insideIRAN » Nuclear Program

How Likely is an Iranian Nuclear Counterstrike?

insideiran — Tue, 06 Apr 2010 18:05:34 +0000

Jamsheed K. Choksy

A preemptive attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities by the U.S., Israel, or both nations has been on the table for quite some time. Yet because Iran has at least a dozen centers related to its nuclear activities, demolishing the program would be extremely difficult. None the less, there is no dearth of war game scenarios by think tanks, universities, government departments, even magazines in the U.S. and Israel. Iran too has conducted its own large-scale defensive and offensive scenarios – including one last November involving actual military exercises.

Ultimately, how events could actually transpire remains anyone’s educated guess. At the very least, Iran will utilize technical knowledge gained over the years to rebuild its nuclear program and work feverishly toward weaponization. It probably also would officially abjure the Non-Proliferation Treaty and bar the International Atomic Energy Agency from any oversight.

Yet there is a far more devastating scenario that needs to be given much greater consideration. Iran could retaliate by actively or tacitly providing low enriched uranium (LEU) to militant and terrorists groups that are targeting the U.S., E.U., and Israel.

When physical incapacitation of nuclear facilities occurs at initial stages of construction, the damage to all parties is both minimal and manageable. Israel followed that trajectory when it struck at Iraq’s Osirak (Tammuz 1) reactor in June 1981 and at Syria’s Al-Kibar facility in September 2007. Iran recommenced its nuclear program during the early 1990s, expanding rapidly as the world dithered. So the window for a surgical strike by the U.S. or Israel has long passed. The scales of attack, devastation, and response have all increased exponentially.

In the chaos that now would surround the aftermath of aerial strikes on its nuclear sites, it is quite likely that Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) could lose control over portions of the nuclear materials inventory. Individuals and groups seeking revenge against attacking nations could spirit away radioactive materials and transfer those to Al-Qaeda via Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. The Taliban and its auxiliaries could be beneficiaries of nuclear elements too. Both terrorist organizations have tried, unsuccessfully so far, to obtain fuel for improvised nuclear devices.

Beyond the actions of rogue scientists and crazy radicals, the Iranian government may seek recourse to similar action as well. Iran’s administration, and especially its IRGC, has played a stealth and uneasy game with both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the basis of the U.S. and Israel being common enemies. Hezbollah and Hamas – Iran’s proxies against Israel – could find themselves in possession of dirty bombs too, courtesy of enraged Iranian military men, scientists, politicians, and mullahs.

Transporting LEU onto the U.S. mainland, while not impossible, will be difficult and so Americans may be the least directly affected by Iranian retaliation through its terrorist cohorts. Smuggling nuclear fuel across highly porous land and maritime borders into Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan for use against coalition forces, western diplomats, and foreign aid-workers may prove harder to prevent. Likewise, from Iran via Iraq and then Syria, LEU may end up in Hezbollah short-range rockets shot into Israel. A similar route overland to the Mediterranean coast and then via boat to Gaza could place LEU in the hands of Hamas suicide bombers entering Israel. Carried by militants across Iran’s border with Turkey and from there into European cities, small dirty bombs could spread terror across the E.U.

Such nightmare scenarios are not merely hypothetical. Intelligence and news reports suggest that Iran’s leaders are preparing an array of responses to possible attacks by the U.S. and Israel. Tehran keeps warning the world of a “devastating” response. As early as 2003, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared: “A military attack against Iran would be suicide for the aggressor.” More recently his aides suggested Iran’s government would retaliate by “blowing up the heart of Israel.”

Despite their belligerent rhetoric, most Iranian clerics, politicians, and generals are not bent on provoking a military confrontation with the U.S. They regard preservation of their power as paramount. Yet, if attacked and weakened, their reactions could be unpredictable and perhaps irrational. So their bellicoseness should not be taken lightly though those words produce a conundrum for the world wherein both inaction and action can have deadly consequences.

Iran lacks the conventional military capacity to retaliate by itself against the U.S., European Union or Israel in an overwhelming manner. Nor does it have nuclear weapons at present. Yet its revolutionary elite remain deeply hostile to the U.S. and Israel. For those reasons, Iran’s leaders may conclude they have nothing to lose by working through terrorist organizations to wreck multiple small-scale radiation havoc on attackers. Even if no such official decision is reached, as noted previously, non-state actors could spirit away some of the radioactive materials from the wrecked sites to assemble and detonate improvised nuclear devices.

So if the U.S. or Israel chooses to go down the martial path vis-à-vis Iran, with or without cooperating together and with or without assistance from the E.U., preemptive planning must be undertaken for a nuclear retaliation. It is absolutely essential to be fully prepared for what could lay ahead if any portion of Iran’s LEU deliberately or accidentally falls into the hands of non-state militants.

Jamsheed K. Choksy is professor of Iranian and International studies and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. He also is a member of the U.S. National Council on the Humanities at the National Endowment for the Humanities. The views expressed are his own.

Obama’s One-Year Anniversary of Outreach to Iran Shows Need for Realpolitik

insideiran — Mon, 08 Mar 2010 18:48:24 +0000

Riccardo Redaelli

COMO, Italy—If proper “timing and tuning” are essential during negotiations, over the past decade, neither Washington nor Tehran has managed to tune their political mood into the same wavelength. When the Islamic Republic was ready to enter into negotiations, the White House was not, and vice-versa.

For years, I criticized the United States’ attitude towards Iran, in particular its inability to understand the Iranian threat perceptions and sense of isolation. During the Bush administration, the mantra was “we do not speak with the devil,” as then-Vice-President Dick Cheney dismissed any direct negotiation with Tehran. The U.S. policy of refusing direct talks with Iran, and its unrealistic and dogmatic stance on its low enriched uranium (LEU) program contributed to the disastrous results of the E3-EU (France, Germany and Great Britain) negotiations of 2003 to 2006. The refusal of the spring 2005 offer by the Iranian nuclear chief negotiator, Hasan Rowhani, has proven to have been a huge mistake: today, we could have had an Iran implementing the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and running a few dozen centrifuges. Instead, we find ourselves frantically looking for an agreement with a radical government that possesses thousands of them and that no longer implements the Additional Protocol.

In brief, U.S. containment strategies have failed in the past and have had huge geopolitical costs in the region, which indirectly led to a consistent Iranian foreign policy not in the United States’ interest, rather than a policy that would have weakened Iran’s ultra-conservatives. The result has created huge difficulties for Iranian reformists and pragmatic conservatives domestically as well as internationally.

The New U.S. Policy toward Iran and the Green Movement

The new U.S. administration, therefore, decided to offer Tehran direct negotiations without preconditions (always perceived as an intolerable humiliation to national pride by Iran’s post revolutionary political elite). President Obama’s message on the occasion of the Nowrūz festival almost exactly a year ago was an unprecedented move, aimed at overcoming the standstill in nuclear negotiations. Unfortunately for Obama, the Iranian electoral crisis exploded shortly after his offers had been made. Massive electoral fraud deprived Mir-Hossein Moussavi, the main reformist candidate, of millions of votes, as is easily demonstrated by a detailed analysis of the turnout figures. In the Islamic Republic, such an alteration of the electoral results represented an unpleasant and shocking degeneration of the Islamic Republic’s power mechanisms.

This was the main reason behind the rise of the so-called Green Movement, with pacific public protests and gatherings asking for new elections and the removal of an illegitimate president. The government reacted in the usual way, with a mixture of violent response from its security forces, arrests, harassment and threats. The electoral fraud had also polarized the Islamic Republic to an unprecedented degree, with its political elite deeply fragmented and with mass protests occurring that recall those of the 1970s against the Pahlavi monarchy.

The Present Mistake

For the international community, the dilemma was whether to back the popular protests or not. The West—and Washington in particular—decided to maintain a very low profile regarding Iranian domestic troubles, with the idea, as cynical as it is naïve, that a weakened regime might have been softer on the nuclear negotiations. The result was the meetings in Geneva and Vienna in the autumn of 2009, when Iran initially accepted the idea of a swap of its LEU stockpile to Russia and France, in exchange for already processed LEU at 20 percent for its research reactor. To the West’s discomfort, Tehran eventually refused the compromise, after confused and still unclear domestic debates.

During the past months, the hope that, following the domestic electoral turbulence, the Iranian government was ready to seriously engage with the Obama administration and that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was able to reach a compromise and deliver it at home (that is, getting the consensus of the rahbar and of the obscure Iranian “nuclear inner circle”) did not materialize, probably due to domestic political divisions. According to less benevolent interpretations, these diplomatic moves were simply another Iranian bluff: Tehran needed time to deal with the chaotic domestic situation. The offers made in Geneva and Vienna in Fall 2009 were part of a scheme for avoiding international pressure while the regime was cracking down on the protesters.

In fact, the West kept a very low profile on the issue for months. A commonly held view in Western political circles was that the reformists could easily be sacrificed on the altar of a nuclear compromise. The gamble did not, however, pay off: we did not get any agreement.
The harsh reality is that, in the meantime, the radicals in Tehran had increased the level of repression and brutality, with thousands of members of Iranian civil society arrested, threatened, raped, or tortured, and several people killed or sentenced to death by an increasingly overconfident, oppressive regime.

Break the Vicious Circle of Always Offering Ahmadinejad Something More

These events oblige the international community—and the West in particular—to reconsider their strategy. For instance, President Obama is facing growing opposition in Washington toward his policy of engagement, and the nuclear negotiations with Iran cannot be allowed to distract us from what is happening in Iran. First of all, it is crucial to prevent our declarations against the repression from being counterproductive, since the Iranian government is already accusing the reformists of being “fifth columnists” of enemies of the Republic. However, there are ways and means of making Tehran understand that the West is not looking for a regime change, but cannot tolerate such a level of domestic violence.

In other words, since Ahmadinejad and the pasdarans have deeply polarized the Iranian political scenario, we should carefully send messages to the Rahbar that Ahmadinejad represents a much greater risk for the Islamic Republic than the reformists, and that we are ready to negotiate with Supreme Leader Khamenei, but we will adopt a tougher stance (at every level, nuclear negotiations included) if he lends his support to such bloody repression. Some of the main religious and political leaders, such as Rafsanjani and, to a certain extent, Mohammad Khatami himself, are attempting the same, trying to de-polarize the domestic political spectrum in the hope that the Rahbar might decide to rebalance the system, adopting a more moderate position. It is probably the last chance Khamenei has to avoid a dramatic transformation of the Islamic Republic and far more severe international isolation.

At the same time, it is time to end our obsession with the uranium enrichment conundrum: it is clear that the only way to keep Iran latent at the nuclear weapon level is through verifications and political confidence, not merely technical solutions, such as the recent proposed swap with Russia, France, Turkey, or elsewhere. Without decreasing the level of mistrust, resistance to a comprehensive agreement will be insurmountable.

For years I backed track-2 programs with Iranians, and I still believe they represented a useful tool of communication, taking into account the antagonistic postures of Washington and Tehran. But the current scenario is radically different: the technical package offered in Vienna and Geneva to Iran represented an honorable compromise, based on the best diplomatic effort of recent years. The package is still on the table, and some minor amendments might be made in order to give extra guarantees to the Islamic Republic’s obsessions. However, we should resist the idea of acquiescing to new Iranian requests or looking for other, smoother “technical solutions” for convincing Iran. The offer is already favorable: it has been almost accepted, almost refused, renegotiated, reneged, and all other degrees of unclear response. In the meantime, Iran continues with its paranoid policy of repression and intimidation of reformists, intellectuals, professors, students, women’s’ rights activists, and simple citizens. And the West continues to stick to its past policy of ambiguous silence over it.

Lack of credibility was one of the main failures of the past U.S. administration’s policy toward the Middle East, since its rhetorical insistence on democratization was a far cry from an ambiguous policy of double standards. We should now avoid the risk of embarking on a pathetically weak new form of realpolitik .

Riccardo Redaelli is the Director of the Middle East Program at LNCV and Professor of Geopolitics at the Catholic University of Milano. He has participated in Track 2 talks with Iran.

Tehran Thumbs Its Nose at Gasoline Sanctions

insideiran — Mon, 01 Mar 2010 18:25:53 +0000

Hossein Askari

WASHINGTON—In Washington, politicians and Iran experts have been pounding the table for what they claim to be the mother of all sanctions on Iran—a gasoline embargo. While in Tehran, Ahmadinejad and his supporters dare President Obama to go ahead and impose a gasoline embargo on Iran. They claim Iran has adequate gasoline storage and enhanced gasoline production capacity to withstand an embargo. Is there substance to Iranian claims? Would a gasoline embargo bring the Tehran regime to its knees?

Iran has the second-highest level of proven oil reserves in OPEC after Saudi Arabia, and also ranks a distant second to Saudi Arabia in oil production. These are today’s OPEC reserves and production standings. Although Iran is a major exporter of crude oil, it is a net importer of refined products, especially gasoline and diesel fuel, from a variety of sources, including China.

This surprising situation is due largely to two policy decisions made by Iran: gasoline and diesel fuel are sold by the government at heavily subsidized prices (significantly below world prices, at about 40 cents per gallon for gasoline), encouraging wasteful fuel consumption and smuggling to neighboring countries, where prices are higher. At the same time, Iran’s domestic refining capacity (1.5 million barrels per day) has not kept up with rapidly growing demand (1.7 million barrels per day), a gap of about 200,000 barrels per day of refined capacity at the light fuels end of the refining process (especially gasoline). To fill the gap, the government imports gasoline and diesel fuel at world prices and turns around and sells it in Iran at the lower subsidized price charged for domestically produced products, putting serious pressure on the government’s budgetary balance.

Facing this domestic shortfall in refined products, Tehran decided some time ago to expand its refining capacity. As a result, it seems that in about three years Iran’s refining capacity will double to close to 3 million barrels per day. This expansion, along with planned domestic price increases for gasoline and diesel fuel, should allow Iran to eliminate imports of refined products and even enable the country to become a net exporter of refined products.

These figures would indicate that Iran today has a domestic shortfall of about 10 percent in its diesel fuel needs (or roughly 60,000 barrels per day) and about 30 percent in its gasoline needs (or roughly 125, 000 barrels per day). Because of smuggling, it is difficult to confirm that this entire apparent shortfall is “real.” Namely what would be the shortfall if smuggling were eliminated? While there is no hard data on how much of this apparent shortfall is due to smuggling, one thing is certain: the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the Intelligence Services are involved in smuggling. As a result, if they see it in their interest to eliminate smuggling, they could reduce it to a trickle. In other words, a part of the 180,000–200,000 barrels per day of apparent domestic shortfall could be eliminated if the IRGC and the Intelligence Services decided to reduce the smuggling of gasoline. How much would this reduction represent? That’s anybody’s guess. But I would venture to say that the real shortfall might be more on the order of 125,000–150,000 barrels per day. And smuggling would all but evaporate if the government allows fuel prices to rise in the event of an embargo.

In a recent statement, Farid Ameri, Managing director of National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company, claimed that a fuel embargo will achieve little, and pointed out that:

• Iran has increased its stockpile of gasoline by about 1 billion liters, to 2.4 billion liters (roughly 15 million barrels), and
• Iran is using its petrochemical plants to produce 14 million liters (roughly 94,000 barrels) of gasoline per day.

If one were to take these claims at face value, the stockpile of gasoline would be equivalent to 100–120 days of fuel imports (assuming 125,000–150,000 barrels per day of fuel imports after the elimination of smuggling). The claim of gasoline from petrochemical plants would reduce the need for imports down to an even more manageable 30,000–55,000 per day, in turn stretching out the life of the gasoline stockpile to 270–480 days in case of a fuel embargo. If both Iranian claims were credible, one could conclude that Iran has a reasonable chance to survive a gasoline embargo, because it also has porous borders and, realistically, it would be impossible to enforce an airtight embargo for 270–480 days.

However, the Iranian regime’s claim about producing gasoline from petrochemical plants is too farfetched even for the most imaginative among us. To the best of my knowledge, no one has figured out a way to make such “flexible” petrochemical plants. Petrochemical plants take as their input the output of refineries (and natural gas) as feedstock, but they don’t produce gasoline and diesel fuel. Mr. Ameri may have meant that they could cut their petrochemical output and thus their intake from oil refineries, enabling an increase in gasoline output.

Even if this is what he meant, this may or may not be true, as most simple oil refineries cannot just flip a switch and overnight change the mix of their refined output; refineries are configured to produce certain mix of products and refine specific types of crude oil. It would appear that Iran could withstand an airtight embargo for about 100–480 days, depending on its ability to increase gasoline output by reducing petrochemical output. Again, the sufficiency of gasoline and diesel fuel in Iran would be further enhanced if it turns out to be difficult to maintain an airtight embargo for an extended period of time. Based on these considerations, it would appear that the regime in Tehran has built itself a reasonable cushion in preparation for a gasoline embargo.

While these may represent the prevailing supply-demand balance of gasoline and diesel fuel in Iran, there are important policy considerations that also can affect realities in Iran. The Iranian government long has realized that it should eliminate the fuel subsidy in order to reduce the growth in gasoline and diesel consumption, eliminate smuggling, improve air quality, increase oil exports, and above all improve the government’s budgetary position. Over the past ten years, the fuel policy has cost Iran in the range of 10 to 20 percent of GDP annually, depending on world prices and the government mandated pump price—an astounding figure. In need of additional revenues, the regime has wanted to eliminate this subsidy by increasing the price at the pump to world levels, but the government has been paralyzed because of the specter of a domestic backlash. It has managed only marginal price increases and adopted a rationing scheme that has slowed down the rate of growth in demand.

While talk of an embargo by politicians is cheap, an effective gasoline embargo can only be implemented through a naval blockade of Iran. Such a blockade would require UN Security Council approval. Mindful of Russian and Chinese ties to Iran, this would be a lengthy and tortuous process, and approval would be by no means certain. An embargo without the UN Security Council would be considered an act of war, and Iran already has declared that it would be met with force and the potential closing of the Strait of Hormuz.

Even assuming that a gasoline embargo were effective in cutting off Iran’s imports, what would happen? Consumption of gasoline would decline by 30 percent. If the government allowed the reduced supply of gasoline, namely, domestically refined gasoline, to be sold at a price that would equate demand to supply, the price would increase to a level that would eliminate the subsidy, meaning no subsidy for imported gasoline and no subsidy for domestically refined gasoline. There would be no incentive to smuggle gasoline to neighboring countries. The government would have higher revenues to spend on other priorities and projects. Low and behold, the sanctions would have done what Tehran has wanted to do for years, and the government would not be held responsible.

What does all this mean? Is a gasoline (and diesel fuel) embargo the mother of all sanctions? Will it cripple the Iranian economy and encourage the population at large to rise up and overthrow the regime?

Based on the above, I would conclude that:

1. An airtight gasoline embargo is difficult to implement, as Iran’s borders are long and porous.
2. China is unlikely to sign on at the United Nations without extracting too high a price from the United States.
3. Even if China does acquiesce, UN negotiations are likely to be long and painful.
4. Iran clearly is expanding its refining capacity, increasing its storage of gasoline (and diesel), preparing to reconfigure its refineries to produce a little more gasoline, preparing the ground to reduce gasoline smuggling, and in the event of an embargo would allow prices to increase, at least somewhat. All of these measures would blunt the impact of a gasoline embargo.
5. An embargo would be blamed on the United States, while shoring up government finances.

The most puzzling question has been why there is so much talk of a gasoline sanction and other unnamed crippling sanctions when financial sanctions, which could deal a mortal blow to the Iranian regime itself, are soft peddled? Some say that the Obama Administration wants to hurt the regime, but not the opposition, so it is treading carefully to find the smartest sanction. I beg to differ. The concern for the impact of sanctions on the opposition is a smoke screen. There are financial sanctions that would have little negative impact on average Iranians while raising havoc for regime insiders and their business partners. Yet we don’t talk of these, much less take action. To my mind, the likely answer is that, at least for now, President Obama still wants to cut a deal with Iran and the IRGC and is not prepared to embark on a road that could lead to confrontation. He wants to appear tough but not be tough. The gasoline sanction is only a smoke screen to buy more time, while Iran becomes less and less dependent on imported fuels and continues to trample on the human and legal rights of its citizens.

Even this puzzle was recently answered in a statement on February 25 as reported by Reuters: “It is not our intent to have crippling sanctions that have . . . a significant impact on the Iranian people,” State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley told reporters. “Our actual intent is . . . to find ways to pressure the government while protecting the people.” It would, therefore, appear that we will continue to talk tough and pretend that we are pressuring the Tehran regime and supporting the suffering people of Iran.

Hossein Askari is Iran Professor of International Business and International Affairs at the George Washington University. During the mid 1980s he was director of a team of international energy experts contracted to design an energy plan and energy planning capabilities for Saudi Arabia.

Defiant Iran Rebuffs IAEA and Escalates Tension with the West

insideiran — Mon, 30 Nov 2009 21:33:35 +0000

Edith Novy

After the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) adopted a resolution on November 27, which urges Iran “to comply fully and without delay with its obligations” (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/ 2009/gov2009-82.pdf), Iran blatantly disregarded international opinion. Iran’s leaders not only failed to answer questions, it threatened to expand its nuclear program and to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Iran provided three major responses:

First, Iranian officials launched several accusations against the IAEA and, specifically Western governments, in order to discredit the resolution. They stated on November 30 that “the resolution was not that of the IAEA, but in fact the P5+1 are behind the resolution.”
(http://isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1448051&Lang=E). Claiming that the IAEA Board of Governors favors the West in the decision-making process, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, Asqar Soltanieh, said on November 30 that, “the structure of the Board of Governors has been molded in such a way that gives Western states the majority votes and so the ability to manipulate the Agency’s activities.”
(http://www.presstv.ir/classic/Detail.aspx?id=112485§ionid=351020104)

An Iranian lawmaker slammed the IAEA Board of Governors on November 30, saying the body only obeys the orders of “global arrogance,” which is a reference to Western states. (http://presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=112477§ionid=351020104)

And Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast rejected the resolution the same day it was issued, saying it was passed “with insistence and political ambitions of certain member states.” “We think that this [resolution] is politically motivated and only aimed at exerting pressure on Iran,” he asserted. (http://www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=112324§ionid=351020104)

Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottki stated on November 30 that it is not possible to “find any logical reason for the Board of Governors’ decision.” He called the resolution “discrimination” and the “law of the jungle.” (http://www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=112517§ionid=351020104)
Following this criticism, the Iranian parliament urged the government to reduce cooperation with the 5+1 and the IAEA. (http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8809081531)

Second, Iran has issued hostile warnings against any change in policy toward Iran by Western governments. Parliament speaker Ali Larijani said on November 30: “We will closely monitor your next steps and if you do not abandon the ridiculous carrot and stick policy, we will take a new approach towards you.” (http://www.isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1448051&Lang=E)

Third, Iran announced over the weekend that it will start with the construction of 10 more nuclear enrichment facilities within the next two months “in response to (the) West’s offensive measures”. (http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8809091305)

Statements by Ali Larijani and a senior lawmaker raise suspicions that Iran could withdraw from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to Larijani, it does not matter “whether you are a member of the NPT or pull out of it.” >a href = http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/11/30/92793.html> (http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/11/30/92793.html)
Parliament member Hassan Ghafourifard stated on November 29, in an interview with state-sponsored television, that “there might be no use to stay in the NPT” if the West refuses to understand Iran’s position. (http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=107441§ionid=351020104)

Timeline of nuclear negotiations with Iran (September 2009 – November 2009)

September 21, 2009

Iran informs IAEA about a second nuclear enrichment facility at Fordo, 20 miles north of Qom

October 1, 2009	Iran meets with the 5+1 group in Geneva
	Agreement is reached to meet again before the end of October
	Iran agrees “in general” to ship low-enriched uranium abroad and to open its new enrichment plant near Qom to UN inspection

October 19, 2009

Iran wants France to be excluded from the potential nuclear deal since “it has failed in fulfilling its previous responsibilities regarding [nuclear] cooperation with Iran.”

October 20, 2009

Iran wants guarantees for nuclear fuel delivery

October 19- 21, 2009

Iran meets with the 5+1 group in Vienna

October 19, 2009

Iran announces that it would buy nuclear fuel rather than receiving it in exchange to export low-enriched uranium

October 23, 2009	Iran misses the deadline to respond officially to the IAEA and postpones an official answer to the IAEA proposal.
	The IAEA statement said: “Iran informed the Director General today that it is considering the proposal in depth and in a favorable light, but needs time until the middle of next week to provide a response.”

October 27, 2009

Iran demands “fundamental changes” to the nuclear deal

November 2, 2009

Western powers urge Iran to accept the deal as it stands

November 18, 2009

Iran verbally rejects the nuclear deal. Confusion arises if this is an official rejection.

November 27, 2009

IAEA Board of Governors passes resolution which urges Iran to immediately stop construction of its Fordo nuclear enrichment plant and to ““to comply fully and without delay with its obligations.”

November, 29, 2009

The Iranian parliament urges the government to reduce cooperation with the IAEA

November 30, 2009	Iran slams the IAEA resolution as being “discriminatory” and announces it will build 10 more nuclear enrichment facilities.
	Additionally, it raises suspicion that it could withdraw from the NPT.

U.S.-Iran Relations: Shades of Hopeful Signs

insideiran — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 16:07:57 +0000

Mahmood Monshipouri

SAN FRANCISCO – The latest technical proposals to emerge from meetings at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna to defuse the standoff over Iran’s nuclear project represent a clear and convincing victory for diplomacy over the cold war rhetoric that had seen Tehran denounced repeatedly by the Bush administration as part of an “axis of evil.” Under the emerging agreement—still to be ratified by Washington and Tehran and far from a done deal—Iran would ship low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia for further enrichment that would then be returned to Iran for use in medical research and treatment. This development occurred despite that fact that Iran is capable of producing the appropriate fuel on its own, and it speaks volumes about the reach and effectiveness of diplomacy.

So far, traditional diplomacy, albeit in the context of new political and economic realities at home and abroad, has prevailed where sanctions, the threat of still further international isolation, and even covert military operations or the possibility of preemptive strikes by the United States or more likely by Israel have failed. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Mohamed ElBaradei and other representatives from France, Russia, and the United States have, for now, given their tacit approval to this agreement, with ElBaradei describing it as “a balanced approach to the problem.”

This step draws a line under the “axis of evil” rhetoric, which proved to be both futile and deeply divisive, as shown by growing splits within the Western alliance, as well as with traditional rivals such as Russia and China. This rhetoric inspired a harsh debate in the West and beyond over whether military interventions—unilateral or otherwise—could transform the Middle East. It has become abundantly clear that the preoccupation with such rhetoric during the Bush administration deflected attention from conducting reasonable diplomatic efforts aimed at seeking regional solutions to some of the most contentious issues of the day.

What may prove to be a lasting thaw in the half-century cold war between Tehran and Washington dates from the Obama administration’s expressed willingness to talk with its Iranian counterparts without any preconditions, a step that addressed long-held perceptions in the Islamic Republic that it would be junior partner in any such talks. Now, two questions arise: what brought about a major change in Iran’s policy on the enrichment of uranium so promptly in recent weeks? And, is this apparent change sustainable, given that Iranian leadership is clearly divided on the question of whether to pursue the nuclear program?
While it is true that the Obama administration is working on wide-ranging sanctions package against Iran in case current diplomatic endeavors to contain its nuclear program fail, it is worth examing why the continuation of sanctions or the use of intimidation have failed to produce any results. Arguably, diplomatic accords stand a better chance of altering Iran’s foreign policy behavior than the continuing sanctions and containment policies imposed by the West. Unlike the situation of the past few years, European and American diplomats have placed their multilateral diplomacy in high gear by meeting their Iranian counterparts and keeping matters from reaching UN Security Council. It seems as though they have succeeded, since the Iranians have adopted a different approach—at least for now—notwithstanding divisive leadership in Iran.

Now that Iran seems to have reached an agreement with the IAEA on the method as well as on the rules of investigation, it can use this opportunity to depoliticize its nuclear activities and programs. This agreement does not resolve all outstanding issues between Iran and the United States, but it surely defuses the tension for the time being. Meanwhile, the Europeans’ approach may prove to be vindicated: trade deals and technical assistance could have a moderating influence on Iran. Economic necessities and pressures for rebuilding the country, some experts say, eventually will compel Iran to engage with the West rather than pursuing futile confrontation. Multilateral diplomacy and dialogue are still the art of the possible. The Obama administration must welcome this development while seizing this moment to defuse regional tensions, especially at a time when it is largely preoccupied with the war in Afghanistan.

Future cooperation with Iran also could enhance the possibility of addressing the Palestinian issues in the occupied territories and Hezbullah in Lebanon—two thorny issues in the side of the region’s stability. Obviously, the occupation of Iraq alienated some of key U.S. allies. In such an environment, the return to multilateral diplomacy under the new administration in Washington is a prudential course of action. Iran could also play a positive role in stabilizing U.S. efforts in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan, where the U.S. military and the Obama administration are trying to agree on the scope of the U.S. and NATO mission there.

In hindsight, nothing has fundamentally altered the old adage in the Persian Gulf region that the more Iran is isolated, the more it becomes part of the problem; the more it is engaged, the more it becomes part of the solution. This reality has not been lost on the part of the Obama administration.

Mahmood Monshipouri is an Associate Professor of International Relations at San Francisco State University. His most recent book is entitled, Muslims in Global Politics: Identities, Interests, and Human Rights

Iran Opposition Leaders Shift Views on Nukes

insideiran — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 15:58:08 +0000

Tara Mahtafar

WASHINGTON/TEHRAN—Iran’s internal crisis has done more than thrust the legitimacy of the Islamic political system under the leadership of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei into the public spotlight. It also has begun to chip away at one of the ruling hardline elite’s few successful policies in recent years—its high-stakes gambit with the West over nuclear power and its implied threat of developing a nuclear bomb.

Since the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, the ascendent hardliners have proven adroit at rallying the Iranian public behind their nuclear agenda. An opinion poll conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland in May 2009 found that the Iranian public “broadly agrees” their country should develop nuclear energy.

My own observations, during my stay in Iran from 2005 to 2009, support this finding. I never heard any Iranian—of any stripe or background—say they were not pro-nuclear. Virtually all Iranians defended the country’s entitlement to a civilian nuclear program, even as they rankled against sanctions and the worsening economy.

Now, however, there are signs that this once-solid landscape has shifted under the feet of Ahmadinejad and his allies in the wake of the crisis triggered by the tainted presidential elections in June. To understand how and why this shift occurred, and evaluate its future direction under Ahmadinejad’s contested tenure, a brief overview of the government’s representation of its nuclear program to the public, and resulting public perception toward it in the last four years, is necessary.

Ahmadinejad rose to power in 2005 on a welfare platform that appealed to members of Iran’s lower-middle class and the rural poor. At that time, a great part of Iran’s large middle class and upper-middle class, feeling disillusioned after eight years of Khatami’s reformist presidency—which had promised much but delivered little—either grew indifferent to the polls or actively boycotted the vote. Sensing this vacuum, Ahmadinejad, then mayor of Tehran and relatively unknown, threw himself headlong into a candidacy that spoke to the economically disadvantaged. He promised economic justice—“oil shares on the kitchen tables” for all. His populist rhetoric won him 61 percent of the vote, although turnout was just under 50 percent.

As soon as Ahmadinejad was in the presidential house on Pastor Street, his talk of “oil-shares” evaporated. Instead, he coined a new mantra to rally public support: “Nuclear energy is our inalienable right.” Before then, the nuclear issue had barely existed in public discourse, but state media and government officials now proceeded to drill it into public consciousness the notion that nuclear energy was imperative for national progress.

By elevating Iran’s nuclear agenda to a matter of sovereignty and patriotism, the president diverted attention away from the sagging domestic economy. Three rounds of UN sanctions bolstered his position, allowing him to blame the West for Iran’s double-digit inflation and to position himself as a stalwart defender of Iranian national interests.

In a country with a strong nationalist streak and a proud notion of cultural identity, this carried a powerful appeal across the politicial and social spectrum: from Ahvaz to Tabriz; south to north Tehran; regime loyalists and opponents; irreligious and pious alike. Very few Iranians—perhaps only a handful of scholars—failed to support the country’s nuclear drive; even those most bitterly opposed to Ahmadinejad approved of his performance on this front.

During June’s televised presidential debates, reformists Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi both endorsed the nuclear program and assured the public they would stay the course to safeguard Iran’s rights to develop nuclear power under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If either of them had won, public backing for Iran’s nuclear policy likely would have remained unchanged.

But the June 12 earthquake hit, and in its aftermath, the legitimacy of Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader was irreparably shattered for a majority of Iranians. Domestic politics surged to the forefront of public attention and pushed the nuclear issue into the background.

It came back into focus when the new Qom facility made headlines around the world. As the Ahmadinejad administration geared up for nuclear talks in Geneva, newly emboldened opposition leaders released a first-ever anti-nuclear statement. Addressing “citizens of the world” and especially “the people and government of America,” Mousavi’s spokesperson Mohsen Makhmalbaf announced that the opposition “shares international concerns about a nuclear-armed Iran.”

The statement was delivered on September 23, the day Ahmadinejad spoke at the UN General Assembly, and was timed to present an alternative stance that a moderate government in Tehran would take. The sentiment was echoed by Karroubi and Mousavi a few days later when they denounced the regime’s nuclear adventurism and pronounced it detrimental to Iran’s national interests.

Abbas Milani, co-director of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution, wrote in this regard:

Though the leaders of the Green Movement have previously questioned the strategic wisdom of a nuclear bomb, these recent statements are the clearest and most fevered rejection of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. They know the current regime, besieged at home by tensions in its own ranks and a citizenry who continue to defy it, seems willing to make short-term nuclear concessions to the West in exchange for assurances that the West will not press human rights issues—a similar grand bargain made with Libya. But the Iranian opposition is warning that, unlike Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, Khamenei and Ahmedinejad have no intention of actually ending their pursuit—only buying enough time to ride out the current domestic crisis.

A Tehran-based analyst close to former president Mohammad Khatami whom I spoke to in early October confirmed that opinion toward the nuclear program among opposition supporters has turned: “People are realizing that the nuclear issue was just a propaganda tool used by the Revolutionary Guard-backed Ahmadinejad administration to take focus off the country’s real political and economic problems. They sold the nuclear program to the public as a vital interest, but after the electoral coup in June, it is obvious for many that the hardliners only care about their own interests and hold on power.”

From now, at least, the two greatest issues facing the Islamic republic today—its legitimacy in the eyes of its people and its nuclear stand-off with the West—are tightly bound together. If, as appears to be the case, the considerable swathe of the Iranian public that has rejected the presidential polls as illegitimate withholds support for an expanded nuclear program, then the domestic crisis cannot help but spill over into the foreign arena for the foreseeable future.

Meanwhile, opposition leaders Mousavi and Karroubi, as a matter of necessity, have differentiated their foreign policy from that of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, partly for their domestic audience—but also as a clear message to the West that strong foreign support for moderating voices in Tehran offers the best long-term prospect of keeping Iran from pursuing a nuclear bomb.

Tara Mahtafar is a journalist working in Tehran and Washington.

Has Iran Already Met Its Nuclear Goals?

insideiran — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 15:34:03 +0000

Maurizio Martellini and Riccardo Redaelli

COMO, Italy –By its very nature, the Islamic Republic of Iran is unpredictable. Its unwieldy political system and fractious political elite complicate any attempt at understanding Iranian political trends, aspirations, perceptions, and goals. Iranian political language is replete with tactical poses, rhetorical stances, and contradictory tones.

Still, it is possible to identify several strategic constants of Iranian foreign and security policy, connected with the nation’s international status, its more specific regional role, and the general aim to protect the Islamic Republic from any possible “existential threat.” And it is in this context that we must view the present nuclear standoff with the West.

Tehran’s nuclear program, aimed at attaining, at the very least, a “latent workable nuclear deterrent,” has emerged as one of the country’s basic strategic goals. According to a general consensus amomg British, German, and Israeli intelligence, this effort got under way in earnest in 2005, after a brief interruption in 2003.

However, a series of domestic and international events, as well as economic and security considerations, may have altered this strategic orientation, or even forced a tactical reconsideration of both the pace of the program and its “metric of success.” Supporters of this latter view draw upon the argument that Tehran’s new flexibility may derive from the fact that its nuclear program already has achieved its basic goals. In other words, “they are already where they wanted to be.”

At the same time, the nuclear standstill carries its own costs for the Iranian leadership. The Obama administation’s offer of direct negotiations, without the preconditions that Iran’s post-revolutionary elite always has seen as an affront to national honor, has stepped up pressure on Tehran to respond in kind. In this atmosphere, the nuclear issue now stands out as the central obstacle to any conclusion of the cold war between Washington and Tehran and to the establishment of a new security order in the Middle East region (which has to include and not exclude Iran).

Moreover, it also has increased the chances of a catastrophic conflict between Tel Aviv and Tehran, and it potentially could drive countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey to take into consideration the possibility of a “weapons-grade outbreak” with regard to their own future plans for civil nuclear energy. In general terms, the absence of a solution to this nuclear question could wreak irreparable damage on the global nonproliferation regime and on any hopes of achieving a world free from nuclear weapons.

On top of this, the domestic electoral crisis has further weakened the hard-line position, and there are signs of growing tensions and discomfort among the Iranian productive economic classes (and, in particular, among the still powerful Bazaaris) for President Ahmadineajd’s policy of bold confrontation with the West. This entrepreneurial class is increasingly distressed by the financial and technological sanctions imposed on Iran, and it has overseen the huge export of resources and capital overseas, mainly to Dubai and other Gulf states.

Thus, this summer, the Iranian government (with the backing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) may have begun to consider the idea of testing the real intentions of the Obama administration, accepting direct talks between Iran and the United States for the first time since 1979, although for now still within the context of the P5+1 negotiations.

From the very start of the nuclear crisis in the summer of 2003, Iran has presented its nuclear program, at home and abroad, in terms of the nation’s inalienable right to pursue uranium enrichment, which is expressly permitted under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which Iran adheres as a non-nuclear weapons state. This despite the fact that experts in civil nuclear technology are all well aware that the sensitive aspects relating to the nuclear fuel cycle are supplementary and by no means economically rational for a country beginning a program for producing nuclear energy or which has an installation producing only a few gigawatts. Low enriched uranium (LEU), needed to feed light water reactors (Western or Russian) can be bought on the open market, and there will also one day be a nuclear fuel bank managed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Given this continuous media message from the Iranian leaders, during 2007 and 2008, the Italian think tank Landau Network–Centro Volta (LNCV) circulated the idea—within Track-2 projects with the Iranians—that the only possible exit strategy was to create a mechanism that would permit the export of Iranian LEU produced at an extra-territorial site. This move could avoid the so-called outbreak scenario, that is to say, ulterior enrichment of the stock of LEU uranium to bomb grade levels (HEU – highly enriched uranium).

By sending/exporting the LEU whenever a critical quota was reached—for present purposes, let us say 1,000 kilograms—Iran could save face on the nuclear issue. It would be permitted to continue uranium enrichment which, we must recall, had become a sort of political mantra to assert both Iran’s international prestige and its rights to pursue civil nuclear power.

With the advent of the Obama administration, the absence of preconditions for direct negotiations between the United States and Iran—and the ostensible desire of the two presidents and their entourages to solve the nuclear question—led to the Geneva negotiations of October 1. The technical formula which, in principle, would satisfy both the American and the Iranian constituencies, as well as the international community, would have to be based on two central ideas.

First of all, most of the LEU produced by Iran which, up to the end of August, totaled approximately 1,500 kilograms, would have to be transported to a third country in order to prevent concerns over an HEU breakout scenario. An interesting aspect of the political agreement reached in Geneva, which has not been given much weight in the press, is that Tehran has not requested special legal treatment for the protection of its material transported abroad, like that provided by an extraterritorial mechanism. Such a shipment, should it take place, would be regulated by a standard supply agreement to be negotiated with the IAEA. In this context , the first technical meeting among the P5+1 countries and Iran under the auspices of the IAEA in Vienna on October 19 to 21, represents de facto a return of the Iranian nuclear file to the agency.

Second, the LEU would need to be transported abroad and converted into fuel bars, which are “less proliferating,” for use in the research reactor in Tehran (RRT). This would not affect the nuclear power reactor at Bushehr, which is already guaranteed the necessary fuel through a “leasing and taking back” agreement with Russia.

Here again, Tehran is sending important, if indirect, messages. The RRT requires enrichment to 19.75 percent, which Russia can carry out at its International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk. Iran itself would be more than capable of doing this with a rapid reconfiguration of a few hundred of the IR-1 centrifuges already in operation (roughly 4,600 at the end of August) at the Natanz enrichment plant. It should be noted that under NPT Iran has every right to do so, but this would probably provoke an immediate military reaction on the part of Israel.

Moreover, the renewed focus on the RRT also enables the international community to justify a suspension of current UN sanctions: the RRT is to produce isotopes for medical purposes, and the sanctions do not bar the use of nuclear energy for medicine and select other pruposes.

These corollaries to the political agreements in Geneva and Vienna do not, however, prevent the possible risk of a collapse of the current technical negotiations, which will be long and complex, and the implementation of which “on the ground” will be extremely complicated.

In sum, for Iran today it is more about cooperating with the West than compromising. In this regard, the authors believe that a powerful boost to this process might come from a bold political move; that is, a direct meeting between President Obama and President Ahmadinejad, or at least at the level of their ministries of foreign affairs, possibly before the end of December 2009. After all, the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize assigned to Obama enables him to meet Ahmadinejad in the spirit of the prize itself which, we should recall, was motivated by attempts “to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between people.”

As a useful spin-off of such a meeting, the Italian side should consider the organization of an international conference in Washington at the Italian Embassy, with the participation of the Iranian Permanent Delegation at the UN, aimed at the promotion of a world free from nuclear weapons. This initiative could also contribute to the success of the next NPT Review Conference scheduled for May 2010.

Maurizio Martellini is the Secretary General of the Landau Network – Centro Volta (LNCV, Como – Italy) and Professor of Physics at the Insubria University (Como). Riccardo Redaelli is the Director of the Middle East Program at LNCV and Professor of Geopolitics at the Catholic University of Milano.

Government Conceals Iranian Opposition to Nuclear Weapon

insideiran — Thu, 08 Oct 2009 19:18:50 +0000

Keyhan Kasravi

BERLIN/TEHRAN—Since the rise of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the radical faction to power in the Islamic Republic in 2005, Iran’s nuclear issue and the possibile consequences of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons have received much more attention in the West than in the past.

Ahmadinejad’s faction of the government handled the nuclear issue with aggressive stance. This was a departure from the approach former President Mohammad Khatami had taken. Ahmadinejad tried to show that Iranians were united in supporting the country’s nuclear enrichment program. In various speeches and interviews, Ahmadinejad tried to convince the audience that he was representing the will of the Iranian people.

Behind the scenes, however, the reality is different. In Iran, only the state-run media is allowed to cover the nuclear issue, and all reformist media outlets are banned from participating in the nuclear debate. Many university professors, commentators, and members of the intelligentsia, along with a large segment of the society, are opposed to how the government is handling this issue. Their voices, however, are not represented in the public debate, and even if they were, voicing their opinions would threaten their safety.

Some leading professors of international relations in Iran’s major universities believe that by gaining access to nuclear weapons, Iran’s regional and global power will not increase. These professors were fired from their positions and had to leave the country. Those opposing the government’s aggressive approach believe that a nuclear Iran will not be in the interest of the Iranian people. On the contrary, it will impose severe costs. The government has banned all media in Iran from writing about the U.N. resolutions against Iran and economic sanctions against Iran.

By creating a media ban, the government has been able to impose its views on the people and pretend Iranians support a nuclear-armed Iran. All of these actions are undertaken by a government headed by a president that does not allow any Iranian journalists to visit the nuclear facilities.

Before the controversial June 12 elections in Iran, the government tried to persuade the world that all Iranians supported the nuclear program as a form of national pride. But Iran has continued to deceive its own people and the world.

The Iranian government has always tried to tell the Iranian people that the nuclear issue has been resolved, and if negotiations are held in the West, they are merely to address other problems in the world. It is for this reason that the leadership in Iran, despite retreating from its radical positions, tries to portray the Geneva meeting on October 1 as a great victory for the Iranian people. They are claiming that the superpowers, led by the United States, are defeated! But holding onto that lie is becoming difficult.

Evidence shows that regarding the nuclear case, the Iranian government has not only manipulated the West but its own people. Secrecy is the essential feature of Iran’s controversial nuclear program. Consider Ahmadinejad’s nervous reactions and his bewildered face when he suddenly learned that the West had intelligence on Qom’s nuclear facility. When he was confronted by the editor of Time magazine in New York and was told that President Obama was going to give a speech about this issue in a few hours, Ahmadinejad was shocked and became angry. It was only then that Ahmadinejad admitted to the existence of this facility. By analyzing the behavior of Iranian leaders regarding the nuclear issue, we can surmise that the facility in Qom is not the only hidden facility in Iran .

The Iranian government has tried to convince the Iranian people that the nuclear issue has been resolved and that the ongoing negotiations with the West focus on other critical issues facing the world. The government also tries to persuade Iranians that the Geneva meeting on October 1 was a great victory for Iran and that the superpowers led by the United States were defeated in the talks.

The leaders try to convey these messages through the domestic, state-run media. Iran ’s hard-line, apocalyptic figures, led by Ahmadinejad, act as though they are the future world leaders, and the world is waiting to benefit from their rule. But history shows that such figures do more harm than good.

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Time is of the Essence

insideiran — Thu, 08 Oct 2009 18:36:33 +0000

Jamie Fly

WASHINGTON—The revelation on September 25 that Iran has been constructing a covert uranium enrichment facility near the holy Shiite city of Qom for several years complicates an already complex picture of Iran’s nuclear capabilities and intentions.

What does this new facility say about the status of Iran’s nuclear program, and what are the implications for the international community’s effort to dissuade Iran from developing a nuclear weapon?

To understand the status of Iran’s nuclear program, one must look at the three components required to develop a nuclear weapon.

The first component is the delivery vehicle. As Iran demonstrated just this week when it tested its Shahab-3 and Sajjil missiles, the country has a very active ballistic missile program, which has made significant progress in recent years. In testimony in June of this year, Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly, director of the Missile Defense Agency, stated that, “Iran has grown its short- and medium-range missile inventories, while improving the lethality, deployment capability, and effectiveness of existing systems with new propellants, more accurate guidance systems, and payloads.” He also noted that recent test launches had demonstrated “a capability to strike targets in Israel as well as southern Europe” and “demonstrated technologies that are directly applicable to the development of ICBMs.”

The second component required to deploy a nuclear weapon effectively is a warhead capable of fitting on a delivery vehicle. It must be the proper size and be correctly configured to produce the reaction required to initiate nuclear fission. Iranian scientists allegedly were working on a suitable warhead prior to the supposed halt of Iran’s military nuclear program in 2003. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to investigate this pre-2003 activity, but its requests to interview Iranian experts involved in this work have been denied by Tehran. The information that the IAEA can ascertain about this research is important because it has implications for Iran’s nuclear timeline. If Iran’s work prior to the halt was largely successful, Iran may not require much additional effort in order to have a warhead capable of fitting on a delivery vehicle. If the decision to halt the program came prior to completion of the work, then additional work will be required, even if Iran has the necessary fissile material for a nuclear weapon.

The third component is fissile material. This is where recent developments are the most troubling. Iran has a declared uranium enrichment facility at Natanz that, as of late August, had approximately 8,300 centrifuges installed, roughly 4,500 of which were spinning uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into low enriched uranium (LEU). In recent years, Iran has overcome significant technical difficulties with its centrifuges, and its rate of production of LEU has increased. Iran has successfully amassed a significant stockpile of LEU at Natanz, more than enough for one nuclear weapon if it was further enriched to highly enriched uranium (HEU).

In a positive development, Iran reportedly agreed on October, 1 during talks in Geneva, to allow much of its stockpile of LEU to be transferred to Russia and France for further processing into fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor. If Iran follows through on this proposal, it will significantly reduce the amount of LEU at Natanz.

Given that Natanz is under IAEA safeguards, to produce HEU at Natanz, Iran would have to kick out the IAEA inspectors, break seals, disable monitoring equipment, and reconfigure the infrastructure of pipes connecting the centrifuges. Such an action likely would be detected and could cause Israel or other countries to take military action. Most experts thus assume that if it made the decision to pursue HEU production, Iran likely would do so at a covert facility, such as the one revealed on Friday. That site, with a reported capacity of 3,000 centrifuges, is just the right size to produce roughly one weapon’s worth of HEU per year, if the centrifuges were properly configured.

Information about the site released by the Obama administration has been limited, but Iran is claiming that the site was for the production of LEU, not HEU, and regardless, because of a disagreement with the IAEA about Iran’s obligations for reporting new facilities, they were not required to report it until next year shortly prior to it becoming operational. Whatever the outcome of that dispute, if Iran were able to build one such facility, there very well may be others that are unbeknownst to Western intelligence agencies.

In sum, Iran has developed missiles capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to Israel and much of southeastern Europe. It is unclear how advanced their weaponization work was prior to 2003, when the U.S. intelligence community believes the program was halted, but Iran clearly has mastered centrifuge technology and could use that technology to produce HEU at a covert facility such as the one at Qom.

What are the implications of all of the above for policymakers?

The existence of the Qom facility raises questions about the conclusions of the U.S. intelligence 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). The NIE stated that Iran’s program had been halted in 2003. Even if the weaponization work was halted by Iran’s leaders, how should one construe President Obama’s statement that the new facility is inconsistent with peaceful purposes? Does this mean that the Iranian leadership has made a conscious decision to pursue a weapon, or that they are just keeping their options open?

Even if Iran has not formally restarted its push to develop a nuclear weapon, the status quo is just as dangerous. Iran might be building up the various capabilities that would allow its leaders to make a future decision to develop a nuclear weapon on short notice.

Jamie M. Fly is executive director of the Foreign Policy Initiative. He served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and on the National Security Council staff from 2005 to 2009.

How to Talk to Iran? Ask Pugwash

admin — Tue, 22 Sep 2009 19:27:14 +0000

ROME — In 2008, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs held four meetings in Europe that included some Iranian officials as well as some Iranian experts from the West and a few countries from other regions. The scope of the meetings was to address ways to develop discussions with Iran that could bring about a more constructive climate and possibly yield some positive results.

This brief contains informal observations and suggestions on a future U.S.-Iran or EU-Iran dialogue, based on the experience of these four meetings. It should be stressed, though, that this brief reflects solely the opinions of the author. No participant in any of these meetings shares any responsibility for what is written here, since the purpose of the meetings, as is the case for any Pugwash meeting, was not to reach a formal consensus among the participants but rather simply to explore options.

From this experience, I offer some specific observations about negotiations with Iran. These points take into consideration what I perceive as significant concerns on the Iranian side more than the so-called Western concerns or Western redlines, as the West’s position already is well known. The aim here is just to see if compromises may be possible.

1. There is a general philosophical approach by the Iranian political leadership that should be understood. This approach deals with some basic principles, such as justice, on which an agreement is possible, even if opinions can differ on conclusions and implications.

2. A logical conclusion of the basic principles would be the rejection of nuclear weapons (NW) as an acceptable instrument of warfare. Any statement or agreement aimed at rejecting NWs as a legitimate instrument of warfare would be considered positive and important.

3. The specific nuclear problem could be fruitfully addressed if some basic principles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are recalled, assumed, and implemented. The Iranians will stress mainly the principle of “no extra discrimination,” in addition to the (already discriminating) distinction between Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. In particular, there is nothing in the NPT that forbids uranium enrichment. If Iran wants to enrich, the argument goes, it should be allowed to do so. On the other hand, regulating the enrichment capability on a mutually agreed basis, strengthening the international monitoring regime, and implementing multinational fuel cycle units or consortiums are all topics that easily could be discussed, and where a consensus should be possible. The ensuing framework should be reassuring enough for those who are concerned about the risks of Iranian nuclear proliferation.

4. The additional protocol Iran signed in 2003 with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be implemented (even if the ratification procedure will take time). The relationship between Iran and the IAEA is a positive one and could be made better if the additional protocol will be ratified. There should be no obstacle to continuing the review of past Iranian nuclear activities (if continuing such a review will be needed). Of course there is also the possibility of Iran giving up uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication inside Iran, provided that it receives absolute guarantees of a nuclear fuel supply. This is the preferred opinion of many people in the West, and economically it makes sense. Iran, though, seems not to be ready, at this stage, to agree to this option. But is should be pointed out that, if future talks focus on “enrichment in Iran yes versus enrichment in Iran no,” the talks will go nowhere. From the point of view of preventing proliferation, what really matters is monitoring and international control.

5. The argument that monitoring cannot prevent the possibility of secret enrichment facilities is true, but it is also a misleading argument. Nothing can exclude the existence of secret facilities in any country, unless a full-scale military occupation of that country by foreign forces and/or the destruction of its industrial infrastructure is carried out. Forcing Iran to declare that it will no longer enrich will not provide an absolute guarantee against secret enrichment facilities.

6. Isolating Iran will neither improve the situation, nor will it eliminate the risks of proliferation. On the contrary, multiplying opportunities for business, cultural, and scientific cooperation could facilitate confidence-building across the existing dividing lines and enhance mutual understanding.

7. The idea of dealing with selected authorities (such as the Supreme Leader as opposed to, say, the president or his representatives) in Iran is not really a sensible one. In any negotiation, it is not up to one of the two parties to select the representative of the other party.

8. Specific issues of regional security (Iraq, Afghanistan, and so on) could be discussed easily in parallel talks. There is a large commonality of interests in preserving and strengthening regional stability and avoiding the spread of areas of lawlessness where terrorist groups might prosper.

9. One of the most controversial topics is the issue of Israel and Palestine. We have heard very harsh rhetorical statements from all sides. Beyond the rhetoric, in a nutshell, the Iranian position is that a just solution for Palestine should be a state where each citizen (be s/he a Jew, Muslim, or Christian) has the right to vote and to be represented. Namely, Iran supports a one-state as opposed to a two-state solution—a legitimate position to hold, albeit different from the equally legitimate position supporting the two-state solution. The common ground here should revolve around the prospect that every country or (national-political) group can contribute to peace in Palestine. It may be pointed out by the Iranians that to ask that Iran withhold its support of Hezbollah (or Hamas), would be like asking the United States to withhold support of Israel.

10. In order to facilitate the negotiating process, groups of non-officials could develop:

Discussions on disarmament and non-proliferation issues, and on the value of specific safeguards for the nuclear civilian programs. Such discussions could be explored among an international group of scientists, including crucially Iranian scientists.

Dialogue on regional security issues, starting with maritime security in the Persian Gulf and proceeding with Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and so on.

11. Among the other topics discussed in the meetings were the following proposals:

Proceeding toward the re-establishment of U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations, first by having the respective countries staff interest sections, who should be entitled to issue visas.

Reaffirming the Algiers accords (1981) that, inter alia, forbid attempts to work toward regime changes in Iran.

Establishing direct flights between the two countries and solving the relevant security problems by mutual agreement (there are a few hundred thousand passengers travelling annually between Iran and the United States).

Organizing governmental exchange visits and inter-governmental meetings.

Discussing economic cooperation in conjunction with the switching off of sanctions.

Facilitating cultural and scientific exchanges and visits of citizens.

After the elections of June 12, 2009, the situation in Iran is more complicated. Foreign governments certainly can request that the Iranian leadership respect human rights and respect the will of the Iranian people. But, ultimately, managing post-election life in Iran is an Iranian internal problem and should not be used as an excuse to block negotiations between Iran and other countries. Any attempt by the West to apply pressure on Iran and impose some form of timetable may well be counterproductive and lead to an unwanted result. This is particularly true if the timetable refers to the prospect of a military attack—no matter which country is anticipated to perform such an attack.