Shayan Ghajar
On February 22, International Atomic Energy Agency officials announced that nuclear talks with Iran had failed once more after a mere two days. The IAEA stated that Iran’s refusal to grant nuclear inspectors access to the Parchin military site caused the breakdown of negotiations. more»
Shayan Ghajar
As tensions between Iran and the United States reach levels unprecedented in recent years, the United States seeks to pressure nations and corporations with a stake in Iran’s oil industry to join in an embargo on the Islamic Republic’s most lucrative source of revenue. more»
Staff
The Iranian response to the recent IAEA report has been quick, dismissive, and defiant.
Lawmakers, politicians, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp commanders have bluntly attacked the report and questioned the credibility and independence of the IAEA, charging the Agency with illegally conducting its proceedings and accepting fabricated evidence. All have vehemently reiterated a commitment to the continuing progress of Iran’s nuclear program. more»
Rafsanjani Falls from Grace: The Political Undoing of a Key Pillar of the Regime
Shayan Ghajar
The political marginalization of one of Iran’s most prominent politicians, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, took a turn for the worse on March 8, when he was forced to cede his seat as head of the Assembly of Experts, one of the government’s most powerful bodies, to rival Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, a traditionalist cleric.
Responsibility for Rafsanjani’s turn for the worse lies squarely with the Supreme Leader. While his rivalry with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad certainly must have played a role in stepping down, Rafsanjani has weathered similar attacks before without being defeated. However, Rafsanjani’s loss of the chair of the Assembly of Experts could only have come about if sanctioned by Supreme Leader Khamenei. Ahmadinejad has supporters in the Assembly of Experts, but the man slated to replace Rafsanjani, Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, is by no means in the Ahmadinejad camp and gained widespread support because he is seen as a moderate. Mahdavi Kani’s nephew is married to the Supreme Leader’s daughter.
While at present it is impossible to determine with certainty, events in the Assembly of Experts and statements by officials with direct ties to the Supreme Leader indicate that Khamenei may finally have tired of Rafsanjani’s support for Iran’s opposition; he has both expressed his support for the Green movement and also condemned the regime’s actions since 2009. Rafsanjani’s only remaining position, which is as head of the Expediency Council, expires in 2012, leaving him little time to regain his strength before the next opportunity to marginalize him emerges.
The defeat for Rafsanjani marks a low point in his longstanding career in Iran’s government–which has included posts ranging from the presidency to head of Iran’s legislature–and signals a major shift in the balance of power in Iran.
Rafsanjani apparently dropped from the race for the chairmanship of the Assembly of Experts in the eleventh hour, citing a desire to avert political schisms withing the Assembly. The Assembly of Experts holds little day-to-day power in the government’s affairs, but the Iranian Constitution grants it the enormous power of appointing or removing the Supreme Leader in the event of his incapacitation or inadequacy. The Assembly’s powers have only been exercised once, upon the death of the father of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in 1989. However, the current Supreme Leader is currently 71, raising questions about his potential future successors.
“More than 80 just and qualified Mujtahids (an expert in religious law) are members of the Assembly of Experts who are valuable capital for our country and establishment and creating division or display of discord in this body is very harmful,” Rafsanjani declared in his opening remarks to the Assembly. While Rafsanjani attributed his withdrawal to a desire to maintain unity, the timing of his decision indicates that fear of publicly losing the position outright in an election was apparently his primary motivation.
Rafsanjani’s many opponents
Rafsanjani and his family have been the targets of a concerted campaign by Ahmadinejad supporters in recent months. The two men and their supporters have been in a political feud since the 2005 presidential elections which raised Ahmadinejad to power over his rival candidate, Rafsanjani. In 2009, after protests swept Iran in the wake of the disputed presidential election, Rafsanjani stated his support for the demands of the protesters in a major public speech as head of Tehran’s official Friday prayers. This was the last Friday prayer speech he was allowed to give.
The feud has only intensified, reaching its peak in recent months: Ahmadinejad supporters harassed Rafsanjani’s daughter, Faezeh–a women’s rights activist and opposition supporter–by physically accosting her and hurling sexually-charged insults at her in February. Rafsanjani’s sons both face pressure as well, with Mehdi Rafsanjani residing in London to escape a warrant issued for his participation in Green Movement protests. Another son, Hashemi, recently resigned as head of the Tehran Metrorail due to a successful strategy of budgetary attrition waged by Ahmadinejad against him.
Hours after Ayatollah Rafsanjani bowed out of the Assembly of Experts election, the Judiciary announced (Farsi language) that two of the men who accosted Faezeh Rafsanjani have been identified and will be charged. The timing is unlikely to be coincidental, considering the use of threats against Rafsanjani’s family to pressure him politically.
While the pressures against Rafsanjani are obvious, the implications of yet another setback for Iran’s Comeback Kid are less clear. While famed for his political resilience over many decades–and justly so, considering his presence in the upper levels of Iran’s leadership positions since the Islamic Revolution–Rafsanjani may finally be out of options. While he retains an important position as head of the Expediency Council, tasked with negotiating disputes between the legislature and Guardian Council, Rafsanjani has been losing positions and influence since his public support of the demands of the Green Movement in 2009. Despite recent remarks echoing hardliner condemnations of the Green Movement as “sedition” and “against Islam,” Rafsanjani’s support for reform is well-known and surfaces whenever he feels politically secure.
What next for Rafsanjani?
Three major possibilities remain, and at present it is anyone’s guess which path Rafsanjani will pursue: First, cowed by threats to his family and chastened by political defeat, Ayatollah Rafsanjani may opt to keep a low profile for a time and count his losses.
Second, Rafsanjani could somehow pull off a near-miraculous comeback–many times in the past, critics hailed every setback to Rafsanjani as his last gasp. Rafsanjani has thus far managed to regain his influence each time. On the other hand, his critics may at last be correct; with the Supreme Leader arrayed against him in the latest battle, Rafsanjani is facing steeper odds than ever.
Finally, more enraged than cowed by his family’s treatment and his humiliation, Rafsanjani may take the plunge and commit to overt and outspoken support for the Green Movement. This strategy may prove unlikely for a man famed for his skills of self-preservation, as aligning with the Greens would provide the Ahmadinejad camp with more than enough ammunition to sideline Rafsanjani permanently. Moreover, there may be little to gain for Rafsanjani by supporting the Greens, as its leaders have been utterly shut off by the Islamic Republic and protests show no sign of destabilizing the government yet.
The next few months will demonstrate whether or not Iran’s most resilient and enduring political figure will opt to keep a low profile or attempt to reverse his waning fortunes.