China and Sanctions: An Elusive Hope

Shayan Ghajar

President Obama’s nuclear summit last week was part of a series of efforts aimed at convincing China and Russia to join American efforts for international sanctions on Iran. Three weeks ago, administration officials announced China was ready to begin serious discussions soon regarding sanctions on Iran. In recent days, however, more and more evidence is mounting to the contrary, indicating any support from China for international sanctions on Iran is highly unlikely.

Iran held its own nuclear summit at the end of last week as a response to the summit in Washington. The conference, titled “Nuclear Energy for All, Nuclear Weapons for None,” came just before Iran announced the launch of construction on a new nuclear site.
Deputy Foreign Secretaries from both China and Russia were reportedly present, a significant blow to American efforts to create diplomatic distance between China and Iran. Iranian state news published numerous statements from Chinese and Russian officials in support of Iran’s nuclear program during and after the conference.

Corroborating these Iranian press reports are statements made by high-ranking Chinese Foreign Ministry officials published on XinhuaNet. A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said China still favors dialogue over sanctions. Reuters also reports that China’s envoy to the U.N. expressed displeasure at targeted sanctions aimed at harming Iran’s energy sector.

Iran’s energy sector, according to Benjamin Weinthal of New York Daily News, may be the largest incentive for China to support dialogue and eschew sanctions. China’s economy, Weinthal points out, is dependent on steady flows of oil and gas from Iran to continue growing: Weinthal estimates 12% of China’s energy needs are met by Iran. Additionally, China’s National Petroleum Corporation has a $4.7 billion contract with Iran’s South Pars Oil Field. China, Weinthal contends, has little economic incentive to support sanctions and is extremely unlikely to support any resolutions that damage its own economy.

A New York Times editorial from April 7 supports Weinthal’s assessment. China has resisted meaningful sanctions against Iran for years, the NYT points out, and has pursued a foreign policy based almost exclusively on a realpolitik agenda of economic or political gain, as opposed to supporting human rights or opposing nuclear proliferation. The editorial cites Steven Halper, a former White House and State Department official, who contends that China’s liberalizing economy has in fact fed its authoritarian power structure rather than harming it by increasing he need for social and economic stability. Money, rather than ideology, has dictated its foreign policy goals such that China regularly engages in extremely lucrative deals and cooperatives with countries regarded by Western nations as despotic.

Mark Weisbrot of the Guardian posits that the United States is using its discontent with China’s influence on the value of the dollar as a bargaining chip to negotiate a sanctions strategy against Iran. Weisbrot highlights a number of reasons for Chinese reticence, namely China views sanctions as a possible rerun of sanctions against Iraq–a mere formality before a military strike. Moreover, by tacitly supporting Iran on the issue of sanctions, Weisbrot says, China gains influence in one of the most powerful nations in the region, and therefore in the Middle East as a whole.

Weisbrot also points to the reluctance of China’s economic and political partners as a factor in their resistance to sanctions. Juan Cole explains this in detail in an April 19 article on Salon. China, as part of the BRIC bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China) emerging outside of the G-7’s influence, will certainly take fellow Security Council members Brazil and Russia’s opposition to sanctions very seriously. India attended Iran’s nuclear summit, and in the future will receive Iranian oil via the “Peace Pipeline” through Pakistan, which will also increase Iranian oil flow to China.
China, it seems, has little to no reason to support sanctions on Iran. Economically, the disruption of Iran’s energy sector would do noticeable damage to China’s economy. Politically, China has little incentive from other Security Council members or India to pursue sanctions against Iran, and would have much to lose in terms of gaining a foothold in the Middle East by wooing Iran’s government with its support. Finally, the moral argument against supporting an authoritarian regime has done little to win the hearts of a state ruled by a single party system, which has proven that authoritarian rule can co-exist with a modern and developed economy.

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