insideIRAN » News Features

Iranians Blame Sanctions on the West, Says Factory Manager

insideiran — Wed, 21 Jul 2010 15:16:39 +0000

Editor’s note: InsideIRAN conducted an interview with an engineer and factory manager, who is located thirty miles outside Tehran, to get his views on the effects of new sanctions. He requested anonymity for security reasons.

Q: Who do Iranians blame for the dire economic situation in Iran?

A: People complain about the conditions. Bu they don’t analyze what has brought about these conditions. They blame foreign actors such as the United States and the United Kingdom. They blame the so-called imperialists whom they believe have cost Iran in blood and treasure. This class of Iranian society, which is a large class, does not find a domestic reason to blame for the economic situation and instead blames foreigners. They support government policies.

Q: What about recent U.S. and U.N. sanctions? Are they going to be viewed the same way?

A: Yes. They feel that is precisely the reason for the bad economic conditions. These sanctions and anti-Iranian actions that take place in the West are believed by the lower classes to be the main causes for Iran’s misfortunes. I can say the majority in Iran thinks this way, and this is not only a view held by the poor. Even some members of the middle class believe the same thing. They see these sanctions as the root cause of all evil. Very few people examine the reasons sanctions were imposed to begin with.

Q: Some people argue that sanctions would eventually create trouble on the streets for the government and would embolden the opposition. Do you think that the economic frustrations would ever turn into street uprisings?

A: I live in this society and I can tell you with certainty—from what I see every day at the factory and in the rural areas of Iran—that this will not happen. As pressure on the Iranian people increases, their reaction to the West becomes harsher and harsher. People will begin hating those countries that they blame for their misfortunes.

Q: What is the socioeconomic background of the workers at the factory you run?

A: Most of them come from the very poor segment of society. Their economic destitution is quiet apparent at first sight. The factory is about thirty miles outside Tehran and our workers come from the slums of Tehran, mostly small towns in the outskirts of the city.

Q: Is there a deep difference in views between those Iranians who work in management and those who comprise the lower levels of the factory in terms of political attitudes?

A: There is a huge gap. This is not something to be ignored. There are major cleavages: economic, social, religious, and political cleavages. Most people may not realize our economic difference right away, but they can easily tell, by the way people are dressed, that there are ideological and political differences between management and the labor force. Management and most engineers at our factory tend to support reforms. I am not saying they are for a certain political group or a political faction. They just favor some sort of political reform in the country. The labor force, on the other hand, is for the status quo. The do not want to see political change.

Q: But why? As you said, they are suffering economically. Why would they support a system that has made them destitute?

A: This goes back to their beliefs. These are not superficial beliefs, rather, they are well ingrained and deep religious beliefs, and these folks really believe in their ideas. They are deeply religious and this shapes their social and political views. They believe that someone who is religious and faithful can eventually succeed economically, politically, and be a more trustworthy person. A politician’s religious background is his winning card.

Q: What was the reaction of your employees, those from the working classes, to the aftermath of the June 12 election?

A: Some of my employees were members of the Basij and participated in beating up protestors. The vast majority of them, including those who did not participate in suppressing demonstrations, were in favor of the government’s brutal actions to quench the protestors. After the events of Ashura (December 2009) many months later, their opposition to demonstrations and protests became even more obvious. They thought their religion, the Imam Hossein and Shiism, was under attack. Some of them who might have had second thoughts about the government and the validity of the June 12 election started to support the government because they thought the protestors were insulting their religion. After all, it is my humble opinion that Ahmadinejad probably won the election. He won by a narrow margin, maybe 51 or 53 percent, but he had enormous support among the urban working classes and those in the rural areas.

Q&A: Iranian Commentator on why some leaders believe isolation with the West is key to the country’s survival

insideiran — Tue, 20 Jul 2010 18:06:26 +0000

Editor’s note: InsideIRAN conducted the following interview with a commentator based in Tehran, who wishes to remain anonymous.

Q: Did you see any evidence in Iran that sanctions were or were not having an effect?

A: Based on my conversations with people over the last couple of weeks, prices have gone up. Prices of basic goods have certainly increased. This is more like a panic. The Islamic republic is certainly adept to such things over the years. They keep themselves propped up through their alliances with other countries. I think it is too early to tell what the overall impact is going to be but I don’t think it is going to be negligible.

Q: Do Iranians blame the West for sanctions or the Iranian government?

A: I think the overall feeling on the street is, “Can we all just catch a break?! We are taking it from all sides!” I don’t think you can ever convince any population that sanctions are good for them. This is a fact of life. The more people I talk to say they knew they were going to impose hardship on the Iranian people but they think in the end it would be good for them. I think the majority of people over there, especially those struggling to get by to put food on the table and pay for clothes and school, would argue that this is not the best rout.

Q: How do you assess the views among Iran’s leaders of the relationship with the West? Do they believe it is at a critical stage or do they think the crisis will subside?

A: I think just like the U.S and other places, one thing Iran has in common with the U.S is that Iran had a big government composed of many moving parts and lots of different people. I don’t think there is one approach. That is a part of the internal conflict and when that conflict is over, then they will assess whether or not to open their relationship with the West, and the U.S in particular. There are various camps and one of them believes this relationship is important for the Islamic Republic’s survival. There is another camp that believes not having relationship with the West is essential for its survival.

I think what we are seeing right now, a big part of it, is that a specific fight is being played out in the establishment inside Iran. Ultimately, I believe that you can’t stop progress, especially in the field of technology, communications, wireless internet, mobile networks are all parts of daily life in Iran and it is not possible to stop this regardless of what the regime wants to do that or not. I am sure there are many within the regime who want to curb people’s access but it is not possible to do that.

Q: Is there still a strong element of fear among the masses? Do they think the government is listening to their calls, watching their moves, and reading their emails?

A: The fear factor is there, but I don’t think it is based in reality. I think more and more as people get educated about the internet, their fears fade away. This is like flying. When you don’t know anything about it, you are scared. But when you learn the physics of it and the calculus behind it, you realize it is not scary anymore. There is an element of that happening in Iran. It is clear that is it virtually impossible to track Skype. I am sure there are people who think everything they do can be monitored. That is not true. And it is not possible. So many people are now back on Facebook. So many people who changed their names on Facebook are back to using their normal names. I think people are for the most part back to their normal lives although it will never be the same. People have moved on from talking about the election. Things are constantly evolving.

Q&A: Delbar Tavakoli on Iranian Civil Society and the West

insideiran — Fri, 09 Jul 2010 17:33:15 +0000

Editor’s Note: A series of discussions were held during the week of July 1 in Brussels, as the European Parliament focused on human rights abuses and civil society in Iran. InsideIRAN conducted the following interview in Brussels with Delbar Tavakoli, a journalist who worked for thirteen years in Iran and recently fled to Paris.

Q: How does the government in Iran manipulate the Internet? Please provide some examples that you have seen of this sort of manipulation and misuse.

Tavakoli: The most notable organization that manipulates the Internet and it does it in a very open, obvious, and shameless way is Fars news. Fars has a website and it feeds other news agencies and newspapers as a semi-official news agency through its website. They put up fake shows on their sites! They easily deny what has been reported elsewhere as news and put on their own fake news show. Sometimes they just change the news, but other times Fars changes public opinion through its means of spreading fake news. You probably follow Fars news. When they feed other news agencies with Fars material, then those agencies cannot have access to decent material. They even hack other websites and take over them.

Q: Has this been a successful method?

Tavakoli: Yes. One of the reasons the government has been so successful in suppressing the opposition is their optimal utilization of agencies such as Fars news. The government has exclusive access to high-speed Internet and therefore has power. They control what is being spread as information and news.

Q: There are segments of society that are influenced by this propaganda and information monopoly. Do they have free access to the Internet? Is it just the upper-middle class and the upper class that have access to the Internet? Would it make a difference if those influenced by government propaganda had better access to the Internet?

Takakoli: Let me tell you what our main problem in Iran is: our lives are politicized. News in Iran is spread through the primitive and poor method of word of mouth; like a game of telephone. Our cab drivers, our teachers, our grocers, and our journalists all transmit the news in an oral fashion. But this means that one person can search something on the Internet and read some news, and then tell someone in a cab and that would spread to hundreds of people. So, even one person like this can be very effective.

Q: Does the Iranian opposition expect help from Western governments, especially the United States, in regard to opening up and easing access to the Internet? What should the West do?

Tavakoli: The opposition has no expectations of direct funding from the West. But they expect the West to create some obstacles for the government and prevent them from censoring the news. The West imposes sanctions against Iran and hurts the average Iranian, while making the dictators much stronger through sanctions. We expect the West to place conditions in agreements and deals they sign with Iran.

Q: But should the West spend money to buy better telecommunications technology, such as better satellites that would improves Internet access for Iranians?

Takakoli: We all know that if the West is doing something, it is first and foremost concerned with its own interests. They are not really doing it for us. Our democratic movement did not start last year. We have been involved in this fight since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. But if one day, in our wildest dreams, the West cared for the Iranian people and decided to do something to help them out in a direct and obvious way, then that would become a tool for the government as an excuse to oppress everyone. The government would divert everyone’s attention from its human rights abuses and would just blame everything on foreign intervention.

Q: How do Iranian journalists and activists use the internet to help others in Iran? Have they been able to use it more successfully outside Iran?

Tavakoli: The only way I have here to communicate with my colleagues in Iran and get the news is through the Internet. I can go contact them right now. I can lobby for them if they are in prison. I can send them real news. We start campaigns to get prisoners released. It is very effective and we count on it. It is our lifeline.

Q: When did you leave Iran?

Tavakoli: I left Iran last year and lived in Turkey for nine months. The Turkish police monitored my every move and listened to my every phone conversation. They are very friendly with the Iranian government and they put enormous pressure on us in Turkey. I had no freedom there and I wasn’t safe.

Activist advises West on Strategies to Strengthen Civil Society

insideiran — Thu, 08 Jul 2010 18:34:57 +0000

Sohrab Razzaghi

BRUSSELS—In the presidential election of 2005, following eight years of political liberalization by the government of President Mohammad Khatami, a new political class in Iran came to power that enjoyed the full backing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In 2009, this new political class managed to consolidate its power through widespread electoral fraud and the reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

This new political class aims to be the country’s only political agents through a campaign of eliminating rivals and dissidents. Their desire for such monopoly is not limited to politics. Their aim is to become Iran’s economic, cultural, and social leaders, and rule Iran according to their own ideology.

This new political class has taken up a massive effort to disrupt the free flow of information and deny access to those who seek the news. In order to do this, they have created an atmosphere of mistrust in social settings and social relationships and are pursuing the atomization of the Iranian society.

Some of the actions taken by this political elite (with the help of their military supporters) are as follows:

• Political and civil obstruction. This means preventing the free operation of political and civic organizations.
• Preventing the free flow of information. Denying freedom of speech and freedom of the press through arresting more than 170 journalists.
• Suppressing civil liberties, such as the right to run for public office.
• Large-scale suppression of student activists and student organizations.
• Torture and execution of political and civil rights activists. More than 800 individuals currently are in prison on political charges. More than eight individuals, most of whom ethnic minorities, have been executed
• Lack of academic freedom and increasing pressure on professors and students.

I would like to propose a number of strategies for a sustainable transition to democracy in Iran:

• Creating social networks in order to support the political and civil liberties movement in Iran and starting talks with Iran’s civil rights and political activists to enhance human rights and democracy in Iran. European countries and the EU must take clearer positions about the Iranian government and its violation of human rights. The EU must place human rights as its top priority on its agenda.
• The only way to stop this ruling political elite is to build a dynamic, democratic, and developing nation. One of the most important priorities is to build civil societies, and therefore, the international community must help civil society activists in capacity-building and related efforts.
• The lack of recognition of human rights is a group problem that plagues Iranian society. In order to instill such values, we need a program of promoting human rights in Iran in various levels and for various segments of society. This is most needed on the local level. Human rights are violated in Iran on three grounds: theoretical, governmental, and lack of respect for human rights among individual citizens.
• Currently, a large number of political activists and human rights defenders are incarcerated. We need to educate a new generation of such activists and a new wave of such organizations, which is why capacity building in Iran is our top priority.
• In order to break the information blockade created by the government, we must enhance the free flow of information among Iranian citizens. We must avoid spending all our efforts on the Internet only, because more than 35 percent of the Iranian population is in rural areas, and many cities, towns, and villages do not have access to the Internet. Therefore, I suggest we think about expanding efforts concerning the Internet to include television.

Sohrab Razzaghi is a civil society activist and researcher who recently left Iran.

Khamenei Sides with Parliament and against Ahmadinejad in Fight over Islamic Azad University

insideiran — Thu, 08 Jul 2010 17:22:23 +0000

Babak

Recent clashes between moderate conservatives in Iran’s parliament and hardliners in the executive branch have moved to an unlikely battleground — the Islamic Azad University, the largest institution of higher learning in Iran.

Since the start of his first term in office, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad began a series of attacks against the management of Islamic Azad University, criticizing administrators on a variety of grounds — including the life-term presidency of Abdullah Jasbi and high tuition rates. Ahmadinejad and his allies have also accused the university’s top officials of stealing public funds (the university is funded by the public). But the most important aspect of this new wave of attacks is the involvement of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who — as founder and chairman of the board of Azad University — is at the center of the firestorm.

After Jasbi allowed opposition leader Mir Hossein Moussavi’s campaign to have unrestricted access to Azad University’s resources, Ahmadinejad’s hardliners decided to try to do whatever it took to eliminate Jasbi and other Rafsanjani loyalists from the university. After years of running one of Iran’s most politically repressive university systems, Jasbi’s decision invigorated students there to participate in politics for the first time in years. Students at Azad University led the way in campus activities during the disputed presidential race last year by participating in rallies, meetings, and political debates.

The government, alarmed by this trend, decided to change Azad University’s constitution to make it possible to remove Jasbi and other Rafsanjani loyalists. This change had to be approved by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, where Ahmadinejad, Rafsanjani’s harsh foe, has a healthy number of supporters. The hardliners were trying to create a link between Azad University’s management and Moussavi and pave the way for a full takeover of one of Rafsanjani’s final centers of power. Since last summer, when Rafsanjani all but allied himself with the Green movement, Ahmadinejad and his supporters have tried to strip Rafsanjani of the vast power he once held in state-affiliated, leadership positions.

Ahmadinejed and his supporters tried to assert that the public endowment of the Islamic Azad University violates the articles of association of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, the country’s highest authority on cultural and educational activities. This is a strategy Ahmadinejad has used to try to place the university under his government’s control.

Two years ago, Rafsanjani, alarmed by the prospect of hardliners taking over this multi-billion dollar power house, proposed that the university’s assets be placed in a trust fund. Azad University is now a private institution, which is funded by public donations given for religious purposes. In principle, it is supposed to be immune from state interference.

After the announcement of the proposed trust, hardliners began a wave of attacks against Rafsanjani. The Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution passed a resolution that would force Azad University to admit five new board members chosen by the Council. According to article 19, chapter three of Azad’s constitution, any changes in its governing regulations are possible through a proposal by the board of founders and approval by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. But the Council moved beyond its legal boundaries and acted on pure political motivations in order to change the current management at Azad.

This fight took yet another unusual turn when Iran’s parliament became involved and sided with Azad and Rafsanjani. Parliament’s involvement proved that Azad University (along with its management and assets) had become the focal point of political fights between moderates and hardliners. Jasbi and most senior executives at Azad either belong to, or are close associates of, the conservative Motalefe Islami Party, one of Iran’s oldest, religious conservative parties with close ties to the merchants of the bazaar.

The intense dispute, which gained national and international media attention, prompted Supreme Leader Khamenei to step into the fray last week. Khamenei wrote two letters to Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, effectively annulling the decision of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, which had sided with Ahmadinejad; he also disallowed changing the university from a for-profit institution to an endowment, which was favored by Rafsanjani. To turn the university into a “vaghf,” or endowment was a maneuver designed by Rafsanjani to protect the university from takeover. In fact, Khamenei’s ambiguous order potentially leaves the university open to the future predatory takeover by Ahmadinejad’s supporters because it is no longer an endowment.

While his decision complicates the picture, the move is a classic Khamenei tactic. His strategy is often not to appear to take sides in the escalating rivalry within the regime, while also ensuring that the outcome is one he desires. For Rafsanjani, this could be another setback, if indeed Ahmadinejad places Azad University under government control.

What this controversy demonstrates is Ahmadinejad and his loyalists’ determination to marginalize the moderate conservatives they believe are a threat to their political power. The outcome of the Azad debate does not bode well for other moderate conservatives who might plan to challenge the hardliners — but, of course, that is the point.

Babak is a journalist and activist living in Tehran.

The Green Movement Will Continue to Challenge Ahmadinejad

insideiran — Thu, 10 Jun 2010 19:46:29 +0000

Anonymous

TEHRAN — As the one- year anniversary of the June 12 election approaches, the feeling on the ground, at least in major cities, is that the current political and economic situation cannot continue. Although many people are disappointed that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remains in power and that the groups behind the coup continue to try to increase their political and economic hold on the country, the general feeling is that “there is fire under the ash,” as we say in Persian. In other words, the popular rage and fury over the rigged election and the use of violence and rape and the popular demands for change remain. Any spark can set this off once again this fire. The coup government knows only too well, judging by its own actions.

Surprisingly, despite the disturbing news of more arrests and continued use of torture, there is a general relative sense of optimism that we are witnessing the slow, gradual breakdown of the Ahmadinejad government. For Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi, the first anniversary is important in as much as it underscores the fact that despite the most pessimistic predictions, the Green Movement is still a force seriously threatening the coup government. At the same time, unlike some Iranian diaspora figures who predicted a quick demise of the Islamic Republic in the months after the June 2009 presidential elections, Karroubi and Mousavi understand that they and the Green Movement are involved in a relatively protracted struggle to achieve their goals. Both men are confident of their ultimate victory.

As someone who is living in Iran, it is important to counter the many myths that are often perpetuated in the West.

The role of communication technology, such as Internet and mobile phones, in the present and future of the Green Movement, continues to be debated. One side argues that one of the keys to strengthening the Green Movement is to create conditions to advance this technology. The other side uses the example of the Arab world to show how these technologies provide more possibilities for the state to crush social movements than to those oppose them. Thus, we should not be too optimistic about the future of the Green Movement, so the argument goes. Although the basic premise of this argument, namely that technology has enhanced the state’s ability to crush threats to it, is sound, its conclusions in regard to Iran do not hold up to deep analysis.

Any comparison between Iran and Arab countries in this regard is faulty for two basic reasons. First, Iranian contemporary history has been marked by popular revolts and movements (1892, 1906–08, 1953, 1963, 1978–79, 1999, 2009–present) which have been absent in the history of the Arab world. Second, one of the main reasons for the Green Movement’s ability to continue to worry the government is the unbridgeable divisions within the elite. Arab authoritarian states, such as Egypt, Assad’s Syria or Saudi Arabia, have never experienced such elite fragmentation, which helps explain their ability to contain and crush social movements. A socio-political link has crystallized between a part of the Iranian elite and a large cross-section of society, which ensures the Green Movement’s continued existence. History shows that societal mass dissatisfaction alone rarely can bring about fundamental political change. Elite fragmentation and/or paralysis is needed.

Many Western observers of the Islamic Republic entertain unrealistic expectations about the rate of change in Iran. First, one must take into account that before last year’s presidential elections no large-scale socio-political opposition movement existed in the country, which gave belief and hope that change could be achieved through the electoral process. Only after last year’s electoral cheating and the failure of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to address the concerns raised by Mousavi, Karroubi, and the millions of people on the streets immediately after the election, did the Green Movement begin to obtain an infrastructure constructed primarily from the bottom. What deserves attention and praise is that despite mass arrests, killings, rapes, and show trials the Green Movement not only survived but succeeded in developing a form of infrastructure which continues to evolve. The view on the streets in Iran is that it is far too early to argue that the Green Movement is no longer a political force.

Mousavi, Karroubi, and many on the ground in Iran, given their first-hand experience of politics and society, understand that victory against the despotism of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei is not a short-term event but a process which began only in June of last year. The Velvet Revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the “color” revolutions in the republics of the former USSR conditioned observers in the West to expect an authoritarian government to collapse after a couple of demonstrations. The dynamics of these countries fundamentally differ from those of Iran.

While the government’s attempts to limit access to outside sources of information and the ability of Iranians inside the country to exchange information and to communicate with each other have certainly produced results, society is finding ways around the restrictions. For example, those with the time and ability to work around these restrictions disseminate information and news through regular e-mail, traditional social networks, such as family, friends, work colleagues, and places of recreation. Those obtaining news and information from these places in turn disseminate them among their own social networks. This writer has been following traditional tea houses, gyms, computer and/or DVD/CD shops in central and south Tehran, Shiraz, and Tabriz which serve as centers of dissemination in soft and hard-copy form of news and information, in particular the statements of Mousavi and Karroubi and plans for collective action.

The challenges facing the Green Movement remain formidable and a long; an uncertain path awaits it. But the continuing outrage over electoral cheating and the use of violence against the people, the worsening economic crisis, and the deep unbridgeable elite divisions, combined with international pressure ensures that the Green Movement and its leaders will continue to challenge Ahmadinejad seriously. It is the symbol of positive political change in the Islamic Republic.

The author is a professor in Tehran.

Young Iranians Speak Out on Election Anniversary

insideiran — Thu, 10 Jun 2010 19:33:21 +0000

Editor’s Note: The following is a series of interviews insideIRAN.org will be conducting with young people in Iran regarding the first anniversary of the disputed presidential election in 2009.

Q: Will you be going to the Saturday protest? Do you think your friends will be going?

A: What a hard question! I’m still debating it. I haven’t made up my mind. I want to go. But I don’t know if my parents will let me. They’ve already forbidden my sisters from going out from the night before. But if they allow me to go, I will definitely go.

I only have 3 friends that I know who are going for sure. They’ve already prepared their gear, their clothes and cigarettes. But these are my high school friends, who are very hardheaded; extremely brave but hardheaded who don’t even think about what will happen to them.

When you go out on Saturday, you have to have your will ready. You have to kiss your family and bid them farewell. Remember the stories we heard about the soldiers who went off to war [Iran-Iraq war] not knowing if they will come back? Remember the religious mourning songs we were told they sang? That’s exactly how it is now because they know they will not return.

Q: Then why do you say you will go if you can?

A: Because I want what we have to survive. It seems to me that everything we achieved is growing very dim now, almost fading. Well, not fading, but it’s growing smaller and smaller. And it needs a big boost. It needs someone to give it a real good shove.

But I understand my parents. Because whoever goes, is going while knowing that he might not come back. That he might die or he might be taken away with no word for months. He might be raped and all sorts of horrible things might happen to him. The risks are just too high now. I personally think nothing will happen on Saturday; just small clutters of people will appear here and there that government forces will beat and arrest and the whole thing will end. I don’t think the reformists will be given a permit. It’s truly, truly frightening. The families just won’t let their kids go. I understand why.

But, who knows? I think the government did a wonderful thing by insulting Khomeini’s family and not letting Hassan Khomeini speak, it was a great thing they did for us just days before June 12th. That will bring some principalists on our side and will turn some principlists against Ahmadinejad – not against the leader of course. But that’s good enough. Ahmadinejad’s gang is a very, very dangerous group. They don’t even believe in Khomeini, much less Khamenei who is not even a marja [source of emulation]. They will even sideline Khamenei the first chance they get.

I just wish they had insulted Khomeini’s family more. Not only will it turn more principalists against Ahmadinejad, but I generally like any insult directed at Khomeini (laughs). We’re not allowed to insult him, but let Ahmadinejad insult him for us.

Q: Do you think there will be no more street protests?

A: Yes, I definitely think so.

Q: What is going to happen to the Green Movement?

A: I definitely don’t think that street protests are the only manifestation of the green movement. But, I also think that the green movement has entered a phase that will take a long time for it to reach any outcomes.

Maybe if street protests had continued, it would have gotten outcomes sooner. But this outcome may have been total defeat. But now that street protests have ended, we have entered a phase where I feel that in our lifetime at least, we will not see its victory. So maybe that’s what some people mean when they say the movement is “dead”, that’s what they mean when they use that word, but I don’t think it’s dead, it’s reached a very different phase, a very slow phase.

Q: What do you mean that if street protests had continued, the outcome would have been defeat?

A: If people had remained in the street, if the demonstrations would have continued, the government would have brought tanks into the streets. And there would have been a horrendous mass killing, worse than anything we could have ever imagined. It would have been leagues worse than what happened. And the Green Movement would have been truly and literally dead – it would have been killed.

As bad as things are now, there are still active people. People who are writing articles, writing on walls, writing on money, who are active online, people who try to put out leaflets, you go to buy stuff at the grocery store and you see the lady’s green bracelet peaking out. You see the movement here and there, you hear it. And if that scenario had happened, if street protests had continued, all these people would have been dead or completely silenced. The movement would have suffered an even bigger blow; because of course the government wasn’t going to back down now, was it?

Q: What do you mean by “outcomes”? What sort of “outcomes” do you see for the Green Movement?

A: Personally I would want, before anything else, for the president and the parliament to be changed around. For instance, I think Ahmadinejad has to come down, and someone like Mousavi has to become president. And if that were to happen, just like Khatami’s time, the parliament too would become more moderate.

But I don’t mean an abrupt, sudden change like a revolution. I have no desire for a revolution. I think the outcome of that would be terrible. Because what we need is gradual change. We still have a very traditional, religious country. Our people have to see what freedom is first. They have to know that if we have “freedom” that won’t mean that someone will come and forcefully take their hijab off their heads.

When I talk to those friends of mine who work in factories, they say that the workers are really afraid of Mousavi. The workers say that we are worried that Mousavi will come to power and will try to take the hijab off our wives and will force us to be Western or whatever. They think freedom means being a certain way, rather than a will to be what you want to be.

I am not even so sure there was fraud in the election anymore. Because I was talking to my friends, well to the five friends who remained in Iran, it seems everyone has left. But a few of my friends work as project managers and engineers in factories. And they say things such as “In the factory I work as a manager, from the four engineers, three are pro-Mousavi. But from the 40 workers, 35 are pro-Ahmadinejad.” So Ahmadinejad does have a base of support. That needs to change. That won’t happen through a revolution.

Figuring all this stuff out takes a lot of time. It won’t happen overnight. The problem isn’t just our government; I think our people need time to think through things.

Q: Will you be going to the Saturday protest? Do you think your friends will be going?

Mina: I’m not going; I know a few of my friends who are thinking of going.

Q: Why do you think that is? Why are people staying away?

Mina: Well, I’d have to begin my dividing people into different groups. Some are simply pressured by their families not to go. Either because their families are scared or, I know lots of kids who aren’t going because someone in their close family has a government job or something, and the parents are afraid that their children will be seen with the pro-green protesters.

Then there’s another group that simply is too frightened to go. I’m a part of this group. Things can just get too dangerous.

There’s another group that’s simply lost hope in the leaders of the movement. They are the ones who thought everything would change overnight, just like they thought things would change overnight with Khatami. And when it didn’t, they were very disappointed and distraught. But they also ask themselves questions I also agree with: in regard to all the bloodshed and imprisonment we faced in the streets, what have these leaders done? A lot of people ask themselves that question, I know I do. And maybe the leaders weren’t in a position to do anything, but still, we can’t help asking ourselves that. And since we can’t find an answer for it, some of just let it go all together. They’ve become completely indifferent.

I went to most of the protests last year and talked to a lot of people. You could find people who were there because of the high price of meat, rent, poultry – people who were there because of their immediate economic problems and they were hoping that those problems would be solved by them joining the protest. But nothing was solved and things only got worse and worse. So these people have changed strategy now and they are sticking to the little trinkets that they have, they are really scared of losing that too. They are afraid that if they show up, they will lose everything. So they don’t even bother with discussions like this or anything about the green movement.

If they [the government] hadn’t created such a horrific, frightening environment, every little change like inflation, the bad economy, etc would have created a new wave of protest. That’s how things were last year; people were ready to protest for everything. But everyone is so fearful that even if prices just jump tenfold tomorrow, nobody will dare do anything anymore.

Q: Do you think anyone will go on Saturday?

Mina: Let me tell you about those who are going tomorrow:

Some belong to the group that is preparing itself for the worst. They are so firm in their convictions that they are ready to lose anything and everything for what they believe in. Others have lost their loved ones and they don’t care anymore about what they lose. It is their sense of loss that will carry them out in the streets.

Or, they are intellectuals who are just too fed up with the government but they aren’t in prison yet, and they know they will be soon, so they have nothing to lose. Or, like some of my friends, they are young students. You know that Persian expression “they’re head smells like stew” [meaning: they are young and oblivious to danger] and they want to insist on their beliefs. They’re not ready for the best or the worst, they just don’t care. They’re young and they don’t think things through.

Those who go will have a very, very difficult day ahead of them, because there are so many police forces in the street for all sorts of reasons: militias, hejab police, morality police, etc etc. the city is so filled with government forces that the protesters won’t have anywhere to run or hide.

All in all, I would say that people will go, but not like last year. And people will be crushed, much worse than last year.

Q: What do you think about the future of the Green Movement?

Mina: Let me get a little romantic. I see it more like a blossom on a tree. It takes time to grow into a full apple and then fall from the tree. History is repeating itself. But it will take time for the apple to ripen and fall. When they greet fists with bullets, they are inevitably leading us towards a revolution just like 30 years ago. In our country, history seems to repeat itself every 30 years.

Q: Will you be going to the Saturday protest? Do you think your friends will be going?

Niloo: No, of course not! I haven’t lost my mind! I have a very important exam. Besides, I’ll be honest with you, I’d be really, really scared to go. If they arrest me, worse, if I get a concussion or some sort of terrible injury, who’s going to be responsible? Who’s going to come to my aid? Going, for anyone, would be pure insanity. I think most students around here think the same way I do. No one I know is going at least.

And I’m not even from the Tehran, my parents live all the way around the country. Imagine what my parents would go through if they found out something had happened to me. Remember last year when the dorms were raided? My mother couldn’t stop crying, even though I was with her at the time. She kept thinking of all those parents who were so far from their kids, who were only hearing the news from other people.

Q: What if you knew your security would be guaranteed? Then would you go?

Niloo: For instance, if they had a permit for the protest and I didn’t have exams, I might have gone. If I knew it would have been safe and if I didn’t have anything else to do, I would go. But would I drop everything I was doing and go even if it was safe? No. I’m tired of this stuff.

Q: What are you tired of?

Niloo: I think street protests have to end but I don’t have a clue what we should do instead. But regarding street protests, not only is it that less and less people show up and it ends up humiliating the movement, but it’s creating problems for us in everything else. With every word of protest, they start bothering and harassing us in the street. You barely walk out before they come after you. They come after us for hejab, for walking with the opposite sex, for everything. When there was no street protest, at least we didn’t have to deal with this harassment every day.

Q: What do you think has happened to the Green Movement?

Niloo: All in all, everyone is quiet now. You can say they are indifferent. I’m one of them.

Q: You turned your profile picture green on facebook. Did all our other friends do the same? What is that supposed to mean?

Niloo: Ok, you’re right. No, you’re right. Let me rephrase, I put it in a really bad way. We are all green inside, but life has to go on. We can’t stay in that state that we were in last year, forever. We have exams; we have families and friends; we have a life. We can’t stay up in the air. We are still green, we still believe in the green movement, we still talk about things every day, but we’re also living our life. That’s how it is now. That’s how it should be. I know in other places you like to see us in the street all the time, but just like you, we have a life (laughs). Don’t forget that we have a life!

Q: Will you be going to the Saturday protest? Do you think your friends will be going?

Saman: No, I wish I was. But no, I’m too scared to go and I have too much school work. I don’t know anyone in our lab that’s going either, but it’s a small lab.

Q: But last year you told me that you went with your parents, professor and entire lab to some demonstrations. So what has changed?

Saman: (laughs) I know it’s really late where you are. Do you have a few hours for me to go through all the reasons? There are so many reasons. Where do I begin?

Last year we were all caught in excitement, in energy; everything in our lives was put on to the side. But reality slowly crept up on us. We have exams, deadlines, work. We can’t stay in that state of excitement forever.

A lot of our friends who were more active were given very severe sentences. You remember what happened to Hossein, right? And so many others. Why should we put ourselves in that situation? To change what?

I’ve also kept you up to date with stuff that the security personnel and Basij do to harass us students in school, remember? And they’ve increased forces in the streets tenfold for this hejab nonsense too. So there are forces everywhere. These things both create an inverse reaction: students hate the government all the more. But it also frightens us all the more. Forces are everywhere, the fear is ever-present.

A lot of people criticize the leaders, Mousavi and Karoubi, for being too soft and passive. They don’t give protesters enough reason and enough motivation to go out and risk their lives. Personally, I think these people making these critiques are only half right. Mousavi and Karoubi have not given us enough reasons, but not because they are not courageous enough, but because they are wise. I think this actually shows some maturity in our politics. Forty years ago a ruthless, charismatic Khomeini opened [verbal] fire on the Shah and asked people to risk their lives, families, everything for his cause. And they obeyed. But Mousavi isn’t willing to risk that much, and to take that much responsibility. I am in favor of this. What is the point of getting thousands of people killed? What did it gain us the first time? I hate Khamenei as much as anyone, but that doesn’t mean we go out in the streets and kill a thousand people, and get ten times more on our side killed as well.

There are other reasons. You know everyone at our universities wants to go abroad. I’m going next year. I don’t know a single student who is willing to stay. We all have plans to go abroad, so we don’t want to risk our admission and buying our military service for some trivial protest that will not change anything anyways.

Another reason we keep talking about are families. Last year, moms and dads would go with their children. But after everything that happened, parents are so scared that they either lock their kids up (laughs) you remember what happened with you last year for 16 Azar?

So if they don’t lock up their kids, they just totally discourage them from going. I know of my friends who’ve had big fights in the house, but of course, in the end, what the parents say always wins. And the parents have a right to be worried. If you go, dying is the best that can happen. What if you lose a limb? Go blind? Get raped? Who knows what will happen? When our friend’s dad who was buddies with Khamenei couldn’t do anything, what can our poor parents do? [Referring to Mohsen Rouholamini who died last year, and whose father was an advisor to Mohsen Rezaie’s presidential campaign]

Q: What do you think about the Green Movement?

Saman: what do you mean?

Q: Some people say the movement is “dead.” Do you agree with their statement?

Saman: I strongly disagree. We don’t have to go in the street and face bullets so that others can see and cry their eyes out and applaud us and give us a “you exist” sticker. We are the ones who know about each other, we are the ones who can say the movement is alive or isn’t. We are the ones who see each other every day and talk every day and know about each other. We don’t care if someone says the movement is alive or dead or if it’s spending its first night in the grave [“shabeh ghabr” a term used in Islamic contexts indicating the first night of someone’s afterlife]. It’s none of their business. Of course we’re alive and of course we still believe in the movement. We don’t have to go out in the street to prove it to anyone.

Green Leaders Took Opposition in Radical Direction

insideiran — Thu, 10 Jun 2010 17:46:09 +0000

Babak

TEHRAN–The tragic events that have occurred since the June 12 election last year have shown that, despite widespread efforts made by reformist groups, Iranian civil society is still in its infancy, particularly compared with democratic countries in the West and even some developing nations. Many analysts interpreted the heated debates between presidential candidates last year and the energetic presidential campaign prior to June 12 as evidence that Iran has begun a process of political tolerance at the highest levels and indicated a sense of political ripeness beyond the expectations of many Iranians.

But the uncivil and rash reaction of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the main opposition candidate, in response to the election fraud and the brutal reaction of government security agencies, transformed the unrivaled democratic experience of the Iranian people into a violent clash between the two sides.

The ideological diversity in the reformist camp eventually led to the intellectual disintegration of the entire movement. There were two distinct groups: the radicals, and moderate reformists without any ideological orientation who have ties with moderate conservatives. These two groups had their own interpretations of the June 12 election and its aftermath. The radicals include Mousavi and his supporters, and the moderate reformists include figures such as former President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani and his Kargozaran Party.

Mousavi, for example reacted against the suspicious actions of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s supporters in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Guardian Council before the election and declared himself the winner on the very night of the poll with no documents in hand. At a press conference held that evening, Mousavi told reporters: “According to reports from our representatives at polling stations, I am the clear winner of the race.” After the election results were announced and Ahmadinejad was declared the winner, Mousavi said, “I am warning that I will not surrender to this manipulation.” But Mousavi had no evidence that he had won the race. He claimed he had election observers at the polling stations, but the Interior Ministry had expelled all observers.

The next day, Mousavi released a statement that began with a Koranic verse usually used at funerals in Iran. The verse means, “We are from God and we will return to God.” This was interpreted by many as a clear declaration that he had nothing to lose, including his life. This was the beginning of the irrational actions of Mousavi, which resulted in the severe repression and imprisonment by the state of reformists.

Now, one year after the June 12 election, the reformists have neither publicly nor privately begun to critique their failures. In fact, on June 10, Karoubi and Mousavi issued a statement advising their supporters not to demonstrate on Saturday, the anniversary of the election, because it is too dangerous. This contradicted their previous suggestions over the last few months that Iranians should protest. They obviously have failed to create a situation that would guarantee that the protests would be peaceful. Another reason they canceled plans for demonstrations could also be that they fear they will not be able to mobilize more than a few thousand people. A small turnout would make their movement look like it is in decline.

The lack of desire on the part of reformist leaders to actively engage with the government and reduce the tensions plaguing the political atmosphere in Iran are indicators that the same old trend of past years will continue. This trend will again center on personalities and will fall short of expanding Iran’s civil society by creating modern political parties, which is essential to begin the process of reform.

As reformist political activist myself, we have always tried to confine our actions in the rigid and quasi-democratic framework of the Islamic Republic system and at the same time criticize the orthodox and totalitarian hardliners. The main ingredient of this framework is the constitution.

When former President Mohammad Khatami was elected in 1997, he vowed to maintain the rule of law. But in these intervening thirteen years, what is apparent is the inability of the reformist side to act in a coordinated manner in implementing either its long-term strategies or short-term tactics.

It seems that this heavy burden falls once again on the shoulders of Iran’s youth, who have always carried the ailing body of “reforms” with great fortitude. It is time for the youth to replace emotions and street violence with peaceful and civil protests in accordance with the country’s national interests. This is of course the duty of all Iranians.

Babak is an activist in Tehran.

One Year On, Green Movement Shows Progress on Human Rights

insideiran — Thu, 10 Jun 2010 17:38:06 +0000

Shadi Mokhtari

WASHINGTON—One year after Iran’s dubious presidential election, the achievements of the opposition Green Movement should not be overlooked. While its path remains long and arduous, the movement has already transformed the way human rights are conceived, talked about, and fought for in Iran. Some of the most significant gains of the movement’s momentous year are worth considering in more depth.

First, the Green Movement has produced what can be considered a psychological shift. Human rights violations and repression tend to have one of two vastly different effects: they can produce submission through fear and intimidation or they can arouse outrage and resistance. For most of its tenure, the Islamic Republic had successfully employed repression to secure its rule. In the first few months following last June’s disputed election, however, collective acquiescence gave way to collective defiance.

Of the countless human rights abuses that afflicted Iran over the last year, three became particularly prominent. The first was the case of Neda Agha Soltan, the 27- year-old woman who was shot during the initial round of post-election protests. Life leaving her body was vividly captured on a cell phone video and viewed by millions around the world via the internet. The second case was that of Mohsen Ruhollamini, the son of a conservative politician who was detained in Kahrizak prison along with other protestors. He died two weeks later amid reports that when his parents received his body, his face was smashed in. The third prominent case was that of the Green Movement leader (and cleric) Mehdi Karroubi’s public disclosure of the systematic rapes of detainees by their interrogators.

In each of these cases, a handful of individuals emerged to publicly disclose an egregious human rights violation committed by the state. Common among these individuals is a sense that the truth about the regime’s violence can no longer remain unspoken. The sentiment is captured by Arash Hejazi, a doctor who tried to help Neda Agha Soltan. “In every life, a moment comes that the integrity of some person would be tested, and I realized on that day this was the moment in my life that I had to choose whether to keep myself safe or prove my integrity”.

Collectively, Iranians displayed a similar sensibility. Each publicized case of death, torture or rape, spurred widespread indignation. In response to threats that he be arrested and prosecuted for spreading lies about the regime, Mehdi Karrubi declared that “the real trial is before the people.” This is an apt characterization of what happened in Iran over the past year. In many ways the state was put on trial by its subjects. Particularly in the case of the systematic rapes in detention, it was the regime that came to be thought of as morally corrupt, vile and pathological, not the victims as the crime’s perpetrators had intended.

Beyond spurring the psychological leap which enabled Iranians to openly challenge their governments’ blatant abuses of power, the Green Movement also clearly transcended important red lines banning explicit references and condemnations of human rights violations in the Islamic Republic.

In previous eras, including the time of former reformist president Mohamad Khatami, discussions of rights were generally more coded, abstract or philosophical. Since last June however, public discourse has focused on the regime’s most severe rights violations, namely torture and politically motivated executions and there has been little mincing of words. In fact, not only has the movement created the space to openly call the regime’s worst atrocities by their names, it has taken on an impressive project of meticulously documenting the violations taking place through victim accounts, forensic evidence and other means.

Similarly, there is a noticeable move away from the embedding of rights claims exclusively in Islamic doctrine and discourses predominant during the Khatami reform era, towards increasingly universal notions of rights. Throughout the past year, opposition leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi along with other reformist figures frequently referred to the Islamic Republic’s behavior as “un-Islamic” or an affront to Islam. However, their discussions of the state’s human rights violations did not stop there. Just as frequently, they invoked the rights guarantees of the Iranian constitution, broader values of human morality and the notion of universal human rights.

This is not to say that Iran’s Islamic intellectuals and reform-minded Islamists have abandoned their religious worldviews for a more cosmopolitan or secular worldview. Rather, they are increasingly comfortable with moving in and out of and entwining the two. This is significant as the willingness of prominent Green Movement leaders with religious credentials to invoke universal human rights in effect discredits the regime’s traditional stance that human rights are nothing more than the product of Western cultural imperialism and Western political agendas.

Finally, it is important not to forget that the Green Movement’s human rights challenge over the last year has in fact forced the regime to make a number of concessions. At the end of July, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the closure of Kahrizak prison where some of the most publicized torture and rape cases took place. One official stated that the prison had been closed because, “it lacked necessary conditions to preserve rights of detainees”. Further, after the public outcry over the rape cases, the reports of systematic rape of prisoners have died down considerably. Finally, although tainted with a significant degree of whitewashing, the government did form several commissions to investigate the alleged abuse, repeatedly backtracked on bogus attributions of victims’ cause of deaths, admitted that torture takes place in Iranian prisons and prosecuted individuals it said had been responsible for the abuses as a result of the Green Movement’s pressure.
While these gains are a far cry from the actual guarantee of rights to which large segments of the Iranian population have long aspired and the challenge of human rights in the face of state violence persists, these gains are significant nonetheless The Green movement has shifted the starting point of public discourse and prevailing assumptions about the Islamic Republic’s human rights practices and that provides openings for future challenges. If the attainment of human rights is understood as a longer-term process for which layers of foundation must by laid, the human rights struggle that took shape over the past year in Iran may be more accurately viewed as a critical stage in the evolution of human rights politics, consciousness and discourses in post-revolutionary Iran.

Shadi Mokhtari is a Washington DC-based independent scholar and attorney specializing in human rights and women’s rights issues in the Middle East. She is the author of After Abu Ghraib: Exploring Human Rights in America and the Middle East (Cambridge University Press, 2009) and the Managing Editor of the Muslim World Journal of Human Rights.

Iranians Flee Country to Escape Repression

insideiran — Thu, 10 Jun 2010 17:28:01 +0000

Arash Bahmani
Editor’s Note: This article is also being published on Foreign Policy

TEHRAN–As an Iranian journalist after last year’s election, I faced a grim future. I was sentenced to sixteen months in prison and my jail term was set to begin at any time. I had already been threatened with a much stiffer sentence – eight years in all – by the very same judge who now ordered me to begin my sentence. My interrogator at the Ministry of Intelligence and the presiding judge both believed that I was not “going to become a human being,” meaning that I would never get on the right political path. The interrogator said to me, “We keep giving you guys multiple chances and now it is enough. You guys are trying to overthrow the government.” As luck would have it, his detention order was not immediately carried out. After consulting with a number of friends, I decided to leave Iran.

I was not alone. Following widespread protests against the disputed June 12 election and the harsh government crackdown on public demonstrations, a number of Iranians felt they had no choice but to leave the country. For them, staying in Iran held only the promise of incarceration, torture, and possibly even death at the hands of jailors, judges, or the security forces. No one could predict what might to happen in prison if he were arrested. This significant wave of migration was primarily composed of young journalists and political activists who had been on the streets during the day and then informed the world each evening about their activities.

The authorities had already confiscated my passport, greatly complicating my plan to make my way to Europe and to continue my political activities there. But there were still two routes left out of Iran, both illegal: crossing Iran’s rugged border with Turkey, or passing through the hazardous valleys separating Iran and Iraq to reach the Iraqi Kurdistan. Such border regions have long been characterized by unsteady central government control, harsh and remote terrain, and dogged independence from events in Tehran, so there were plenty of smugglers for either destination. The price tag for illegal passage across the Iranian border amounted to ten thousand dollars – and there was no guarantee of safe arrival. It is very possible for someone to be killed by the very same smugglers once they get their money. Anything could happen at the border.

Some even offered to take me all the way to Europe after they smuggled me to Turkey. I rejected this last offer, something I later learned may have saved my life. The offer to get me to Europe was nothing more than a tasteless joke. Human smugglers board thirty to forty people on wooden rafts in the maritime border between Turkey and Greece and then leave them to their fate. One Iranian physician, who lived in the Iraqi Kurdistan, boarded on one of these rafts so he could reach Europe to continue his education. He drowned. Another friend of mine, also a journalist, had better luck than the physician. Yet, he told me horrifying tales of his miserable and inhumane situation in Greece. He and 47 other refugees were put in a Greek prison cell made of metal no bigger than 60 square meters.

I found another path. With the help of a friend, a Kurdish political party took responsibility for taking me across the border. The Toilers Komoleh Party of Iran’s Kurdistan had successfully smuggled a number of Iranian dissidents in the past and they are still active in helping Iranian activists and journalists. After living underground for one week, I was told to go a city in Iran’s Kurdistan and make contact with my handler. I traveled thirteen hours on the road to get to the agreed location. I switched cars several times in various cities, in case I was being followed. But I finally made contact with my handler around noon and we decided to cross the border in the early morning.

I must mention that in the past three decades, the Iranian government has waged a propaganda campaign against the Kurdish people by accusing them of being thieves, decapitating innocent people, drug smuggling, membership in separatist parties and terrorist organizations. As a result, Iranian popular opinion of Kurds is not very favorable. I went to Kurdistan despite all these preconceived notions about Kurds. I was told to stay at my handler’s house for the night, but I could not sleep at all that night. I was too worried that someone might steal my money or my laptop.

We hit the road at 7 a.m. The Iran-Iraq border is generally mountainous and very windy. It was a cold day in December 2009, and the winds were brutally cold. We also had to face the dangers of Iranian border patrol agents and their patrol vehicles. The Islamic Republic has made it very clear that it would open fire on people in the Kurdish border without any warning.

We walked for about five hours. That is not including the many times we had to hide from border agents, or lie on the ground to evade patrolling police cars. Once over the border and inside Iraqi Kurdistan, a car with two passengers awaited me. They took me from my handler and I continued the rest of my journey with them.

This was not the end of my troubles. There is a law in the Iraqi Kurdistan that allows police officers to arrest and incarcerate anyone for up to six months if they fail to provide adequate identification documents. Given the underdeveloped nature of the justice system there, I could not really count on having access to legal services if I were arrested. There are periodic checkpoints on major roads in Kurdistan, so traveling these roads in a car would mean certain detention. As a result, it took a day and half to get to my destination, from the time I left the Iranian border. Once there, however, I was issued an identity card, so that I no longer had any problems with the Kurdish police regarding my illegal entry.

Iranian refugees in the Iraqi Kurdistan face a number of severe difficulties. One of the major problems is lack of funds. Most people who flee do not have time to pack adequately or to bring lots of money. People who leave Iran the same way I did can carry only a few items with them. We were asked not to bring anything except identification and our laptops. In this situation, a refugee must purchase everything once he gets to his destination. I do not know what would have happened to us had the Komoleh Party not taken care of us.

Unfortunately, the office of UNHCR in Kurdish Iraq or other human rights organizations provided little or no help at all. In effect, such refugees do not have a refuge anywhere. I must add that the process at UNHCR takes about one year. Most refugees wind up in Soleimanieh, while the French consulate and the office of UNHCR are located in Erbil, 250 miles away. Every trip from Soleimanieh to Erbil costs $100, which is a significant sum of money for the refugees.

The assistance provided by the French government was the only lifeline for most refugees. Eventually, I managed to get a visa to move to France, where I now live, but many of my friends and colleagues are in still refugees in Iraq and face an unpredictable future.

Arash Bahmani is an Iranian journalist.