Will Iran retaliate if attacked? Israeli intelligence officials and neo-conservative pundits in the United States argue that Iran is bluffing – that it wouldn’t dare.

But on Tuesday, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. powerfully rebutted this view. Clapper argued not only that Iran would retaliate, but that some Iranian officials are now even willing to carry out attacks on U.S. soil.

In his unclassified statement submitted to the U.S. Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence, Clapper said: “Iran’s willingness to sponsor future attacks in the United States or against our interests abroad probably will be shaped by Tehran’s evaluation of the costs it bears for the plot…as well as Iranian leader’s perception of U.S. threats against the regime.”

The issue of survival is not taken lightly by the Iranian military and political establishments. According to an article published by the Guardian, an Iranian idiom is quite popular among military officials, “If we drown, we’ll drown everyone with us.” The Iranian regime is prepared to fight until the end.

Many foreign leaders, such as France’s Nicholas Sarkozy are also very worried about the implications of a potential military conflict with Iran. As reported by the German publication Spiegel, during his New Year’s address to diplomats in Paris, Sarkozy stated, “A military intervention [in Iran] would not solve the problem [of Iran's nuclear program], but would trigger war and chaos in the Middle East and maybe the world.

Such conclusions are far more realistic than that of a retired Israeli official who told the New York Times: “I am not saying Iran will not react. But it will be nothing like London during World War II.”

In the eyes of the Iranian regime, this is a fight for survival far more threatening than the domestic challenge presented by the protest movement of millions of Iranian demonstrators in 2009.

The recent pronouncements from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other Iranian officials should be taken seriously. In November, Khamenei said: “Iran is not a nation to sit still and just observe threats from fragile materialist powers which are being eaten by worms from inside.

“Anyone who harbors any thought of invading the Islamic Republic of Iran – or even if the thought crosses their mind – should be prepared to receive strong blows and the steel fists of the military, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, and the Basij, backed by the entire Iranian nation,” he said.

Is he bluffing? There is no way to know for sure, but are Israel and the United States willing to accept the potential risks?

There are a number of political, economic, and military retaliatory moves Iran is perfectly capable of and willing to carry out in the short and long-term.

- According to Clapper’s Worldwide Threat Assessment, “Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it is expanding the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces.” Iran can use its missile abilities to strike Israel.

- Some might make the argument that Iran’s military capabilities are not on par with Israel or the United States. It does not matter. Even if Israel succeeds in short-term air strikes, Iran is willing and able to cause and promote instability in the region. This is in direct contradiction with the United States’ broad interest in the Middle East, which is stability.

- Iran may not be able to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed indefinitely, but even threats and potential attempts will cause volatility in the Persian Gulf.

Some point to recent history and argue that Iran has never launched a large-scale retaliatory attack. But times have changed, and Iran’s position has shifted. Iran is now preparing for an attack on its soil, and part of this strategy includes an effective second strike.

I was the chief editor of the Sokhangooyeh Do’alat, the official website for the Iranian government in 2003-2004. I was also a reporter who extensively wrote for various Iranian publications about military and security matters. During my career, I have had many meetings and interviews with military commanders from various ranks and even was awarded a prize for my work by the Foundation for Preservation of the Holy Defense Values, which is a state organization in charge of preserving and promoting the revolutionary values of the Iran-Iraq war.

For more than ten years–during many formal and informal meetings– as a journalist in Iran, I have always been curious about the strategies the Iranian military is planning for a potential confrontation with the United States.
I recall a famous Iranian idiom that was quite popular among the military officials: “If we drown, we’ll drown everyone with us.” They were pretty clear about their intention. If attacked by a Western power, the war would not be contained within the Iranian boarders. The entire world would become Iran’s battleground – at least this was their thinking.

Serious of tactics and strategies were continually discussed in public and private gatherings, including the following:

A Manual for Causing Damage to the United States and Asymmetrical Warfare

On September 23, 2007, the Etemad Meli newspaper published my interview with General Ezatollah Ghafourzadeh, the chief of the Iranian Army’s Strategic Research Center. I believe he felt comfortable talking to me because I knew him well and we were from the same city.

In this interview, Ghafourzadeh announced the news of the publication of a classified book entitled, “Methods for Causing Damage to Trans-Regional Enemies” by Iran’s Army. He was, of course, referring to the United States. According to the statements by the Iranian General, various strategies for causing damage to the United States in different areas has been studied and spelled out in this manual. He also talked about the formation of a group called, the Council of Future Studies, which meets every three months and updates the manual and a defensive plan for a potential war.

This council also studies and plans for a potential “disproportionate war” with the United States. They have conducted other studies under various titles such as “Armored Unites,” “Applications for Mortar Units,” “Psychological Operations,” and the “Application of Artillery Units in Asymmetrical Warfare.”

The findings of the aforementioned studies has been that by dividing the army into many independently operating units, in an event of a military conflict with the United States, each post would be able to autonomously make decisions without communicating with the headquarters.

A Global War with the United States

During our conversation, Ghafourizadeh stated: “We will force the enemy to fight us [on our terms], when we want to and where we want to…by observing and studying America’s war in Iraq, and the Kosovo War, the Lebanon War, and the tactics used by Hamas, we have developed a native style of warfare. We have incorporated the [aforementioned lessons] with our own abilities and understanding and created a new native combat style.”

Simply put, the new styles of warfare the Iranian commanders speak about are newer and wider subversive operations. These are similar to strategies used by Hezbollah in Lebanon or even groups like Al-Qaeda. Iranians have learned from such tactics, have added their own knowledge and expertise, and will potentially implement them in a geographically wider and more devastating manner. Such a war might even be launched against the United States and European countries.

After my interview with Ghafourzadeh, I attempted to verify his statements, so I searched for his remarks published in other news media. In another interview with Mehr News, a semi-official news agency, on October 20, 2007, Ghafourzadeh stated: “At any time and in any place, we are able to engage the enemy in unorganized and tactical warfare. In the past, Iran’s military was only able to combat the enemy in an organized fashion. However today, our troops have the ability to engage the enemy with any type of clothing; in any style of warfare.”

A Quick and Decisive War

The tactics Ghafourzadeh and other Iranian commanders refer to as “new methods of fighting,” include a short duration of fighting, immense firepower, and an extensive geographic area. He publically explained part of this strategy in his interview with the Hamshahri newspaper on March 9, 2009:

“In future wars, the enemy will showcase its ground ability via high mobility mechanized offensive units…today the military operations take place around the clock. The enemy will operate night and day. Instead of direct running battles [with the enemy], the modern [Iranian] operations are vast, three dimensional, and multifaceted… It is no longer true that a war would, for example, start at the Iran-Iraq border and end there. An outbreak of a possible war could directly impact all the countries and the region as a whole.”

According to this commander’s statements and based on my other numerous encounters with other Iranian military officials, I believe Iran is planning to respond with a war of attrition and sabotage in the region and across the globe.

Using Propaganda as Deterrence

When I encountered the Iranian official’s public rants and propaganda against the West, I always wondered why, despite the highly classified nature of these strategies, military officials announce them publically.

I found my answer during a conference with Ali Shamkhani, Iran’s former Defense Minister, with government officials. In that meeting, Shamkhani was asked about the reason behind the heightened propaganda about Iran’s military abilities. Shamkhani’s response was illuminating. Iran’s Defense Ministry was implementing the strategy of deterring a foreign attack by publically announcing Iran’s military capabilities. The officials believed by declaring, and perhaps exaggerating the Islamic Republic’s abilities, the United States would be dissuaded from attacking the country.

According to Shamkhani, this policy was reviewed and approved by Iran’s political elites and the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. During the same time period an organization by the name of the Central Military Propaganda Office was established in the Defense Ministry. This newly-founded center was tasked with advertising the military capabilities of the Islamic Republic in order to paint a harsh outcome for the United States if it decides to attack Iran.

This strategy would in turn increase the morale of internal forces and the population as well. Shamkhani labeled this tactic as “strengthening psychological operations.” These psychological operations are still taking place and they are aimed at strengthening the moral of the Iranian troops against the enemy’s damage.

Mandatory Readiness Training

The Iranian commanders talk about modern means of warfare, but their reliance on unconventional warfare requires a great deal of manpower. According to my discussion with various military officials, which were censored by the Army’s Intelligence Office and never published, another strategy, which is being discussed but has yet to be executed, is the implementation of a mandatory readiness training service. Each individual who has already completed his military service will be asked to annually report to various military bases and renew his military training.

Planning for a confrontation after the United States invasion of Iraq

However, despite their official statements dismissing the possibility of a military attack by the United States, the Iranian officials are taking the threats very seriously. Since the day the United States invaded Iraq, the Iranian officials began their planning for a potential confrontation. The Ministers of Commerce and Agriculture were tasked with planning and preparing for a potential war with the West and finding ways to provide the country with the necessary food supplies. These trends continue to this day and all officials are required to keep the possibility of a potential war in mind as they are planning for future.

Ehsan Mehrabi is a distinguished Iranian journalist who has written about the Islamic Republic’s military, parliamentary politics, and various other socio-political issues for more than a decade. He has worked as the parliamentary reporter for the reformist newspapers Etemad Meli and Tose’eh, and as a reporter and political editor for Hambastegi newspaper. During his career he has interviewed many Iranian military commanders and officials. He left Iran a few months ago.

The evidence of Khamenei’s belief can be found in his public speech in Qom on January 9, “The current conditions in Iran are the same as Badr and Kheybar, and not Shaab-e-Abu Talib,” Khamenei said.

According to Islamic history Shaab-e-Abu Talib is a region in Saudi Arabia, where during the early days of Islam, the Prophet Mohammad and his followers were forced to live under an economic and social blockade for three years. According to Islamic literature, the situation was so bad that “they had to tie rocks to their stomachs” in order to alleviate the pain resulting from prolonged hunger.

Similar language emerged in an unprecedented statement by Mahmoud Bahmani, head of Iran’s Central Bank, announced on December 21, 2011, “We have to manage the society in a way to survive for two years. Just like if were trapped in Shaab-e-Abu Talib.”

Khamenei dismissed the head of the Central Bank’s statements, but by recognizing the situation similar to Badr and Kheybar, he has indirectly confessed that the Islamic Republic is isolated domestically, regionally, and internationally.

However, he believes, just like the Prophet of Islam, he should face his opponents with the small army at his disposal.

The Battles of Badr and Kheybar were two important battles fought by the Prophet of Islam against the enemies of the newly-established religion. He fought the enemies, despite the small size of his army, and was victorious in both battles.

Despite the current harsh economic conditions, this history indicates Khamenei is hopeful that by adopting the policies of “patience and endurance” and “threats against threats,” he and his supporters could stand against the United States and the West.

The threats coming from Iran, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz, influencing Arab states in transition, publishing reports about capturing U.S. spies, and increasing the levels of domestic oppression are all tactics used by Iran in order to deal with the internal and external crisis.

By threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz, the clerics in Iran are hoping to force the United States and the West to take a step back. They also hope to intimidate the regional countries and demonstrate Iran’s military might in order to improve their shaky legitimacy internally.

Iran has welcomed the recent developments in the Arab world with this strategy. The Islamic Republic is trying to convince its people that the citizens of the Arab world have chosen the same path as Iranians chose thirty-two years ago.

In the meanwhile, the Islamic Republic is trying to exploit its deteriorating relationship with the United States. Iran is holding the United States responsible for the majority of its own flaws, shortcomings, and internal problems. The regime has also tried to connect the members of the opposition to Western governments in order to legitimize the harsh repression against activists fighting for change.

His devotees, only one day after the storming of the British embassy in Tehran, confessed that they were “deceived” by a seven-member council whose members belong to the student basij (affiliated with the IRGC) in Tehran universities.

After two years of silence, Hassan Alaei, former IRGC Navy Chief, in a controversial op-ed published in Ettelaat newspaper, a publication under the direct supervision of Khamenei, implicitly advised the Supreme Leader to learn from Mohammad Reza Shah, who was toppled in the 1979 Islamic revolution. Alaei suggested that the oppression of the regime’s critics should be stopped.

For more than 10 months, a great number of Khamenei’s supporters have been clearly declaring that the Supreme Leader’s personal support for Ahmadinejad was a mistake. They believe that Ahmadinejad “deviated” from the political mainstream and plans to force the clergy from the country’s power structure.

In the meantime, after the implementation of the first phase of the subsidy reform program and the recent set of sanctions, Iran’s economic situation is more dreadful than ever. According to Asadollah Asgar Oladi, the head of Chamber of Iran-China Commerce, the inflation rate is close to 40%. Asgar Oladi warns that if the situation continues during the next six months, the country may face supply shortages.

The international sanctions on Iran, imposed due to the country’s defiance of UN Security Council resolutions on its nuclear program, are expanding day by day.

After nearly six years of establishing sanctions against Iran due to its nuclear program, Fereydoun Abbasi, Head of Iran’s Atomic Energy, admitted that some Iranian nuclear scientists are not willing to cooperate with Tehran on nuclear projects due to risks of sanctions.

Despite all the internal and external problems, the Islamic Republic has reacted to the recent set of Western sanctions with the “threats against threats” strategy.

Iran’s actions and statements show us how worried the government is of internal opposition and a threat of external wars.

Contrary to what the Iranian government claims, the foundations of its legitimacy have been shaken due to the crackdown of the protesters following the 2009 presidential election. Threatening the United States and the West and repressing the people domestically is not a sign of bravery. These actions are signals of an internal fear expressed in various forms by the Islamic Republic.

Behnam Gholipour is an Iranian journalist with more than 15 years of experience. He has written for various Iranian publications such as Abrar, Tose-eh, and Etedal. Gholipour also worked as a political analyst and reporter for Radio Zamaneh. He is currently the chief editor of the Digarban website.

If there were any doubt that Iran has sentenced a young Iranian-American to death purely for political reasons, Amir Hekmati’s family has now provided convincing evidence of Iran’s true motives.

In an interview with the BBC Persian Service, the family said Hekmati, fearful he would find himself exactly in the situation he is in now, visited the Iranian Interests Section in Washington, D.C.,  before  his trip.  He provided detailed information about his background as a former U.S. marine and sought advice from officials at the Interests Section. He asked if they thought this would cause problems for him in Tehran, and they assured him it was safe to make the trip.

Not only did the Iranian officials in Washington mislead Hekmati, but it seems that they alerted the authorities in Tehran, transforming the young man into the latest political pawn in the running conflict between Iran and the United States.

This new information sheds light on both the depth of Iran’s fear of Western intervention and the lengths to which it is resolved to counter mounting pressure from the United States. It should also serve as a warning to many of the Republican Presidential hopefuls that, while it is easy to raise the rhetorical temperature for domestic political gains, taking on the regime in Tehran will be no simple matter.

Whether it is an isolated strike on its nuclear facilities or a larger attack, Iran would retaliate with all its might as would its proxies in the Middle East. Such a development would make the costly, bloody conflict now winding down in Iraq look like a training exercise.

The death sentence for an Iranian-American on charges of “collaborating with a hostile government [the United States], membership in the United States’ intelligence organizations, and attempting to accuse Iran of terrorism” is highly unusual, even for Iran. While Americans have been taken hostage, Iranian-Americans held for long periods in prison, no American in recent memory has received the death sentence.

Despite the evidence to the contrary, Iran maintains that its judiciary is independent from politics. But in fact, the Iranian judicial branch is politicized and the majority of the political cases tried in the Islamic courts are predetermined rulings handed down to the judge by higher officials.

The decisions behind sensitive political cases are often made within the upper echelons of the intelligence and security organizations. Trials and the events surrounding political cases are also used for propaganda purposes, which is true in the case of Hekamti.  His confessions were broadcast on December 18 on Iran’s state-run television on a program entitled “confessions of an American Spy.”

According to a subsequent report published by Fars News, a semi-official news agency close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp, the accused admitted to staying in the Bagram U.S. military air base in Afghanistan for two months prior to his trip to Iran. According to this report, Hekmati confessed to receiving intelligence training during his stay at the base. Now, it is known that this information, according to BBC Persian’s interview with his family, was provided to the Iranian government through their Interests Section in Washington DC.

Judge Abolghasem Salavati, the judge presiding over Hekamti’s trial, is infamous for handing out heavy prison terms and execution sentences to the majority of the accused in his court. He has presided over many sensitive political cases, such as the trials of the three American hikers, the prominent Iranian blogger, Hossein Derakhshan,  Zahra Bahrami, a  Dutch-Iranian citizen who was executed for “drug trafficking,” and the Iranian politician and diplomat Ebrahim Yazdi. He was also the judge who presided over the numerous show trials following the disputed 2009 presidential election, handing out heavy prison sentences to hundreds of Iranian reformists and dissidents.

More proof of the judiciary’s lack of independence is the direct involvement of the Supreme Leader in choosing the head of the judicial branch. Sadegh Larijani, the head of the judicial branch, was handpicked by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2009. He is the brother of Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, with close ties to the military and intelligence agencies.

Given the political nature of the judiciary, and what appears to be a shift in how Iran is dealing with sanctions and other aggressive acts by the United States, it would not be surprising if Hekmati becomes another victim among those who have gotten caught in the crossfire of Tehran and Washington’s perennial cold war.

As Iran issued another threat on Tuesday, this time to take action if the U.S. Navy returns an aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf, it might seem that the government in Tehran is begging for a military attack.

Why else would the Iranian regime test fire a cruise missile during exercises in the Persian Gulf on Monday? Why would it threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz two weeks ago while also conducting 10 days of military exercises to show off Iran’s military might? In addition, Iran’s nuclear agency said its scientists had produced their first nuclear rod, despite tough sanctions from the United States, the United Nations and the European Union.

But Iran is not begging for a military confrontation. It’s recent aggression is due, in fact, to its fear of a pending military attack. My sources inside the country say the circle of regime insiders around Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei truly believes an attack is inevitable, perhaps even before the U.S. presidential election. Therefore, to save face at home and in the region, Iran’s saber-rattling has reached a fever pitch.

In order not to appear weak in light of the pressure coming from the United States, Iran is determined to show it maintains the upper hand, which it tries to demonstrate through its military exercises, threats and hostile rhetoric. But such behavior, which Iran believes demonstrates its strength and some in the United States view as aggression, should not be misunderstood as Iran provoking the United States to launch a military attack.

The more candidates running for election in the United States publicly endorse a military attack, and the more the Obama administration is forced to appear hawkish, the more the Iranian regime works to prepare for what insiders believe will be a hit on the country’s nuclear facilities if not the population.

Despite the fact that the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic has depended upon an ideologically-driven foreign policy for more than thirty years – no normalized relationship with the United States and no recognition of the state of Israel – this in no way means Iran wants a military conflict. There is a difference in finding virtue in the distance between Iran and Western powers, as the regime has done since the Islamic revolution, and risking self-destruction.

As much as American pundits and politicians highlight the hostile statements coming from Tehran, a closer examination reveals Iran’s backpedalling in recent days.

Iran’s vice president appeared definitive when he threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if further sanctions are imposed on Tehran. “If we cannot export oil, not a drop will be allowed to be exported by anyone else,” said Muhammad Reza Rahimi, Iran’s first assistant president.

But since then, commanders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps have retreated somewhat by explaining that passage through the Strait is a weapon Iran would use only if necessary. “We will respond to any threat by intensified threat and this fact has no time or geographical limitations,” said Brigadier General Hossein Salami, Lieutenant Commander of the IRGC. He added, “Our response to threats is threats.”

Another IRGC commander also backed away from threats to close the Strait. Masoud Jazayeri, a powerful general, tried to retreat from the brink by saying such talk is five years old and Iran has other options to defend itself “when the time comes.”

American policy makers and pundits should use their imagination to see the view from Tehran. Influential Americans sound the daily call for action to be taken against Iran, even though most fail to explicitly spell out the details. Compound this with a long-standing belief of Supreme Leader Khamenei that the United States’ objective has always been regime change in Iran. The small circle around Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader himself believe they are engaged in a new cold war, which has been hotter than that between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union, characterized by covert operations inside their country including the assassinations of nuclear scientists, a computer virus and attacks on Islamic Revolutionary Guards posts.

These Iranians belief that this “soft war” is a prelude to real war on the horizon. Despite the failures of President Obama’s engagement policy with Iran during the early period of his administration, there was one important success, which is often forgotten: Obama managed to convince at least part of the Iranian people that the United States was not in conflict with them, but their government. This message found particular resonance with at least some young Iranians who want to become part of the globalized world. However, with the approval of the most recent sanctions on Iran’s central bank, it is likely Iran’s business class will blame Obama. They have witnessed a depreciation of 10 percent in their currency just in the last week.

Now, Khamenei and his hard-line loyalists have just received the evidence to undo this delicate and newfound trust between Americans and Iranians. Both Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in recent months have used the bellicose rhetoric from Washington to argue at home that the United States is at war with the Iranian people. This serves many useful purposes for the regime, including justifying repression against those who are accused of being “spies” for the United States who in reality are working toward positive change in Iran.

But in the end, Iran wants to move away from the brink. Cooler heads in Washington should do their part to end the escalation of hostility before the regime’s perception becomes reality.

The possibility of a military strike against Iran has become a focal point of U.S. foreign policy debates. As the hawkish voices intensify, we as members of a generation born in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War cannot help but remember the tragedy of those eight years of bloodshed that are so ingrained in our memories.

We want to highlight the images that both haunt our generation and capture the ways that the regime in Iran used the war as a tool to strengthen its control over the country. Although many socioeconomic and political factors are different today, we believe that, if attacked, the Iranian regime will use the same tactics to crush dissent and once again secure its authority over the people.

Both born in 1985, we vividly recall the final phase of the Iran-Iraq War and its aftermath. We remember the cacophonous sound of air strikes in and around Tehran and the nights of taking refuge in neighborhood public shelters. We recall the worried faces of our parents as the sound of alarm sirens — deafening to our young ears — ripped through the air. We remember standing on our balconies and watching a parade of coffins go by, as mourning mothers broke down and said their last goodbyes to dead sons.

One of the first heroes introduced to us in elementary school was a 13-year-old boy named Hossein Fahmideh. We learned all about his story and his heroic act, done in the name of Iran and the Islamic Revolution. We were told that he was among the many young boys who took up the call for martyrdom. For defending the Islamic land, the ruling clergy promised him a place in heaven. Martyr Fahmideh, as he was known to us, had tied grenades to his waist and threw himself under an Iraqi tank to stop it from advancing toward Iranian territory. We grew up hearing constant reminders of Fahmideh’s bravery and of the many others like him who sacrificed their lives in defense of our “Islamic land.”

As young girls, we were asked to guard our veils so as not to disappoint Martyr Fahmideh, who would be watching his Iranian Muslim sisters from heaven. As young boys, we were instructed to carry on his legacy by unswervingly defending our land against the imperialist West and other threats to the Islamic Republic.

Today, as our generation in Iran experiences grave social and political injustices, many find themselves jaded and cynical about the revolutionary ideals that were never delivered upon. We regularly stay in touch with family and friends inside the country, and their reports indicate a strong sense of mistrust and resentment toward the authorities. Today we wonder whether Fahmideh, if he were alive, would have been a member of the Green Movement. Would he be a factory worker fighting for labor rights? Would he, just like us, be a part of the country’s enormous brain drain, studying at some Western university? Or perhaps he would simply be among the host of college-educated, unemployed adults who watch, silent and disappointed, as the Islamic Republic destroy the nation’s prospects in the name of his, and every other veteran’s and martyr’s, bravery.

Our generation is quite familiar with the tactics that the Islamic Republic utilized during the years of the Iran-Iraq War and the decades that followed. The regime used the conflict as an excuse to keep the nation repressed and fearful of losing land to enemies — perhaps the most sustainable way to secure and stabilize its rule. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni, the Revolution’s paramount leader, declared when the conflict began, “War is a divine blessing, a gift bestowed upon us by God. The cannon’s thunder rejuvenates the soul.” The regime mastered the art of repression during the 1980s. Anybody who dared to speak out against the government was considered the enemy of Islam and the divine rule of the Islamic Republic, a legacy carried forth into the postwar era.

In the months following the 2009 presidential elections, the regime’s repressive tactics seemed to have finally lost their effectiveness as millions of young men and women peacefully marched in the streets. They loudly demanded the freedoms promised to them by their leaders, freedoms for which the martyrs of the Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War had supposedly sacrificed their lives. Ever since those unprecedented demonstrations, the Islamic Republic has ramped up its use of force and violence. Yet for all of its repressive efforts, it is not able to put an end to the people’s escalating frustrations and dissatisfaction.

During the past two years, fearful of losing their grip on power, Iran’s rulers have cracked down with increasing severity on social and political freedoms. Although the popular opposition movement seems to be contained, it is not dead. A generation of young activists are picking up the mantle of responsibility and carrying on the struggle for reform. Throughout the country, university students have prevented government officials from delivering speeches on campus or even entering their schools. By writing open letters against the regime’s policies and staging strikes and protests, the students have kept the call for change and freedom alive.

Any military action against Iran will derail the process of peaceful political transition and reform in the country. Given the domestic turbulences, we fear that a military strike against the Islamic Republic is a desirable outcome for the regime. We fear that even the threat of such an attack only helps the regime to regain some of its lost legitimacy and mobilize the people in defense of their homeland.

With the recent talk of possible war, the regime’s leadership is preparing the nation for a large-scale conflict. Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), recently insisted that the armed forces are ready for military engagement. According to Fars News, the semiofficial news agency close to the Guards, he stated, “Complete and full scale preparedness of the military forces, including the IRGC, Basij, and people was the reason why the enemies did not go beyond just threatening Iran and the reason why we are witnessing their retreat from their threatening remarks now.”

Even if quite weakened internally, a regime like Iran’s benefits from an imminent threat posed by a foreign enemy — it binds the people more tightly to a central power that can defend the national borders. Despite the differences between the Iran of today and during the years of the war with Iraq, a military strike would almost certainly awaken the patriotic sentiments of the people, leading them to set aside domestic political considerations in defense of their land against the external adversary. With war, we fear that the peaceful demonstrators of the Green Movement will be forced to pick up arms against foreign invaders instead of continuing their arduous path of demanding reform.

Thus, as members of the generation of a bloody war, we worry that a military strike by Israel or the United States against Iran would be the golden opportunity that the overlords of the Islamic Republic expediently await.

Reza H. Akbari is a research associate at the Century Foundation and a graduate student at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, majoring in Middle East studies.

Azadeh Pourzand is a recent graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and Nijenrode Business Universiteit in the Netherlands. Her research and consultancy work focuses on youth, women, and civil society in Muslim contexts.

While they refuse to use the term “election boycott,” they recognize that participating in elections is in effect useless, which is essentially a boycott. Therefore, we can predict that the regime will be faced with an electoral crisis. History has shown that widespread voter turnout is important to the regime; Iran’s leaders believe great voter participation lends legitimacy to the elections, which as neither fair nor transparent.

We have long witnessed the confrontation between the reformist and principlist (conservatives) fronts in the political structure of the Islamic Republic. This confrontation is a revisionist conflict between the people in support of the status quo and individuals arguing for reforms. The reformists were removed from politics after the fraudulent 2009 presidential election due to the solutions they presented to bringing about positive change in Iran. They proposed ideas, such as détente with America, an open economy, human rights, and the accountability of the Supreme Leader. However, these proposals were not acceptable to the principlists.

After the reformist front was completely removed from the equation, the principlists fractured into three groups: those who supported President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; traditional Principlists led by hardline Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi; and those led by Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani.

Ahmadinejad is aware of the deep hatred of the traditional principlists toward him. If his faction can win the upcoming parliamentary elections, he can be hopeful that his camp could do well in the future presidential elections in 2013. A dominant presence in the parliament would ensure that the traditional conservatives would not take revenge upon him.

The disagreement between ayatollahs Mahdavi Kani and Mesbah Yazdi is over their attempt to control the parliament and potentially the presidency through their supporters. However, more importantly, their difference lies in their attempt to secure a position for themselves as the next Supreme Leader after the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. They both believe they are qualified and worthy of this position. Mahdavi Kani and Mesbah Yazdi are both senior members of the Assembly of Experts.

The principlists want to preserve the status quo. The challenge for the principlists is how to achieve this without addressing several political and economic crises facing the country. The answer has three components: force, wealth, and deception. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp is their tool for applying force. The bazaar is a tool under their control for managing wealth, and the clergy is used for deception. Fundamentally, the power structure in Iran is based on these three pillars. In the 2005 presidential election, when the principlists and reformists faced off, Ahmadinejad was victorious because he succeeded in capturing the support of these three groups.

In the fight amongst the principlist factions, Ahmadinejad has left the circle of traditional principlists due to the fact that he has lost the support of two important components; the clergy and the IRGC no longer support him. Since he is still in charge of the executive branch, he has access to petroleum revenues, but his support among the Bazaaris is also dwindling.

Therefore, among the prominent politicians vying for power, the Larijani family and their circle of supporters are the best possible option for taking over the parliament. The Larijani family and their supporters have the most connections with the three pillars of politics. As the son of an influential cleric, Ali Larijani enjoys a great relationship with the Bazaar, and he was also a senior member of the IRGC. The Larijani family is also close to Khamenei.

Ali Larijani and Sadegh Larijani are in charge of the Iranian Judicial and Legislative branches of the government, respectively. Another Larijani brother also holds influential positions in the government. Some call them the Iranian Kennedys, even though they do not possess the degree of prestige the Kennedy family has enjoyed in the United States. We should not forget that Ali Larijani was also presidential candidate in 2005, and lost the election.

Khamenei’s favorite list for the parliamentary elections, which Mahdavi Kani has been chosen to structure, possesses the aforementioned components –the clergy, IRGC, and Bazaar. Constructing such a list of candidates will not be possible unless the Guardian Council disqualifies candidates and steals the election. Therefore, what is likely to happen should be called “selections” and not elections.

It is clear that when the government chooses to ignore the crises facing the country and follows the path of tyranny, the level of participation among the people decreases. The despotic government is therefore forced to steal the elections and stage a cover-up. The 2009 presidential election was one example of this phenomenon. The upcoming parliamentary polls in March are likely to be another example of authoritarianism triumphing over free elections.

Hossein Alizadeh is the former Iranian charge d’affaires at the Iranian embassy in Finland. He resigned after the contested 2009 presidential election.

When interviewed, the attackers repeatedly have spoken about their experience – at least as it is perceived by them – as similar to that of the occupation of the U.S. embassy thirty-two years ago. The occupation of the American embassy resulted in the end of the diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States, but at the same time it became a launching pad for the student occupiers into government and parliamentary positions. Therefore, in the absence of  a U.S. embassy in Tehran, the Basiji students viewed climbing the walls of the British embassy as an opportunity to climb through the ranks of Iranian politics. However, these students must not have heard the well-known saying: History repeats itself the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.

Most of Iran political analysts are aware that many of the individuals protesting at the British embassy do not represent most Iranian students. It appears that the protesters who gathered in front of the British embassy were given permission by Iranian government officials to convey that the Iranian people oppose British policies toward Iran. However, an important question still remains: Why did the Iranian government put an end to the protests following the 2009 disputed presidential election by any means necessary, but decided to be passive toward the protests in front of the British embassy?

The British embassy attackers freely threw stones at the embassy even though two years ago, during the famous Ashura-day protest launched against the government, a student was arrested simply for being accused of throwing stones at Iranian police. He was later sentenced to be executed for that crime. (This ruling was not carried out as a result of protests by the media and the people).

Shortly after the attack on the British embassy, one Iranian parliamentary member referred to the action as the “capture of the nest of British spies” and called it a third revolution. “Nest of spies” is a description the Iranian regime gave in justifying the takeover of the U.S. embassy thirty-two years ago. Ayatollah Khomeini referred to the capture of the embassy as the second revolution and a more significant one than the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Nonetheless, it appears that state authorities, hours after the attack on the British embassy, altered their stance due to strong diplomatic pressures that reminded them of their international obligations. According to the 1961 Geneva Convention, governments that host foreign embassies are responsible for their protection and safety.

The Iranian government’s retreat was evident in Ali Akbar Salehi’s remarks. The Iranian Foreign Minister attempted to distance the government from the attacks. However, at the same time he emphasized that British policies have angered the Iranian people.

In reality, for many years the Iranian government has used the Basij to further its own interests, while at the same time portraying their actions as spontaneous deeds of the people. The Basij organization is part of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards that in recent years has increasingly served to carry out the objectives of Supreme Leader Khamenei, particularly after the formation of the Green Movement. The Basij forces are part of Khamenei’s efforts to militarize the state.

In fact, after the 2009 protests that made the government aware of its decreasing popularity among the people, the Basij’s annual budget increased to more than $ 400 million. The Basij organization has many branches, one of which is a student branch. Even though this branch has the word student in its title, a military commander is in charge.

The requirements for joining the Basji force include believing in the system of government and the leader of the Islamic Republic. The members of the Basij organization undergo ideological and military trainings in order to use religious principles as the rationale for defending the Iranian state. Joining this group also has economic benefits. Most of the members of Basij are employed at governmental organizations and companies affiliated with the state. Some of the members are also admitted into universities without possessing the appropriate academic background.

The above mentioned events are taking place during a time when the student movement that advocates democracy and human rights was severely suppressed two years ago and the leaders of the movement have either been imprisoned or have been expelled from the university campuses. Bahareh Hedayat is one of the student leaders who is a member of the Central Office of Consolidating Unity. Bahareh has been sentenced to nine and a half years in prison because of her statements and participation in student meetings. Zia Nabavi can also be named. He is the founder of the Advocacy Council for the Right to Education (ACRE). He has been sentenced to ten years in prison, in one of the worst Iranian prisons, for objecting to denial of education as a form of state punishment in Iran.

Unlike two years ago, Iranian students, due to imprisonments and academic suspensions, can no longer organize mass protests against the government. Nevertheless, they attempted to send a message to the world that the attackers of the British embassy are not their representatives. This message can be observed in the statement of the Office of Consolidating Unity, the most prominent student organization in Iran. This office expressed its dissatisfaction that the international media is representing the attackers of the British embassy as students. The students have announced that their real leaders are those who have been imprisoned as a result of protests against government policies.

Mehdi Arabshahi was the former Secretary of the Office of Consolidating Unity and a prominent student activist who now lives in New York. Following the 2009 presidential election protests, Arabshahi was arrested and detained in Evin prison for three months in solitary confinement.

Many things are up for grabs in this month’s Egyptian parliamentary elections: the role of religion, the power of the military, and the emerging shape of Arab democracy. But one thing is not: Cairo’s foreign policy. Washington believes that a secular victory would be good for U.S. interests and an Islamist win would be problematic. But no matter which party picks up the most seats in parliament, the new Egypt will be less compliant to U.S. demands and cultivate warmer relations with Iran.

Egypt’s spring revolution was largely directed at former President Hosni Mubarak’s failed domestic leadership. But Egyptians were fed up with his foreign policies as well. To maintain good ties with the United States and Israel, Mubarak had been reflexively hostile toward Iran and its allies — Hezbollah, Hamas, and Syria. In recent years, his hostility was ever more apparent. According to WikiLeaks cables released in 2010, Mubarak had even said that “Iranian influence was spreading like a cancer from the [Gulf Cooperation Council] to Morocco.” He also reportedly gave Israel a green light to conduct its 2008 bombing raids on Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It is telling that the Iranian regime named a street in Tehran in honor of the assassin who killed Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

Egypt’s alliance with Washington unnerved the Egyptian public. They felt that their country’s standing in the Arab world was slipping, and that Mubarak was to blame. This grievance, however, remained largely hidden from view during the Tahrir Square protests. Demonstrators burned no foreign flags, for example, and they refrained from chants against the United States and Israel. They wanted Mubarak out, and that meant relentlessly harping on domestic issues, such as Egypt’s massive unemployment problem, poor educational system, and lack of government services.

But now that the elections are approaching, public debate over Egypt’s new role in the world has reached a fever pitch. In interviews during a recent trip to Cairo, activists, experts, and candidates from across the political spectrum agreed that Egypt should seek significantly friendlier relationships with Iran and its allies in order to build influence in the region. A new government in Cairo should also, many said, maintain good ties with Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the United States — but not at the expense of its partnering with the Iranian regime. “There is no reason for us to have hostilities toward Iran,” said Mustafa el-Labbad, the director of the Middle East Center for Regional and Strategic Studies in Cairo, “although there are vast differences between us.”

Even the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Egypt’s transitional military government, which is sometimes touted as the player most closely aligned with U.S. interests ultimately agrees. If the population wants a better relationship with Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Syria, the SCAF would be hard-pressed to ignore the sentiment. Of course, friendship with these actors could also be in the SCAF’s own interests: By maintaining connections with all major factions in the Middle East, the SCAF, serving as Egypt’s government, will increase its own influence in regional politics.

Signs of the council’s turn toward Iran were apparent from the revolution’s earliest days. One of SCAF’s first major acts was to allow Iran to move ships through the Suez Canal — something it has prohibited since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Tehran reciprocated: The Iranian regime vocally supported the uprising. And soon after Mubarak fell, Iran announced that it had appointed an ambassador to Egypt for the first time since diplomatic ties were cut in 1978. In May, after meetings with high-level Iranian officials, Egypt’s foreign minister stated that the country had “opened a new page” with Iran. In August, Iran sent another diplomatic delegation of high-level officials to Cairo to solidify personal ties.

The crux of the matter is that Egyptians again want their country to be the center of the Arab world. They feel it is their due: Egypt is the most populous of the world’s 22 Arab-speaking countries; the home of Al-Azhar, the university and mosque complex that is the seat of learning for Sunni Muslims; and the heart and soul of Arab cinema. Even so, they know that when the new political order in the Middle East consolidates, they may be forced to contend with lots of centers of power. The more of these that they are on good terms with, the closer they will be to achieving their goal.

Egypt’s yearning for regional influence goes hand in hand with its transforming arrangement with Israel and the United States. Among elites and as well as the general public, animosity toward Israel transcends religion and political affiliations. The September attack on the Israeli embassy in Cairo tapped into decades of frustration and desire for a dramatic show of Egyptian society’s disdain for Israel. Under Mubarak, Egyptians had expressed their opposition in occasional demonstrations and, when permitted, in the media. Nationwide campaigns erupted against scholars, artists, and other public figures who dared travel to Israel. In the mid-1990s, Egyptians even refused to buy shampoo they believed was produced in Israel because they thought their hair would fall out.

To be sure, Muslim Brotherhood candidates have vowed to maintain ties with Israel, but it is hard to imagine that they — or any other faction — will be able to do so while pursuing close relations with Iran. To a lesser extent, the same is true of Cairo’s connection to Washington. No Egyptian candidate advocates completely severing ties with Washington — after all, that would mean relinquishing the $2 billion in annual aid the United States supplies to Egypt. But on the stump, the widespread view is that Washington should have much less say in the affairs of state than it did under Mubarak.

In Cairo today, the fear of covert U.S. interference in the election runs deep. The campaign manager of a candidate who has Islamist roots but recently left the Muslim Brotherhood alleged in an interview that the Washington-based National Democratic Institute, which is funded by the U.S. Congress and has a local office in Cairo, is financing the campaigns of some candidates. The campaign manager said he believed that the NDI was trying to make sure that pro-U.S. candidates would win. Another parliamentary candidate pointed out an invitation on his desk to an event at the U.S. embassy, declaring that he would not risk his chance of winning by being seen in the company of Americans. The SCAF has even warned U.S. election-monitoring groups that they can only “witness” the upcoming elections, not monitor them, which means that outsiders will be prohibited from entering the areas where voting takes place. Now that Mubarak is gone, the political class is losing its tolerance for “foreign intervention” — from the United States, nongovernmental organizations, or anyone else.

As Egyptians go out to vote, predictions hold that the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party will do better than any other faction. An October poll conducted by the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies found that 36 percent of respondents favored the Muslim Brotherhood. Brotherhood candidates predict a higher return: According to Emad Hamdy, the chief campaign adviser to Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a popular Egyptian figure who is running for president as an independent after having left the movement in the spring, noted that “the Brotherhood combined with independents associated with the Brotherhood could obtain 65 percent of the votes.”

Whatever the result, Egyptians want to be rid of the remnants of the Mubarak regime. This means that whether the Muslim Brotherhood proves victorious, Egypt will aim to be a regional power in the Arab world. Of necessity, that will include good relations with other powers across the Middle East that had heretofore been kept at arm’s length.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, one of the greatest failures of the country’s leadership has been the inability to make a promised transition from a monarchy to republican rule. In fact, since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei began his tenure as Supreme Leader twenty-two years ago, he has centralized power further in his own hands, creating what can be called a clerical monarchy.

Now, Khamenei may be completing the circle and entirely eliminating any notion of a “republic” by turning Iran into a fully blown theocratic and authoritarian state.

Last month, Khamenei made a short statement, which has sparked an intense debate. The 72-year-old Iranian leader hinted at the possibility of dissolving the post of president, one of only two institutions in which the populace has a say.

During a visit to Kermanshah, a western Iranian province, Khamenei announced, “In the country’s current political system, there is a president who is directly elected by the people. This is a good and an effective method. However, if someday in the distant future, it is decided that the parliamentary system is a better way to elect the head of the executive branch, there is nothing wrong with changing the current mechanism.”

So why has the Supreme Leader decided to suggest eliminating the position of the presidency in Iran? What does he have to gain from this dramatic political shift? The most obvious explanation is his determination not to repeat the disputed 2009 election and its aftermath. Elections in Iran historically have offered the population rare opportunities to express their grievances with the regime. The protests in 2009 and 2010, which drew millions of Iranians to the streets, not only seriously threatened Khamenei’s ability to govern, but exposed his unpopularity.

In recent years, beginning with the victorious election in 1997 of Mohammad Khatami to the presidency – an outcome conservatives and hardliners did not expect or want – the regime has faced a dilemma over whether the benefits of elections outweigh the costs. The presidential and parliamentary elections – the two polls in which a sizeable number of the electorate are allowed to participate – provide a façade that the country is somewhat of a republic, even though a body called the Guardian Council vets candidates long before voters ever get to the polls.

But the 2009 election and its aftermath inspired a poplar rebellion unprecedented in Iran’s post-revolutionary history. And now that uprisings have swept the Arab world, it is not surprising that Khamenei is so worried about public reaction to Iran’s scheduled 2013 presidential poll that he prefers to eliminate it entirely.

In addition, electoral seasons in Iran inspire some degree of euphoria within society. It is often a time of lively public debate over politics, women’s limited rights in Iran, the economy and Iran’s place in the world, which generally produces widespread criticism of the regime. Khamenei might believe now that the regime is too weak to withstand such intense public scrutiny.

Should Khamenei eliminate the post of president and instead create a parliamentary system, the power to govern would be even more concentrated in the office of the Supreme Leader and this has been Khamenei’s long-term objective.

In recent years, he has moved to acquire influence over three central branches of government. He effectively controls the judicial branch of the government by personally choosing its head. He maintains control over the legislative branch through the supervisory power given to the Guardian Council. This council consists of 12 jurists who determine the compatibility with the Shari’a (Islamic law) with the laws passed by the Parliament. If the laws do not pass the necessary requirements, the Council refers them back to the Parliament for revision. This effective veto power gives the council the de facto role of a parliamentary upper chamber. Six individuals on this 12-member body are directly elected by the Supreme Leader and the other half by the parliament from the jurists nominated by the head of the judiciary.

Khamenei will further control the legislative branch with the recent approval of the “Parliamentary Supervision over Members of Parliament” bill. On Tuesday, September 27, the Iranian Parliament approved Article 4 of the “Parliamentary Supervision over Members of Parliament” bill, which specifies a method for Parliament to expel certain MPs from the body. Based on one of the provisions in this bill, if the Council of Supervision votes to expel a certain member, he or she is not able to file a legal objection through the judicial system. The bill completely removes the legal immunity of members of the parliament in fulfilling their role as representatives.

This provides Khamenei or his aides with the ability to eliminate any parliamentary member deemed to be a trouble maker. By eliminating the position of the presidency, the Supreme Leader effectively dissolves a semi-independent branch of the government whose head is directly chosen by the people, after the Guardian Council vets the candidates seeking to run in the election.

It appears that discussion about eliminating the position of the president has been underway for a few months. According to Fars News, a semi-official news agency, a powerful deputy in the parliament, Mohammad Dehghan, revealed that the office of the Supreme Leader had assigned a group of legal experts to study the feasibility of a shift in the political structure of the country.

According to Dehghan, “This team has studied tens of articles in the constitution and they have identified some issues.” Dehghan reiterated that this team has been functioning under the supervision of the Office of the Supreme Leader and their findings have been sent to that office. Dehghan is referring to the constitutional articles related to the executive branch of the government.

There are many regime insiders who are worried about the future identity of the Islamic Republic. According to Aftab News, on October 25, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Head of the Expediency Council, protested the possibility of eliminating the presidency in Iran. He warned that the decision will further restrict the political environment and cautioned that this decision would “be contrary to the Constitution and would weaken the people’s power of choice.”

According to Rafsanjani’s official website, “Republicanism and Islamism are the two unalterable elements of the Islamic Republic,” and changing these pillars will ultimately alter the nature of the regime.

Grand Ayatollah Mousavi Ardabili, an important marja’ (source of emulation for Shiite Muslims) who is close to Iran’s opposition movement, also criticized such a possible move. In a meeting with a group of journalists, the Grand Ayatollah said, “Changing the political system and selecting the president [or prime minister] by the parliament will decrease people’s participation [in the national affairs of the state].”

Whether or not Khamenei decides to eliminate the presidency, there is little doubt he will continue to consolidate more power in his office. These days, the words of the late Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri ring more true than ever. Following the regime’s intense crackdown on political opposition in 2009, Montazeri declared that “The Islamic Republic is neither Islamic nor a Republic.”