idea of dealing with selected authorities (such as the Supreme Leader as opposed to, say, the president or his representatives) in Iran is not really a sensible one. In any negotiation, it is not up to one of the two parties to select the representative of the other party.

8. Specific issues of regional security (Iraq, Afghanistan, and so on) could be discussed easily in parallel talks. There is a large commonality of interests in preserving and strengthening regional stability and avoiding the spread of areas of lawlessness where terrorist groups might prosper.

9. One of the most controversial topics is the issue of Israel and Palestine. We have heard very harsh rhetorical statements from all sides. Beyond the rhetoric, in a nutshell, the Iranian position is that a just solution for Palestine should be a state where each citizen (be s/he a Jew, Muslim, or Christian) has the right to vote and to be represented. Namely, Iran supports a one-state as opposed to a two-state solution—a legitimate position to hold, albeit different from the equally legitimate position supporting the two-state solution. The common ground here should revolve around the prospect that every country or (national-political) group can contribute to peace in Palestine. It may be pointed out by the Iranians that to ask that Iran withhold its support of Hezbollah (or Hamas), would be like asking the United States to withhold support of Israel.

10. In order to facilitate the negotiating process, groups of non-officials could develop:

Discussions on disarmament and non-proliferation issues, and on the value of specific safeguards for the nuclear civilian programs. Such discussions could be explored among an international group of scientists, including crucially Iranian scientists.

Dialogue on regional security issues, starting with maritime security in the Persian Gulf and proceeding with Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and so on.

11. Among the other topics discussed in the meetings were the following proposals:

Proceeding toward the re-establishment of U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations, first by having the respective countries staff interest sections, who should be entitled to issue visas.

Reaffirming the Algiers accords (1981) that, inter alia, forbid attempts to work toward regime changes in Iran.

Establishing direct flights between the two countries and solving the relevant security problems by mutual agreement (there are a few hundred thousand passengers travelling annually between Iran and the United States).

Organizing governmental exchange visits and inter-governmental meetings.

Discussing economic cooperation in conjunction with the switching off of sanctions.

Facilitating cultural and scientific exchanges and visits of citizens.

After the elections of June 12, 2009, the situation in Iran is more complicated. Foreign governments certainly can request that the Iranian leadership respect human rights and respect the will of the Iranian people. But, ultimately, managing post-election life in Iran is an Iranian internal problem and should not be used as an excuse to block negotiations between Iran and other countries. Any attempt by the West to apply pressure on Iran and impose some form of timetable may well be counterproductive and lead to an unwanted result. This is particularly true if the timetable refers to the prospect of a military attack—no matter which country is anticipated to perform such an attack.