Shayan Ghajar

Conflicting reports from Iranian media outlets about the apparent attempt on Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s life have led to a myriad of theories in the foreign media. The uncertainty surrounding the event has only heightened. Not only were Iranian news agencies reporting different things at different times, but now Iran seems to be in a total media blackout regarding the event.

Despite the disparities in the accounts of the incident near the Iranian city of Hamedan, there are three primary accounts covered by the Iranian press, including state-owned or affiliated press. These stories changed during the day, reflecting either the clarification of the incident after initial confusion, or the modification of the official story for public relations purposes.

The Initial Story: A Grenade Attack

Many analysts and news agencies appear to support the likelihood of the first version of events reported in Iran, namely that an unnamed individual hurled a homemade grenade at Ahmadinejad’s motorcade, but failed to harm the president. Fars News, unofficially affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was the first to use a Farsi term for hand-grenade in reference to the projectile, according to Hurriyet Daily News, which documented the story before its removal.

Fars News, as well as a few other Iranian news sites, initially treated the event as an assassination attempt or terrorist attack on the Iranian president. Their sites were later modified to say firecracker rather than grenade, and modified again to say the firecracker had been thrown in a celebratory manner rather than an attack.

Reuters spoke to an unnamed source in Ahmadinejad’s office who described the event as an attack, saying Ahmadinejad was unhurt but several bystanders were injured and one person was arrested, with Mehr, a semi-official news agency, asserting that several arrests had been made. At the same time, official statements from the Iranian president’s office now claim that there was no attempt whatsoever on Ahmadinejad’s life.

Both Reuters and the Guardian have posted a photo allegedly showing the reaction of Ahmadinejad’s bodyguards to the possible attack. However, the photograph is inconclusive –none of the guards have drawn their firearms, nor are they leaping to cover Ahmadinejad’s body from attack.

The (Second) Official Story: A Firecracker

Shortly after the first version of events was posted, all the websites previously reporting an assassination attempt changed the stories to say the explosive had been a firecracker, thrown either by a mischievous teenager or an overly-excited supporter celebrating Ahmadinejad’s arrival.

AlJazeera quotes an unnamed witness as saying a teenager had thrown the firecracker, and was subsequently detained. The anonymous witness was not of the opinion that the teenager intended to harm the president at all.

However, as the Guardian article highlights, firecrackers are illegal in Iran, resulting in a widespread underground DIY firecracker industry that claims dozens of lives each year from explosive accidents. It would be extremely unusual for a homemade firecracker, both illegal and dangerous, to be used in a rally to celebrate the head of state. At the least, were the projectile a firecracker, it would have been intended to disrupt the event.

The Press Blackout and the Weight of Evidence

Further complicating the situation is the press blackout that occurred on many state-affiliated and owned news agencies in recent hours. In an unusual move, Fars News, which changed its story from the assassination scenario to the firecracker, later removed all references to the event whatsoever, as did Mehr News. The Islamic Republic News Agency moved the story to an unnoticeable margin after reporting the second official story regarding the thrown firecracker.

This media blackout is certainly indicative of definite embarrassment, and possibly ongoing security concerns, in Iran. If the projectile were merely a firecracker thrown in a fit of exuberance at the sight of the president, it is unlikely the state news agencies would go to such length to obfuscate or silence the episode. Rather, it would be valuable propaganda, portrayed across the Iranian news wires as a sign of the fanatical support for Ahmadinejad in Hamedan. On the other hand, if the projectile was intended to harm the president, publicity around the event would highlight the impotence or inefficiency of his guards.

The BBC’s Jon Leyne points out that during Ahmadinejad’s trips to Iran’s provinces, his security precautions are not as tight as one would assume for a head of state. Visits and tours are announced in advance to give time for local supporters and government officials to organize a welcome, and as photographs of such tours demonstrate, Ahmadinejad usually has less than a dozen guards immediately nearby, while hundreds or thousands of supporters mob his vehicle in the streets. It is not at all impossible that a disgruntled individual or group took advantage of the relatively lax security to attempt to kill or humiliate Ahmadinejad.

As Reuters’ round-up of various expert opinions suggests, the Iranian president has no shortage of bitter enemies both inside and outside the country. Ethnic separatists, radicalized Green Movement supporters, or any number of ideological opponents have all vocalized their hatred of the president. However, due to the improvised and amateur nature of the explosive, it is unlikely that Ahmadinejad’s accusation of an Israeli plot on his life has any relevance to this particular event.

Amidst all the uncertainty, there is no question that something about the event has galvanized the Iranian security apparatus to initiate major damage control. It is likely at least one person was arrested, considering that both firecrackers and hand grenades are highly illegal in Iran. Perhaps the identity of the suspect or suspects would shed more light on the issue, though it is far from certain at this point if the Iranian authorities would ever reveal such a thing.