Shayan Ghajar

From Turkey’s vantage point, the Tehran Declaration brokered by Turkey and Brazil on May 17 was an unprecedented breakthrough in diplomatic efforts to gain any token of cooperation from Iran regarding its nuclear program. Turkey and Brazil’s heads of state hailed the compromise as a victory for diplomacy and a sign of the changing structure of international politics. For the first time since the 1979 Islamic revolution, they say, Iran has compromised with the West over its nuclear program.

For these reasons, Turkey and Brazil believe U.N. sanctions on Iran were a great betrayal to their exhaustive diplomatic efforts with Tehran. The sanctions, passed just three weeks later, stole the wind from Brazil and Turkey’s sails, leaving the two nations to consider their next moves, as they seem torn between their commitment to the Tehran Declaration and a new style of international relations on the one hand, and the risks of fully embarking on a course that antagonizes the powers-that-be in global politics on the other.

Turkey and Brazil’s leaders still seem to be taken aback at the complete disregard for what one Turkish daily termed their “diplomatic coup.” Both nations deliberately intended their success in brokering the deal to shake up the traditional methods of international conflict resolution and highlight what their governments feel is the outdated and undemocratic structure of the U.N. Security Council.

Brazil’s Foreign Minister Celso Amorim published an op-ed in the International Herald Tribune June 14 delineating Brazil’s goals and sentiments regarding the Tehran Declaration and Iran’s nuclear program. To Brazil, Amorim makes plain, the way the United Nations has dealt with the Iranian nuclear program highlights the inequality inherent in international decision-making bodies, which “remain the exclusive territory of a small group of countries.” The success of Turkey and Brazil where Western nations failed, Amorim says, precipitated a jealous reaction from the P5+1, whence came the 4th round of sanctions.

Amorim continued this train of thought in statements made on June 21. The Security Council, Amorim declared, is based on a 65- year-old model of international power and no longer reflects the changing world order and capabilities of newly ascendant nations. “The reform is inevitable. If you ask me [when it will occur], I will not be able to say, but it is not plausible to keep it the way it is,” Amorim stated.

Turkey has gambled much more than Brazil on the Tehran Declaration. As Iran’s neighbor, Turkey has vested long-term strategic and economic interests in keeping the possibility of dialogue open between Iran and the P5+1. Under Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s leadership, Turkish foreign policies have been geared towards “friendly relations with neighbors,” aimed at fostering regional cooperation in both economic enterprise and security issues.

Turkey has much to gain from these initiatives, as trade with Iran grows exponentially and multi-billion dollar energy deals are signed between the two nations in increasing numbers. The two nations also share similar security concerns, ranging from Kurdish separatists to the instability of the nascent Iraqi government.

Additionally, Turkey’s growing economy brings with it increased global and regional influence. Its geographic centrality in the Middle East and the fact that Turkey straddles two continents, both culturally and physically, have cemented the importance of acting as an intermediary in Middle Eastern affairs. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has integrated this awareness into his policies, using Turkey’s growing momentum to forge a stronger reputation for himself and Turkey, both domestically and abroad. According to George Friedman, chief of STRATFOR, “The Turkish economy is growing very rapidly, Europe is weakening now and the U.S. is withdrawing from Iraq[...] so the relative power of Turkey is growing independent of any policy.”

Mediating the nuclear fuel exchange deal with Iran was one of Turkey’s major attempts at utilizing its regional and international influence. With so much at stake for Turkey—it’s diplomatic reputation, months of efforts, and economic and strategic interests in its region—this dismissive response has caused a great deal of re-evaluation for Turkey’s highest officials regarding their foreign policy.

Turkey shares many common interests with the West: a non-nuclear armed Iran, resolution of the Middle East conflict, a stable Iraq, and energy security. And while the West continues to ignore Turkey’s efforts in pursuing these shared goals, Turkey will continue to pursue these goals on its own terms and seek, like Brazil, influence in international bodies not dominated by a select few nations’ interests.

At the same time, however, Turkey faces the unenviable task of balancing its regional interests with those of its strategic ally, the United States. Nowhere is this more exemplified than in Turkey’s continuing efforts to pursue the Tehran Declaration and maintain its legitimacy despite heightening tensions between Iran and the West. In this regard, Turkey is aware it must maintain the Declaration to preserve its diplomatic reputation, and is likely pressuring Iran to continue its support for the agreement as a result.

And while the diplomatic fallout from the fourth round of UNSC sanctions on Iran continues, Iran is getting ever more disenchanted with making even token efforts at compromise, and has sent an increasing number of signals that it believes its enemies will pursue direct military confrontation in the near future.