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	<title>insideIRAN &#187; Nuclear Program</title>
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		<title>Iran Pushes Back on EU Sanctions</title>
		<link>http://www.insideiran.org/media-analysis/iran-pushes-back-on-eu-sanctions/</link>
		<comments>http://www.insideiran.org/media-analysis/iran-pushes-back-on-eu-sanctions/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 20:34:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Reza Akbari</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Media Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Program]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. Iran Relations]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insideiran.org/?p=3374</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Reza H. Akbari</em><br />
<br />
<em> Editor’s note: The following is a roundup of the most important developments reported in Iran on January 31 regarding Iran’s response to EU sanctions and the IAEA inspectors. </em></p>
<p><em><span id="more-3374"></span></em>Iran’s Oil Minister, Rostam Ghasemi, announced that Iran is working&#8230;</p>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Reza H. Akbari</em><br />
<br />
<em> Editor’s note: The following is a roundup of the most important developments reported in Iran on January 31 regarding Iran’s response to EU sanctions and the IAEA inspectors. </em></p>
<p><em><span id="more-3374"></span></em>Iran’s Oil Minister, Rostam Ghasemi, announced that Iran is working on a plan to stop exporting oil to “some countries,” and the European Union’s ban of the country’s oil imports has no impact on Iran’s crude production.</p>
<p>According to many Iranian media sources, as reported by BBC Persian Service on January 30, Ghasemi reacted to the news of the European Union’s decision to embargo Iran’s oil by stating, “Based on the future plans of the Oil Ministry, [Iran] will soon stop its oil exports to some countries.”</p>
<p>Ghasemi indicated that Iran will always find a market for its oil and it is the European countries that should worry about finding an alternative source of petroleum. Ghasemi completely dismissed any concern about the European Union’s embargo, which will be implemented by July 1, adding, “Iran has a market for its oil exports even with cuts [in sales] to Europe and will face no problem in this regard.”</p>
<p>According to IRNA, addressing reporters on Tuesday, Iran’ Oil Minister stated, “Iran&#8217;s oil cannot be omitted [removed] from the international market…European countries have imposed the oil sanctions against Iran themselves and the impacts of these sanctions will definitely turn back to themselves.”</p>
<p>Ghasemi also reiterated that his ministry is awaiting a decision from the Iranian parliament that is working on a proposal to halt oil exports to Europe. IRNA quoted Ghasemi as saying, “This motion is being examined in the parliament, but it hasn&#8217;t been finalized yet and we are waiting for its final results.”</p>
<p>Last week the Foreign Ministers of 27 countries in the European Union sanctioned Iran’s oil in order to force the country to abide by the United Nation’s Security Council resolutions demanding Iran to stop its nuclear activities.</p>
<p>Many western foreign policy experts claim the international sanctions are designed to pressure the Iranian regime and not the people. However, with the recent announcement of the inability of grain shipments to reach the country, this argument becomes harder to make.</p>
<p>According to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/30/iran-grains-shipments-idUSL5E8CU2YB20120130" target="_blank">Reuters</a>, European Union sanctions have halted food import deals to Iran leaving about 400,000 tons of grain held up on at least 10 ships outside Iranian ports.</p>
<p><strong>IAEA Inspections and Iran’s Seemingly Cooperative Reaction </strong></p>
<p>Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s foreign minister, announced that the IAEA inspection team is allowed to extend its trip, if they wish.</p>
<p>According to IRNA, Salehi announced on Monday that Iran is “very optimistic about the mission and the outcome” of the IAEA’s inspection trip to Tehran. He added, “The trip was planned for three days, but if the IAEA wishes, the trip can be extended.”</p>
<p>Iran’s Foreign Minister seemed to be trying to diffuse the already tense situation exacerbated due to the recent military threats by Israel and western governments. He urged the United States and the European Union to “replace the sanctions with a policy of engagement.”</p>
<p>The three-day inspection tour by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team began on Sunday.</p>
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		<title>Explosion Kills Iranian Nuclear Scientist</title>
		<link>http://www.insideiran.org/media-analysis/explosion-kills-iranian-nuclear-scientist/</link>
		<comments>http://www.insideiran.org/media-analysis/explosion-kills-iranian-nuclear-scientist/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Jan 2012 21:19:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Reza Akbari</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Media Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Program]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. Iran Relations]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insideiran.org/?p=3325</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Reza H. Akbari</em><br />
<br />
According to Iranian officials,  Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, an Iranian nuclear scientist, was assassinated in Tehran on Wednesday, the latest in a series of assassinations linked by Iranian authorities to a Western covert plot to stop the Islamic Republic&#8230;</p>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Reza H. Akbari</em><br />
<br />
According to Iranian officials,  Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, an Iranian nuclear scientist, was assassinated in Tehran on Wednesday, the latest in a series of assassinations linked by Iranian authorities to a Western covert plot to stop the Islamic Republic from its nuclear ambitions.</p>
<p><span id="more-3325"></span></p>
<p>Based on reports by the Iranian media, Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan was killed due the explosion of a bomb near Seyed Khandan, a neighborhood in northern Tehran. According to Fars News, a semiofficial news agency close to the IRGC, Roshan was the Commerce Deputy Director of the Natanz enrichment facility and a professor at the Sharif University, Iran’s leading university in technology, engineering and physical sciences.</p>
<p>According to Fars News, a magnetic bomb was planted under the car of Ahmadi Roshan by an unknown motorcyclist. Iranian officials are blaming Israel and Mojahedin khalq Organization (MKO) for the attack. Mohammd Reza Rahimi, Iran’s first vice-president labeled the event as “state terrorism.”</p>
<p>According to Fars News, a few hours ago Reza Qashqayee, the driver of the assassinated professor who was severely injured in the blast died from his wounds in the hospital. The third victim of the explosion is a wounded pedestrian who has been transferred to a hospital.</p>
<p>Iranian officials seem persistent to continue their nuclear ambitions despite the most recent assassination of their leading nuclear scientists. According to Fars News, addressing a parliament session on Wednesday, vice-speaker of the parliament, Seyed Shahabeddin Sadr, mentioned that terrorist attacks on the lives of Iranian scientists are aimed at stopping Iran&#8217;s progress.</p>
<p>&#8220;The enemy assumes that it can hinder the Islamic Republic&#8217;s move towards progress and growth through such actions, but the experience gained as a result of the enemy&#8217;s blind assassination attempts over the last 30 years shows that these assassinations will not influence our nations,&#8221; he said. Sadr also warned that such terrorist attacks may backfire because they result in the Iranian nation&#8217;s stronger solidarity and determination.</p>
<p>The blast took place on the second anniversary of the assassination of university professor and nuclear scientist, Massoud Ali Mohammadi, who was killed in a similar fashion in January 2010.</p>
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		<title>Q&amp;A: Cumulative Details of IAEA Report Show Iran’s Progress Toward Weaponization</title>
		<link>http://www.insideiran.org/news/qa-cumulative-details-of-iaea-report-show-iran%e2%80%99s-progress-toward-weaponization/</link>
		<comments>http://www.insideiran.org/news/qa-cumulative-details-of-iaea-report-show-iran%e2%80%99s-progress-toward-weaponization/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Nov 2011 19:55:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>insideiran</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Featured Article]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News Features]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Program]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insideiran.org/?p=3139</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Editor’s note: This week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released its latest report on Iran’s nuclear program to member states. The report shows that Iran has mastered the critical steps needed to build a nuclear weapon. InsideIran’s Reza Akbari&#8230;</em></p>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Editor’s note: This week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released its latest report on Iran’s nuclear program to member states. The report shows that Iran has mastered the critical steps needed to build a nuclear weapon. InsideIran’s Reza Akbari conducted an interview with Dina Esfandiary, a Research Analyst and Project Coordinator at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.</em></p>
<p><em> </em></p>
<p><em>Q: The IAEA says Iran is now significantly closer to weaponizaton and has nuclear capability. Should the regime decide to pursue this option? Do you agree with this assessment?<br />
</em> <span id="more-3139"></span></p>
<p>A: The IAEA report cites evidence that points to nuclear weapon R&amp;D. This, along with the growth of enriched uranium stockpiles and progress in its ballistic missiles program, demonstrates that Iran wants the ability to produce a nuclear device. It makes it hard to believe that Iran’s program is for civilian purposes.</p>
<p>But the information in the report is not new. Some national intelligence organisations have known about these activities for a while now, but the IAEA had been cautious to release their findings publically until they were verified.</p>
<p>Nowhere in the report does it say that Iran has a nuclear weapon, or is currently making one, which is why we must be cautious in calling for action immediately.</p>
<p><em>Q: What evidence in the IAEA report do you find most compelling regarding Iran’s nuclear capability?</em></p>
<p>A: The piece of information that has attracted the most attention is Iran’s R&amp;D efforts in weaponizaton. But there are actually two other significant points in this report. Firstly, the fact that it was released under the auspices of the IAEA, giving the information contained extra credibility in the eyes of the international community. Secondly, it is the aggregate weight of the information rather than the individual parts that demonstrates Iranian intent. As previously mentioned, it is Iran’s R&amp;D into weaponizaton coupled with its advancing missile program, continued enrichment and the secrecy surrounding its nuclear activities that provides compelling evidence of Iran’s intentions.</p>
<p><em>Q: The report also indicates that Iran has relied upon foreign materials to develop its program. Do you believe this is accurate?</em></p>
<p>A: This is one of the most interesting aspects of the report. In its report, the IAEA outlined that a former Soviet scientist and nuclear weapons expert spent some time in Iran and allegedly assisted them in their program. In addition, following an interview with a member of the AQ Khan network, the agency explained that Iran had received bomb designs from the network, including more advanced designs than those sold to Libya in the past. The report also outlines assistance received by other nuclear-weapon states. It is this kind of activity that the sanctions regimes target.</p>
<p>At the moment, Iran has a certain amount of technology, which it either developed by itself, or received outside assistance with. Given Iran’s technological limitations, it is reasonable to concur with the IAEA report. In addition, given the amount of political pressure it was under, the IAEA would not have released this information if it were not sure of its accuracy. According to the report, the intelligence came from multiple sources, and not just Western intelligence sources but information that the IAEA developed on its own, including the information about Iran’s procurement, and black market networks.</p>
<p><em>Q: The IAEA report states that Iran’s program is far more ambitious and advanced than was believed to be the case. Do you agree with this assessment? In what ways it is ambitious and advanced?</em></p>
<p>The IAEA report represents the most complete outline of Iran’s nuclear capabilities that government and UN agencies have been prepared to confirm publicly, but it is roughly in line with expectations in the nuclear-security community.</p>
<p>The latest IAEA report confirms that Iran’s program is ambitious and has progressed considerably. But it is important to highlight that up until now, Iran has not made the decision to go nuclear. Its progression has been relatively slow, especially when compared with Pakistan’s crash program. In addition, Iran’s program has been the target of sanctions and sabotage efforts (assassinations, Stuxnet, industrial sabotage) that have further prevented it from advancing as fast as regime heads may have wanted it to advance.</p>
<p>It is also important to highlight Iranian’s perseverance with its nuclear program. No matter what the international community has thrown their way, Iran has declared its commitment to continuing its “peaceful” program. In fact, just this week, in response to the release of the IAEA report, President Ahmadinejad stated that Iran would not “retreat one iota” from its nuclear ambitions.</p>
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		<title>Q&amp;A: IAEA Report Indicates Iran’s Slow Development on Nuclear Program</title>
		<link>http://www.insideiran.org/news/qa-iaea-report-indicates-iran%e2%80%99s-slow-development-on-nuclear-program/</link>
		<comments>http://www.insideiran.org/news/qa-iaea-report-indicates-iran%e2%80%99s-slow-development-on-nuclear-program/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Nov 2011 14:59:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>insideiran</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Featured Article]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News Features]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Program]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insideiran.org/?p=3128</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Editor’s note: This week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released its latest report on Iran&#8217;s nuclear program to member states. The report shows that Iran has mastered the critical steps needed to build a nuclear weapon. InsideIran’s Reza Akbari&#8230;</em></p>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Editor’s note: This week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released its latest report on Iran&#8217;s nuclear program to member states. The report shows that Iran has mastered the critical steps needed to build a nuclear weapon. InsideIran’s Reza Akbari conducted an interview with Ali Vaez, a fellow for science and technology and director of the Iran project at the Federation of American Scientists.</em></p>
<p><em> </em></p>
<p><em>Q: The IAEA says Iran is now significantly closer to weaponizaton and has nuclear capability. Should the regime decide to pursue this option? Do you agree with this assessment? </em> <span id="more-3128"></span></p>
<p>A: The fact that Iran is seeking nuclear latency has been well-known to the intelligence and non-proliferation communities for a long time. Both the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate and the 2009 IAEA report stated, &#8220;Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons, if it decides to do so.&#8221; For one thing, the new IAEA reports shows that Iran’s progress on nuclear arms experiments has been much milder than alarmists claim. The new IAEA report clearly demonstrates that since 2003 weaponization efforts have become dispersed and are pursued with diminished vigor.</p>
<p>The report contends that the information package Iran received from A.Q. Khan&#8217;s illicit nuclear network was more sophisticated than the starter kit that Libya obtained from the same supplier. Nevertheless, the agency does not claim that Iran has been able to master this technology. The IAEA simply highlights Iran’s research and development efforts, which does not readily translate to actual weaponization. Therefore, there is still time for diplomacy to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. In 2003, the Europeans convinced Iran through diplomacy to admit to its past wrongdoings. The goal should now be to revitalize the diplomatic engagement process and provide Tehran with guarantees that it will not be penalized if it comes clean of its past activities and cooperates with the IAEA. The same approach was successfully employed in the case of Libya.</p>
<p><em>Q: What evidence in the IAEA report do you find most compelling regarding Iran&#8217;s nuclear capability?</em></p>
<p>A: I think, much like the hype and the fallout surrounding the release of iPhone 4S, the new IAEA report failed to surprise. The report is unprecedented in the scale and scope of the detailed information that it has revealed to the public eye, but contains no new information. Since the agency had pierced Iran&#8217;s cloak of nuclear secrecy numerous times in the past, most of the information in the 12-page annex of this report was referenced to previous IAEA publications. Moreover, the report has failed to scrap the word “possible” from the often-used construct “possible military dimension” of Iran’s nuclear program; at best it has rendered the word “probable,” more diplomatically relevant. Nonetheless, evidence on the possibility of ongoing nuclear arms experiments is extremely thin and mostly based on information received from one or two unnamed sources. The agency also does not make a compelling case when it gets to dual-use technologies that could be use for non-nuclear arm related experiments. This part of the report requires more scrutiny from the experts; as for example the exploding bridge-wire detonators have many civilian applications contrary to what the IAEA contends.</p>
<p>For more substance, see page 8 of the annex:</p>
<p><em>The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured program.  There are also some indications that <span style="text-decoration: underline;">some activities relevant</span> to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that <span style="text-decoration: underline;">some may still be ongoing</span>.</em></p>
<p><em>Q:  The report also indicates that Iran has relied upon foreign materials to develop its program. Do you believe this is accurate?</em></p>
<p>A: Almost all nuclear weapon states benefited from external assistance to develop their atomic arms. Israel enjoyed the US support, while India used American and Canadian technology to obtain the ultimate weapon. Soviet Union aided China in getting the atomic bomb, and in turn helped Pakistan to develop its nuclear weapons program. The fact that Iran has had extensive ties with Russia, Pakistan and North Korea to develop its nuclear program has been public knowledge for a long time. The exact nature of these relations, however, is still opaque, despite the IAEA’s effort to shed more light on it. The new IAEA report is thus not a game-changer.</p>
<p><em>Q:  The IAEA report states that Iran&#8217;s program is far more ambitious and advanced than was believed to be the case. Do you agree with this assessment? In what ways it is ambitious and advanced?</em></p>
<p>A: The Iranian nuclear program is extensive, ambitious and advanced; but it is not a crash program towards nuclear weapons. In fact, the new IAEA report reveals that the pace of Iranian uranium refinement has continued to stagnate. Iran’s antiquated IR-1 machines continue to underperform and five years after Ahmadinejad promised to deploy a new generation of indigenous centrifuges, Iran has yet to set up a complete cascade of them. Yet, the fact that Iran has been willing to pay such a huge price for a program that has virtually no economic rational and energy benefits increases concerns about Iran’s true intentions. Iran’s only reactor in Bushehr merely provides less than two percent of the country’s energy needs, which pales in comparison to 18 percent waste in Iran’s electrical transmission lines.</p>
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		<title>Iran Rejects Allegations of Trying to Reach Nuclear Weaponization</title>
		<link>http://www.insideiran.org/media-analysis/iran-rejects-allegations-of-trying-to-reach-nuclear-weaponization/</link>
		<comments>http://www.insideiran.org/media-analysis/iran-rejects-allegations-of-trying-to-reach-nuclear-weaponization/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 07 Nov 2011 21:33:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>insideiran</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Foreign Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Media Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Program]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insideiran.org/?p=3113</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Reza H. Akbari</em></p>
<p>Iranian officials reject the findings of a report set to be released this week by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which shows that Iran is within the reach of obtaining a nuclear weapon. <span id="more-3113"></span></p>
<p>Iran’s Foreign Minister, Ali&#8230;</p>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Reza H. Akbari</em></p>
<p>Iranian officials reject the findings of a report set to be released this week by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which shows that Iran is within the reach of obtaining a nuclear weapon. <span id="more-3113"></span></p>
<p>Iran’s Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, responded to the news of the release of the IAEA report by labeling it as “baseless and false.” According to the Iranian Students’ News Agency, ISNA, Salehi addressed the issue during a press conference on November 5, by stating, “For quite a time there has been controversial talks about a forthcoming IAEA report, which will present some evidence of Iran’s missile activities. There have been similar talks and so called evidence presented in the past. The Islamic Republic has given the necessary replies. We responded to the alleged studies in 117 pages. I believe these documents [IAEA report] are forgeries, but if they insist to publish them, let’s do it and get it over with.”</p>
<p>As reported by the Washington Post, intelligence provided to the United Nations&#8217; nuclear watchdog agency shows that Iran has mastered the critical steps needed to build a nuclear weapon. An article by Joby Warrick published on November 6, in Washington Post, reported that according to the intelligence, Iran appears to have received crucial technical assistance from foreign experts. The IAEA report is expected to be the agency’s most detailed research to date on Iran’s nuclear activities.</p>
<p>Salehi continued his remarks by highlighting the United Sates’ questionable history of accurate intelligence. He provided an example of such false accusations by referring to the United States’ allegations toward Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. “Previously the United States presented such accusations in the form of the Niger scandal. United States’ Secretary of State presented documents to the United Nations and the Security Council. He even mentioned that the Nigerian Prime Minister has signed the documents. This evidence was used as a pretext to attack Iraq. After killing tens of thousands of innocent people, it was discovered that the document was fabricated. The U.S. Secretary of State at the time apologized, but what good is an apology when so many innocent lives are taken away.”</p>
<p>The Iranian Foreign Minister is referring to Colin Powell&#8217;s role to garner international support for a multi-national coalition prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. To this end, Powell addressed a plenary session of the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003 to argue in favor of military action. Citing numerous anonymous sources, Powell asserted that &#8220;there can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more.&#8221;</p>
<p>Salehi accused the IAEA of violating its neutrality and sided with US intelligence claims under its new Chief Yukiya Amano.  Salehi indicated, “He [Yukiya Amano] is using information that his predecessor, Mohamed ElBaradei, said the agency could not authenticate independently.”</p>
<p>Salehi mentioned that it seems like the IAEA has been politicized and it is being forced to make decisions under pressure. “Publish the report. We are aware of the truth. Publish the facts and let’s see what will happen,” Salehi added.</p>
<p>According to Iran Newspaper, a publication affiliated with the Iranian government, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also warned about the “final moment of clash.” According to a report by Iran newspaper on November 5, the Iranian president stated, “The west has mobilized all of its forces to confront and finish Iran at once. It is clear as daylight that NATO forces are panting in excitement to confront Iran. However, this confrontation is not necessarily a military one and could be of a political nature.”</p>
<p>According to Fars News, in an interview with Egypt’s state-owned Al-Akhbar newspaper, Ahmadinejad lashed out at Israel after the country’s President, Shimon Peres, warned that an attack on Iran is increasingly likely. “(the) US and Israel are seeking to rally international support for an attack on Tehran because Iran is a very powerful country with huge capacities and capabilities and the US and Israel are unable to wage an attack on the country alone,” Ahmadinejad said.</p>
<p>Despite Israel’s harsh rhetoric, the Iranian government seems to be holding its position on the nuclear issue. Iranian Parliamentary member, Esmaeil Kowsari, dismissed Israel’s threats of a military action against the Islamic Republic as a “political and military bluff.”</p>
<p>According to Mehr News, a semi-official news agency, Kowsari, the Deputy Chairman of the Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, added, “recent threats made by officials of the US and the Zionist regime are a political and military bluff. The Zionist regime and the US are in no position to attack Iran.”</p>
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		<title>Ahmadinejad&#8217;s Renewed Call for Nuclear Talks Void of Support</title>
		<link>http://www.insideiran.org/foreign-relations/ahmadinejads-renewed-call-for-talks-void-of-support/</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 11 May 2011 18:32:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>shayan_ghajar</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Critical Comments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Program]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insideiran.org/?p=2419</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Shayan Ghajar</em><br />
<br />
Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appears to have survived the internecine struggles over the Ministry of Intelligence for the time being, yet the contest of wills between the embattled president and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has by no means abated.<span id="more-2419"></span> Ahmadinejad&#8230;</p>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Shayan Ghajar</em><br />
<br />
Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appears to have survived the internecine struggles over the Ministry of Intelligence for the time being, yet the contest of wills between the embattled president and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has by no means abated.<span id="more-2419"></span> Ahmadinejad is under attack from <a href="http://www.insideiran.org/media-analysis/attacks-against-ahmadinejad-continue-despite-apparent-reconciliation/">all sides</a>: the parliament seeks to <a href="http://www.insideiran.org/media-analysis/critics-in-parliament-move-against-ahmadinejad/">hamper his ministerial plans</a>, the Supreme Leader struck down his attempts to force the Intelligence Minister out of office, and even many of his die-hard supporters ranging from clerics to news agencies sided with Khamenei over him. Consequently, in an apparent bid to appear nonplussed, strong, and as relevant as ever both domestically and internationally, Ahmadinejad attempted to initiate yet another spurious meeting with members of the U.N. Security Council after months of stalled negotiations.</p>
<p>Seemingly out of the blue, Ahmadinejad and a few other officials, such as the Foreign Minister and the head of the nuclear program, announced on May 9 that <a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jAuNUGpgaM9aBQbylS0BOyFXPlRA?docId=CNG.d9be2af4c7111ceebb9f06f4d37012ee.5e1">Iran would respond</a> to a letter sent by European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton three months prior, in February 2011. Ahmadinejad himself <a href="http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9002200333">made the declaration</a> during the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries in Istanbul. Ahmadinejad set out for the meeting almost immediately after the worst of the <a href="http://www.insideiran.org/news/clash-over-mashaei-reveals-fissures-within-the-regime/">Intelligence Ministry debacle</a> had passed.</p>
<p>The Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, inadvertently revealed that even with regards to responding to Ashton’s months-old letter, internal political rivalries over authority and jurisdiction in Iran prevail over unified official response. When <a href="http://www.tehrantimes.com/Index_view.asp?code=240266">asked by reporters</a> about the situation of the letter and Iran’s future response, Salehi defensively clarified the matter of jurisdiction and lay responsibility for Iran’s reaction squarely with the president as well as nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, not the Foreign Ministry. Salehi’s irritation at the ambiguity of precisely which aspect of the government shoulders responsibility for the negotiations is evident in his response: “Firstly, the letter sent by Catherine Ashton, the head of EU foreign policy chief, is for Dr. Jalili, not for me, and I have never said that this letter was sent for [the Foreign Ministry],” Salehi protested.</p>
<p>Secondly, Salehi pontificated, the Foreign Ministry’s involvement in the letter was restricted to consultations on the response, but not actual decision-making. “Thirdly, the letter is on Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s table until he’ll say what to do and after that Dr. Jalili is supposed to send a letter, not the Foreign Ministry,” he concluded. Jalili, Iran’s nuclear chief, is known to be a Khamenei loyalist&#8211;however, the Supreme Leader’s role regarding the new call for talks remains unknown at this time. If Khamenei ordered the new calls for talks and intended to demonstrate the government’s solidarity on the nuclear program, Salehi’s comments may be taken as a sign that no issue is too sacred for Iran’s elite to use as a political <em>casus belli</em> in their internal struggles for power. </p>
<p>The incoherence of Ahmadinejad’s unexpected announcement was compounded by news that the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/10/russia-iran-nuclear-idUSLDE74912D20110510">Bushehr nuclear plant</a> had begun operating at low capacity, a crucial preliminary step in attaining full functionality. Given that the P5+1 have repeatedly declared their entire purpose for negotiations to be addressing concerns over Iran’s nuclear enrichment, Ahmadinejad’s intent to resume negotiations is utterly obviated by Iran’s repeated declaration&#8211;including just <a href="http://www.mehrnews.com/en/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1309464">days after</a> the statement of renewed interest in talks&#8211;that nuclear enrichment is non-negotiable. Moreover, Iran <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/11/us-nuclear-iran-russia-idUSTRE74A44F20110511">received additional fuel</a> in the first and second week of May 2011 from Russia, as well as assistance in starting up the Bushehr plant, which will prove to be a further thumb in the eye of P5+1 negotiators, though Iran is obligated in its agreement with Russia to return spent fuel after use, to forestall European and American fears of weaponization.</p>
<p>Ahmadinejad’s domestic critics, as well as representatives of the European Union, sound unusually similar in their reaction to the sudden call for more talks. </p>
<p>Raja News, a site previously supportive of Ahmadinejad that turned staunchly critical upon his abortive mutiny surrounding the Minister of Intelligence affair, published a <a href="http://www.rajanews.com/detail.asp?id=88386">derisive article (Farsi language)</a> on May 10 questioning the purpose of the talks. Titled “What is the latest status of Iran’s nuclear dossier?”, the article describes the incompatible and unresolvable differences between what Iran and the P5+1 are willing to do to achieve compromise, noting that despite the sea changes happening in the Middle East, the obstacles to progress on the nuclear issue remain.</p>
<p>The European Union <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/11/us-iran-nuclear-eu-idUSTRE74A30I20110511">seems to agree</a> that the renewed call for talks lacks promise or logic. “On its own, Mr. Jalili&#8217;s letter does not contain anything new and does not seem to justify a further meeting,” a spokesman for Catherine Ashton stated on May 11. Nevertheless, the European side indicated they will pursue a followup with Iran in the future.</p>
<p>Ahmadinejad’s rather frantic attempt to remind Iran’s domestic audience of his international relevance has utterly backfired. Rather than precipitating new and significant interaction between Iran and its global critics, Ahmadinejad has further revealed the worsening schisms plaguing the Iranian government. The move is a testament to Ahmadinejad’s desperation, besieged on all sides by former allies more loyal to the status quo than to a new generation of unorthodox populists.</p>
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		<title>How Likely is an Iranian Nuclear Counterstrike?</title>
		<link>http://www.insideiran.org/news/how-likely-is-an-iranian-nuclear-counterstrike/</link>
		<comments>http://www.insideiran.org/news/how-likely-is-an-iranian-nuclear-counterstrike/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 Apr 2010 18:05:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>insideiran</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[News Features]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Program]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. Iran Relations]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insideiran.org/?p=1142</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Jamsheed K. Choksy</em><br />
<br />
A preemptive attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities by the U.S., Israel, or both nations has been on the table for quite some time. Yet because Iran has at least a dozen <a href = http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles_pdfs/Iran/iran_nuclear_sites.pdf>centers</a> related to its nuclear activities, demolishing the&#8230;</p>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Jamsheed K. Choksy</em><br />
<br />
A preemptive attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities by the U.S., Israel, or both nations has been on the table for quite some time. Yet because Iran has at least a dozen <a href = http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles_pdfs/Iran/iran_nuclear_sites.pdf>centers</a> related to its nuclear activities, demolishing the program would be extremely difficult. None the less, there is no dearth of <a href = http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2010/02/04/war_games_explore_military_options_for_iran_97526.html>war game scenarios</a> by <a href = http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2010/02_iran_israel_strike_pollack/02_iran_israel_strike_pollack.pdf>think tanks</a>, <a href = http://innpattsim.wordpress.com/2010/03/03/summary-of-patterson-school-of-diplomacy-simulation-2010/>universities</a>, <a href = http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/30/blind_mans_bluff>government departments</a>, even <a href = http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/will-iran-be-next/3599>magazines</a> in the U.S. and Israel. Iran too has conducted its own large-scale defensive and offensive scenarios – including one last November involving actual <a href = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8372985.stm>military exercises</a>.<span id="more-1142"></span><br />
<br />
Ultimately, how events could actually transpire remains anyone’s educated guess. At the very least, Iran will utilize technical knowledge gained over the years to rebuild its nuclear program and work feverishly toward weaponization. It probably also would officially abjure the Non-Proliferation Treaty and bar the International Atomic Energy Agency from any oversight.<br />
<br />
Yet there is a far more devastating scenario that needs to be given much greater consideration. Iran could retaliate by actively or tacitly providing low enriched uranium (LEU) to militant and terrorists groups that are targeting the U.S., E.U., and Israel.<br />
<br />
When physical incapacitation of nuclear facilities occurs at initial stages of construction, the damage to all parties is both minimal and manageable. Israel followed that trajectory when it struck at Iraq’s <a href = http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/osiraq.htm>Osirak (Tammuz 1) reactor</a> in June 1981 and at Syria’s <a href = http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,658663,00.html>Al-Kibar facility</a> in September 2007. Iran <a href = http://isis-online.org/country-pages/iran>recommenced</a> its nuclear program during the early 1990s, expanding rapidly as the world dithered. So the window for a surgical strike by the U.S. or Israel has long passed. The scales of attack, devastation, and response have all increased exponentially.<br />
<br />
In the chaos that now would surround the aftermath of aerial strikes on its nuclear sites, it is quite likely that Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) could lose control over portions of the nuclear materials inventory. Individuals and groups seeking revenge against attacking nations could spirit away radioactive materials and transfer those to Al-Qaeda via Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. The Taliban and its auxiliaries could be beneficiaries of nuclear elements too. Both terrorist organizations have <a href = http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/17/peddling_peril?page=0,0>tried</a>, unsuccessfully so far, to obtain fuel for improvised nuclear devices.<br />
<br />
Beyond the actions of rogue scientists and crazy radicals, the Iranian government may seek recourse to similar action as well. Iran’s administration, and especially its IRGC, has <a href = http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4745>played</a> a stealth and uneasy game with both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the basis of the U.S. and Israel being <a href = http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2009/12/iran_al-qaeda.html>common enemies</a>. Hezbollah and Hamas – Iran’s <a href = http://www.cfr.org/publication/9362/>proxies</a> against Israel – could find themselves in possession of dirty bombs too, courtesy of enraged Iranian military men, scientists, politicians, and mullahs.<br />
<br />
Transporting LEU onto the U.S. mainland, while <a href = http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/03/27/radioactive.smuggling/index.html>not impossible</a>, will be difficult and so Americans may be the least directly affected by Iranian retaliation through its terrorist cohorts. Smuggling nuclear fuel across highly porous land and maritime borders into Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan for use against coalition forces, western diplomats, and foreign aid-workers may prove harder to prevent. Likewise, from Iran via Iraq and then Syria, LEU may end up in Hezbollah short-range rockets shot into Israel. A similar route overland to the Mediterranean coast and then via boat to Gaza could place LEU in the hands of Hamas suicide bombers entering Israel. Carried by militants across Iran’s border with Turkey and from there into European cities, small dirty bombs could spread terror across the E.U.<br />
<br />
Such nightmare scenarios are not merely hypothetical. Intelligence and news reports suggest that Iran’s leaders are preparing an <a href = http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=54427>array of responses</a> to possible attacks by the U.S. and Israel. Tehran keeps <a href = http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/994801.html>warning</a> the world of a “devastating” response. As early as 2003, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei <a href = http://www.tvotw.com/AttackOnIranWouldBeSuicide_Khamenei_5Jun2003.htm>declared</a>: “A military attack against Iran would be suicide for the aggressor.” More recently his aides <a href = http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE59816920091009>suggested</a> Iran’s government would retaliate by “blowing up the heart of Israel.”<br />
<br />
Despite their belligerent rhetoric, most Iranian clerics, politicians, and generals are not bent on provoking a military confrontation with the U.S. They regard <a href = http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/22/iran-ayatollah-khamenei-green-movement-opinions-contributors-jamsheed-k-choksy.html>preservation</a> of their power as paramount. Yet, if attacked and weakened, their reactions could be unpredictable and perhaps irrational. So their bellicoseness should not be taken lightly though those words produce a conundrum for the world wherein both inaction and action can have deadly consequences.<br />
<br />
Iran <a href = http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/>lacks</a> the conventional military capacity to <a href = http://www.globalfirepower.com/>retaliate</a> by itself against the U.S., European Union or Israel in an overwhelming manner. <a href = http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_721_Report.pdf>Nor does</a> it have nuclear weapons at present. Yet its revolutionary elite remain deeply hostile to the U.S. and Israel. For those reasons, Iran’s leaders may conclude they have nothing to lose by working through terrorist organizations to wreck multiple small-scale radiation havoc on attackers. Even if no such official decision is reached, as noted previously, non-state actors could spirit away some of the radioactive materials from the wrecked sites to assemble and detonate improvised nuclear devices.<br />
<br />
So if the U.S. or Israel chooses to go down the martial path vis-à-vis Iran, with or without cooperating together and with or without assistance from the E.U., preemptive planning must be undertaken for a nuclear retaliation. It is absolutely essential to be fully prepared for what could lay ahead if any portion of Iran’s LEU deliberately or accidentally falls into the hands of non-state militants.<br />
<br />
<em>Jamsheed K. Choksy is professor of Iranian and International studies and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. He also is a member of the U.S. National Council on the Humanities at the National Endowment for the Humanities. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
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		<title>Obama’s  One-Year Anniversary of Outreach to Iran Shows Need for Realpolitik</title>
		<link>http://www.insideiran.org/news/obama%e2%80%99s-one-year-anniversary-of-outreach-to-iran-shows-need-for-realpolitik/</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Mar 2010 18:48:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>insideiran</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Featured Article]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News Features]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Program]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. Iran Relations]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insideiran.org/?p=1019</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Riccardo Redaelli</em><br />
<strong><br />COMO, Italy</strong>—If proper “timing and tuning” are essential during negotiations, over the past decade, neither Washington nor Tehran has managed to tune their political mood into the same wavelength. When the Islamic Republic was ready to enter into negotiations,&#8230;</p>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Riccardo Redaelli</em><br />
<strong><br />COMO, Italy</strong>—If proper “timing and tuning” are essential during negotiations, over the past decade, neither Washington nor Tehran has managed to tune their political mood into the same wavelength. When the Islamic Republic was ready to enter into negotiations, the White House was not, and vice-versa.<span id="more-1019"></span><br />
<br />
For years, I criticized the United States’ attitude towards Iran, in particular its inability to understand the Iranian threat perceptions and sense of isolation. During the Bush administration, the mantra was “we do not speak with the devil,” as then-Vice-President Dick Cheney dismissed any direct negotiation with Tehran.  The U.S. policy of refusing direct talks with Iran, and its unrealistic and dogmatic stance on its low enriched uranium (LEU) program contributed to the disastrous results of the E3-EU (France, Germany and Great Britain) negotiations of 2003 to 2006. The refusal of the spring 2005 offer by the Iranian nuclear chief negotiator, Hasan Rowhani, has proven to have been a huge mistake: today, we could have had an Iran implementing the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and running a few dozen centrifuges. Instead, we find ourselves frantically looking for an agreement with a radical government that possesses thousands of them and that no longer implements the Additional Protocol.<br />
<br />
In brief, U.S. containment strategies have failed in the past and have had huge geopolitical costs in the region, which indirectly led to a consistent Iranian foreign policy not in the United States’ interest, rather than a policy that would have weakened Iran’s ultra-conservatives. The result has created huge difficulties for Iranian reformists and pragmatic conservatives domestically as well as internationally.<br />
 <br />
<em> The New U.S. Policy toward Iran and the Green Movement </em><br />
<br />
The new U.S. administration, therefore, decided to offer Tehran direct negotiations without preconditions (always perceived as an intolerable humiliation to national pride by Iran’s post revolutionary political elite). President Obama’s message on the occasion of the Nowrūz festival almost exactly a year ago was an unprecedented move, aimed at overcoming the standstill in nuclear negotiations. Unfortunately for Obama, the Iranian electoral crisis exploded shortly after his offers had been made. Massive electoral fraud deprived Mir-Hossein Moussavi, the main reformist candidate, of millions of votes, as is easily demonstrated by a detailed analysis of the turnout figures.  In the Islamic Republic, such an alteration of the electoral results represented an unpleasant and shocking degeneration of the Islamic Republic’s power mechanisms.<br />
<br />
This was the main reason behind the rise of the so-called Green Movement, with pacific public protests and gatherings asking for new elections and the removal of an illegitimate president. The government reacted in the usual way, with a mixture of violent response from its security forces, arrests, harassment and threats. The electoral fraud had also polarized the Islamic Republic to an unprecedented degree, with its political elite deeply fragmented and with mass protests occurring that recall those of the 1970s against the Pahlavi monarchy.<br />
<br />
 <em> The Present Mistake </em><br />
<br />
For the international community, the dilemma was whether to back the popular protests or not. The West—and Washington in particular—decided to maintain a very low profile regarding Iranian domestic troubles, with the idea, as cynical as it is naïve, that a weakened regime might have been softer on the nuclear negotiations. The result was the meetings in Geneva and Vienna in the autumn of 2009, when Iran initially accepted the idea of a swap of its LEU stockpile to Russia and France, in exchange for already processed LEU at 20 percent for its research reactor. To the West’s discomfort, Tehran eventually refused the compromise, after confused and still unclear domestic debates.<br />
<br />
During the past months, the hope that, following the domestic electoral turbulence, the Iranian government was ready to seriously engage with the Obama administration and that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was able to reach a compromise and deliver it at home (that is, getting the consensus of the rahbar and of the obscure Iranian “nuclear inner circle”) did not materialize, probably due to domestic political divisions. According to less benevolent interpretations, these diplomatic moves were simply another Iranian bluff: Tehran needed time to deal with the chaotic domestic situation. The offers made in Geneva and Vienna in Fall 2009 were part of a scheme for avoiding international pressure while the regime was cracking down on the protesters.<br />
<br />
In fact, the West kept a very low profile on the issue for months. A commonly held view in Western political circles was that the reformists could easily be sacrificed on the altar of a nuclear compromise. The gamble did not, however, pay off: we did not get any agreement.<br />
The harsh reality is that, in the meantime, the radicals in Tehran had increased the level of repression and brutality, with thousands of members of Iranian civil society arrested, threatened, raped, or tortured, and several people killed or sentenced to death by an increasingly overconfident, oppressive regime.<br />
<br />
<em> Break the Vicious Circle of Always Offering Ahmadinejad Something More </em><br />
<br />
These events oblige the international community—and the West in particular—to reconsider their strategy. For instance, President Obama is facing growing opposition in Washington toward his policy of engagement, and the nuclear negotiations with Iran cannot be allowed to distract us from what is happening in Iran. First of all, it is crucial to prevent our declarations against the repression from being counterproductive, since the Iranian government is already accusing the reformists of being “fifth columnists” of enemies of the Republic. However, there are ways and means of making Tehran understand that the West is not looking for a regime change, but cannot tolerate such a level of domestic violence.<br />
<br />
In other words, since Ahmadinejad and the pasdarans have deeply polarized the Iranian political scenario, we should carefully send messages to the Rahbar that Ahmadinejad represents a much greater risk for the Islamic Republic than the reformists, and that we are ready to negotiate with Supreme Leader Khamenei, but we will adopt a tougher stance (at every level, nuclear negotiations included) if he lends his support to such bloody repression. Some of the main religious and political leaders, such as Rafsanjani and, to a certain extent, Mohammad Khatami himself, are attempting the same, trying to de-polarize the domestic political spectrum in the hope that the Rahbar might decide to rebalance the system, adopting a more moderate position. It is probably the last chance Khamenei has to avoid a dramatic transformation of the Islamic Republic and far more severe international isolation.<br />
<br />
At the same time, it is time to end our obsession with the uranium enrichment conundrum: it is clear that the only way to keep Iran latent at the nuclear weapon level is through verifications and political confidence, not merely technical solutions, such as the recent proposed swap with Russia, France, Turkey, or elsewhere. Without decreasing the level of mistrust, resistance to a comprehensive agreement will be insurmountable.<br />
<br />
For years I backed track-2 programs with Iranians, and I still believe they represented a useful tool of communication, taking into account the antagonistic postures of Washington and Tehran. But the current scenario is radically different: the technical package offered in Vienna and Geneva to Iran represented an honorable compromise, based on the best diplomatic effort of recent years. The package is still on the table, and some minor amendments might be made in order to give extra guarantees to the Islamic Republic’s obsessions. However, we should resist the idea of acquiescing to new Iranian requests or looking for other, smoother “technical solutions” for convincing Iran. The offer is already favorable: it has been almost accepted, almost refused, renegotiated, reneged, and all other degrees of unclear response. In the meantime, Iran continues with its paranoid policy of repression and intimidation of reformists, intellectuals, professors, students, women’s’ rights activists, and simple citizens. And the West continues to stick to its past policy of ambiguous silence over it.<br />
<br />
Lack of credibility was one of the main failures of the past U.S. administration’s policy toward the Middle East, since its rhetorical insistence on democratization was a far cry from an ambiguous policy of double standards. We should now avoid the risk of embarking on a pathetically weak new form of realpolitik .<br />
<br />
<em> Riccardo Redaelli is the Director of the Middle East Program at LNCV and Professor of Geopolitics at the Catholic University of Milano. He has participated in Track 2 talks with Iran. </em></p>
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		<title>Tehran Thumbs Its Nose at Gasoline Sanctions</title>
		<link>http://www.insideiran.org/news/tehran-thumbs-its-nose-at-gasoline-sanctions/</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2010 18:25:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>insideiran</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[News Features]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Program]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. Iran Relations]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insideiran.org/?p=997</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Hossein Askari</em><br />
<br />
<strong>WASHINGTON</strong>—In Washington, politicians and Iran experts have been pounding the table for what they claim to be the mother of all sanctions on Iran—a gasoline embargo. While in Tehran, Ahmadinejad and his supporters dare President Obama to go ahead&#8230;</p>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Hossein Askari</em><br />
<br />
<strong>WASHINGTON</strong>—In Washington, politicians and Iran experts have been pounding the table for what they claim to be the mother of all sanctions on Iran—a gasoline embargo. While in Tehran, Ahmadinejad and his supporters dare President Obama to go ahead and impose a gasoline embargo on Iran. They claim Iran has adequate gasoline storage and enhanced gasoline production capacity to withstand an embargo. Is there substance to Iranian claims? Would a gasoline embargo bring the Tehran regime to its knees?<span id="more-997"></span><br />
<br />
Iran has the second-highest level of proven oil reserves in OPEC after Saudi Arabia, and also ranks a distant second to Saudi Arabia in oil production. These are today’s OPEC reserves and production standings. Although Iran is a major exporter of crude oil, it is a net importer of refined products, especially gasoline and diesel fuel, from a variety of sources, including China.<br />
<br />
This surprising situation is due largely to two policy decisions made by Iran: gasoline and diesel fuel are sold by the government at heavily subsidized prices (significantly below world prices, at about 40 cents per gallon for gasoline), encouraging wasteful fuel consumption and smuggling to neighboring countries, where prices are higher. At the same time, Iran’s domestic refining capacity (1.5 million barrels per day) has not kept up with rapidly growing demand (1.7 million barrels per day), a gap of about 200,000 barrels per day of refined capacity at the light fuels end of the refining process (especially gasoline). To fill the gap, the government imports gasoline and diesel fuel at world prices and turns around and sells it in Iran at the lower subsidized price charged for domestically produced products, putting serious pressure on the government’s budgetary balance.<br />
<br />
Facing this domestic shortfall in refined products, Tehran decided some time ago to expand its refining capacity. As a result, it seems that in about three years Iran’s refining capacity will double to close to 3 million barrels per day. This expansion, along with planned domestic price increases for gasoline and diesel fuel, should allow Iran to eliminate imports of refined products and even enable the country to become a net exporter of refined products.<br />
<br />
These figures would indicate that Iran today has a domestic shortfall of about 10 percent in its diesel fuel needs (or roughly 60,000 barrels per day) and about 30 percent in its gasoline needs (or roughly 125, 000 barrels per day). Because of smuggling, it is difficult to confirm that this entire apparent shortfall is “real.” Namely what would be the shortfall if smuggling were eliminated? While there is no hard data on how much of this apparent shortfall is due to smuggling, one thing is certain: the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the Intelligence Services are involved in smuggling. As a result, if they see it in their interest to eliminate smuggling, they could reduce it to a trickle. In other words, a part of the 180,000–200,000 barrels per day of apparent domestic shortfall could be eliminated if the IRGC and the Intelligence Services decided to reduce the smuggling of gasoline. How much would this reduction represent? That’s anybody’s guess. But I would venture to say that the real shortfall might be more on the order of 125,000–150,000 barrels per day. And smuggling would all but evaporate if the government allows fuel prices to rise in the event of an embargo.<br />
<br />
In a recent statement, Farid Ameri, Managing director of National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company, claimed that a fuel embargo will achieve little, and pointed out that:<br />
<br />
•	Iran has increased its stockpile of gasoline by about 1 billion liters, to 2.4 billion liters (roughly 15 million barrels), and<br />
•	Iran is using its petrochemical plants to produce 14 million liters (roughly 94,000 barrels) of gasoline per day.<br />
<br />
If one were to take these claims at face value, the stockpile of gasoline would be equivalent to 100–120 days of fuel imports (assuming 125,000–150,000 barrels per day of fuel imports after the elimination of smuggling). The claim of gasoline from petrochemical plants would reduce the need for imports down to an even more manageable 30,000–55,000 per day, in turn stretching out the life of the gasoline stockpile to 270–480 days in case of a fuel embargo. If both Iranian claims were credible, one could conclude that Iran has a reasonable chance to survive a gasoline embargo, because it also has porous borders and, realistically, it would be impossible to enforce an airtight embargo for 270–480 days.<br />
<br />
However, the Iranian regime’s claim about producing gasoline from petrochemical plants is too farfetched even for the most imaginative among us. To the best of my knowledge, no one has figured out a way to make such “flexible” petrochemical plants. Petrochemical plants take as their input the output of refineries (and natural gas) as feedstock, but they don’t produce gasoline and diesel fuel. Mr. Ameri may have meant that they could cut their petrochemical output and thus their intake from oil refineries, enabling an increase in gasoline output.<br />
<br />
Even if this is what he meant, this may or may not be true, as most simple oil refineries cannot just flip a switch and overnight change the mix of their refined output; refineries are configured to produce certain mix of products and refine specific types of crude oil. It would appear that Iran could withstand an airtight embargo for about 100–480 days, depending on its ability to increase gasoline output by reducing petrochemical output. Again, the sufficiency of gasoline and diesel fuel in Iran would be further enhanced if it turns out to be difficult to maintain an airtight embargo for an extended period of time. Based on these considerations, it would appear that the regime in Tehran has built itself a reasonable cushion in preparation for a gasoline embargo.<br />
<br />
While these may represent the prevailing supply-demand balance of gasoline and diesel fuel in Iran, there are important policy considerations that also can affect realities in Iran. The Iranian government long has realized that it should eliminate the fuel subsidy in order to reduce the growth in gasoline and diesel consumption, eliminate smuggling, improve air quality, increase oil exports, and above all improve the government’s budgetary position. Over the past ten years, the fuel policy has cost Iran in the range of 10 to 20 percent of GDP annually, depending on world prices and the government mandated pump price—an astounding figure. In need of additional revenues, the regime has wanted to eliminate this subsidy by increasing the price at the pump to world levels, but the government has been paralyzed because of the specter of a domestic backlash. It has managed only marginal price increases and adopted a rationing scheme that has slowed down the rate of growth in demand.<br />
<br />
While talk of an embargo by politicians is cheap, an effective gasoline embargo can only be implemented through a naval blockade of Iran. Such a blockade would require UN Security Council approval. Mindful of Russian and Chinese ties to Iran, this would be a lengthy and tortuous process, and approval would be by no means certain. An embargo without the UN Security Council would be considered an act of war, and Iran already has declared that it would be met with force and the potential closing of the Strait of Hormuz.<br />
<br />
Even assuming that a gasoline embargo were effective in cutting off Iran’s imports, what would happen? Consumption of gasoline would decline by 30 percent. If the government allowed the reduced supply of gasoline, namely, domestically refined gasoline, to be sold at a price that would equate demand to supply, the price would increase to a level that would eliminate the subsidy, meaning no subsidy for imported gasoline and no subsidy for domestically refined gasoline. There would be no incentive to smuggle gasoline to neighboring countries. The government would have higher revenues to spend on other priorities and projects. Low and behold, the sanctions would have done what Tehran has wanted to do for years, and the government would not be held responsible.<br />
<br />
What does all this mean? Is a gasoline (and diesel fuel) embargo the mother of all sanctions? Will it cripple the Iranian economy and encourage the population at large to rise up and overthrow the regime?<br />
<br />
Based on the above, I would conclude that:<br />
<br />
1.	An airtight gasoline embargo is difficult to implement, as Iran’s borders are long and porous.<br />
2.	China is unlikely to sign on at the United Nations without extracting too high a price from the United States.<br />
3.	Even if China does acquiesce, UN negotiations are likely to be long and painful.<br />
4.	Iran clearly is expanding its refining capacity, increasing its storage of gasoline (and diesel), preparing to reconfigure its refineries to produce a little more gasoline, preparing the ground to reduce gasoline smuggling, and in the event of an embargo would allow prices to increase, at least somewhat. All of these measures would blunt the impact of a gasoline embargo.<br />
5.	An embargo would be blamed on the United States, while shoring up government finances.</p>
<p>
The most puzzling question has been why there is so much talk of a gasoline sanction and other unnamed crippling sanctions when financial sanctions, which could deal a mortal blow to the Iranian regime itself, are soft peddled? Some say that the Obama Administration wants to hurt the regime, but not the opposition, so it is treading carefully to find the smartest sanction. I beg to differ. The concern for the impact of sanctions on the opposition is a smoke screen. There are financial sanctions that would have little negative impact on average Iranians while raising havoc for regime insiders and their business partners. Yet we don’t talk of these, much less take action. To my mind, the likely answer is that, at least for now, President Obama still wants to cut a deal with Iran and the IRGC and is not prepared to embark on a road that could lead to confrontation. He wants to appear tough but not be tough. The gasoline sanction is only a smoke screen to buy more time, while Iran becomes less and less dependent on imported fuels and continues to trample on the human and legal rights of its citizens.<br />
<br />
Even this puzzle was recently answered in a statement on February 25 as reported by Reuters: “It is not our intent to have crippling sanctions that have . . . a significant impact on the Iranian people,” State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley told reporters. “Our actual intent is . . . to find ways to pressure the government while protecting the people.” It would, therefore, appear that we will continue to talk tough and pretend that we are pressuring the Tehran regime and supporting the suffering people of Iran.<br />
<br />
<em>Hossein Askari is Iran Professor of International Business and International Affairs at the George Washington University. During the mid 1980s he was director of a team of international energy experts contracted to design an energy plan and energy planning capabilities for Saudi Arabia.</em></p>
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		<title>Defiant Iran Rebuffs IAEA and Escalates Tension with the West</title>
		<link>http://www.insideiran.org/nuclear-program/defiant-iran-rebuffs-iaea-and-escalates-tension-with-the-west/</link>
		<comments>http://www.insideiran.org/nuclear-program/defiant-iran-rebuffs-iaea-and-escalates-tension-with-the-west/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Nov 2009 21:33:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>insideiran</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Critical Comments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Program]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insideiran.org/?p=685</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Edith Novy</em><br />
<br />
After the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) adopted a resolution on November 27, which urges Iran “to comply fully and without delay with its obligations”<a href="http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-82.pdf"> (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/<br />
Board/ 2009/gov2009-82.pdf)</a>, Iran blatantly disregarded international opinion. Iran’s leaders not only failed to answer questions,&#8230;</p>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Edith Novy</em><br />
<br />
After the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) adopted a resolution on November 27, which urges Iran “to comply fully and without delay with its obligations”<a href="http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-82.pdf"> (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/<br />
Board/ 2009/gov2009-82.pdf)</a>, Iran blatantly disregarded international opinion. Iran’s leaders not only failed to answer questions, it threatened to expand its nuclear program and to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). <span id="more-685"></span></p>
<p>Iran provided three major responses:</p>
<p>First, Iranian officials launched several accusations against the IAEA and, specifically Western governments, in order to discredit the resolution. They stated on November 30 that “the resolution was not that of the IAEA, but in fact the P5+1 are behind the resolution.”<br />
<a href="http://isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1448051&amp;Lang=E"> (http://isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1448051&amp;Lang=E)</a>. Claiming that the IAEA Board of Governors favors the West in the decision-making process, Iran&#8217;s ambassador to the IAEA,  Asqar Soltanieh, said on November 30 that, &#8220;the structure of the Board of Governors has been molded in such a way that gives Western states the majority votes and so the ability to manipulate the Agency&#8217;s activities.&#8221;<br />
<a href="http://www.presstv.ir/classic/Detail.aspx?id=112485&amp;sectionid=351020104"> (http://www.presstv.ir/classic/Detail.aspx?id=112485&amp;sectionid=351020104) </a></p>
<p>An Iranian lawmaker slammed the IAEA Board of Governors on November 30, saying the body only obeys the orders of “global arrogance,” which is a reference to Western states. <a href="http://presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=112477&amp;sectionid=351020104"> (http://presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=112477&amp;sectionid=351020104) </a></p>
<p>And Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast rejected the resolution the same day it was issued, saying it was passed &#8220;with insistence and political ambitions of certain member states.&#8221; &#8220;We think that this [resolution] is politically motivated and only aimed at exerting pressure on Iran,&#8221; he asserted. <a href="http://www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=112324&amp;sectionid=351020104"> (http://www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=112324&amp;sectionid=351020104) </a></p>
<p>Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottki stated on November 30 that it is not possible to “find any logical reason for the Board of Governors&#8217; decision.” He called the resolution  “discrimination” and the “law of the jungle.” <a href="http://www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=112517&amp;sectionid=351020104"> (http://www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=112517&amp;sectionid=351020104) </a><br />
Following this criticism, the Iranian parliament urged the government to reduce cooperation with the 5+1 and the IAEA. <a href="http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8809081531"> (http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8809081531) </a></p>
<p>Second, Iran has issued hostile warnings against any change in policy toward Iran by Western governments. Parliament speaker Ali Larijani said on November 30: “We will closely monitor your next steps and if you do not abandon the ridiculous carrot and stick policy, we will take a new approach towards you.” <a href="http://www.isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1448051&amp;Lang=E"> (http://www.isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1448051&amp;Lang=E) </a></p>
<p>Third, Iran announced over the weekend that it will start with the construction of 10 more nuclear enrichment facilities within the next two months “in response to (the) West’s offensive measures”. <a href="http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8809091305"> (http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8809091305) </a></p>
<p>Statements by Ali Larijani and a senior lawmaker raise suspicions that Iran could withdraw from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to Larijani, it does not matter “whether you are a member of the NPT or pull out of it.” &gt;a href = http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/11/30/92793.html&gt; (http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/11/30/92793.html)<br />
Parliament member Hassan Ghafourifard stated on November 29, in an interview with state-sponsored television, that “there might be no use to stay in the NPT” if the West refuses to understand Iran’s position. <a href="http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=107441&amp;sectionid=351020104"> (http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=107441&amp;sectionid=351020104)</a></p>
<p><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Timeline of nuclear negotiations with Iran (September 2009 –  November 2009) </span></strong><br />
<strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;"> </span></strong></p>
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">September 21, 2009</td>
<td width="500">Iran informs IAEA about a second nuclear enrichment facility at Fordo, 20 miles north of Qom </td>
</tr>
</table>
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">October 1, 2009 </td>
<td width="500">Iran meets with the 5+1 group in Geneva</tr>
<tr>
<td width="120"></td>
</td>
<td width="500">Agreement is reached to meet again before the end of October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="120"></td>
</td>
<td width="500">Iran agrees “in general” to ship low-enriched uranium abroad and to open its new enrichment plant near Qom to UN inspection</td>
</tr>
<table>
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">October 19, 2009</td>
<td width="500">Iran wants France to be excluded from the potential nuclear deal since “it has failed in fulfilling its previous responsibilities regarding [nuclear] cooperation with Iran.”</td>
</tr>
</table>
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">
October 20, 2009</td>
<td width="500">Iran wants guarantees for nuclear fuel delivery</td>
</tr>
</table>
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">October 19- 21, 2009</td>
<td width="500">Iran meets with the 5+1 group in Vienna</td>
</tr>
</table>
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">October 19, 2009</td>
<td width="500">Iran announces that it would buy nuclear fuel rather than receiving it in exchange to export low-enriched uranium</td>
</tr>
</table>
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">
October 23, 2009</td>
<td width="500">Iran misses the deadline to respond officially to the IAEA and postpones an official answer to the IAEA proposal. </td>
<tr>
<tr>
<td width="120"></td>
<td width="500">The IAEA statement said: “Iran informed the Director General today that it is considering the proposal in depth and in a favorable light, but needs time until the middle of next week to provide a response.”</td>
</tr>
</table>
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">October 27, 2009</td>
<td width="500">Iran demands “fundamental changes” to the nuclear deal</td>
</tr>
</table>
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">November 2, 2009</td>
<td width="500">Western powers urge Iran to accept the deal as it stands</td>
</tr>
</table>
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">November 18, 2009</td>
<td width="500">Iran verbally rejects the nuclear deal. Confusion arises if this is an official rejection. </td>
</tr>
</table>
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">November 27, 2009</td>
<td width="500">IAEA Board of Governors passes resolution which urges Iran to immediately stop construction of its Fordo nuclear enrichment plant and to ““to comply fully and without delay with its obligations.” </td>
</tr>
</table>
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">November, 29, 2009</td>
<td width="500">The Iranian parliament urges the government to reduce cooperation with the IAEA </td>
</tr>
</table>
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">November 30, 2009</td>
<td width="500">Iran slams the IAEA resolution as being “discriminatory” and  announces it will build 10 more nuclear enrichment facilities. </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<tr>
<td width="120">
<td width="100">Additionally, it raises suspicion that it could withdraw from the NPT.</td>
</tr>
</table>
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