Jasim Husain Ali
Editor’s Note: Dr. Jasim Husain Ali, a member of the parliament in Bahrain, based this article on his high-level meetings with Iranian officials during his recent trip to Iran.
TEHRAN—Iran’s authorities blame anti-revolutionary forces for taking advantage of understandable grievances that erupted after the June 2009 presidential election to advance their own objectives to undermine the Islamic Republic. The goals include applying pressures on Iran to make concessions on its controversial nuclear program and to undermine the regime’s image domestically and internationally. The accused include the United States, Great Britain, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the People’s Mujahedeen Organization and groups that support the Shah’s dynasty.
Interestingly enough, Tehran is largely pleased with the low-profile stances of the Obama Administration. Conversely, Great Britain is accused of fomenting disturbances through its sizable diplomatic mission in Tehran. Not surprisingly, attempts are being made in different circles in Tehran, including among legislators, to limit diplomatic relations with Great Britain. Still, Saudi Arabia is blamed for employing its media empire, notably the network Al Arabiyah, to spread anti-Iranian propagandas in the Arab World as part of the rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh for regional supremacy. As such, the Saudis are accused of trying to depict Iran as a country that faces serious domestic unrest and instability.
To the best of my assessment, Iranian authorities are not worried about the fallout of post-election disturbances on the regime’s sustainability. To the contrary, some view the unrest as an opportunity to overcome steady socio-economic challenges, notably underemployment. To be sure, Iran suffers from underemployment, whereby many Iranians work below their capacities in terms of their knowledge, skills, and experience.
Still, other officials believe the unrest over the past seven months will pave the way for an increase in tolerance of a more liberal society. This is the case because the regime cannot overlook the fact the majority of demonstrations are part of the youth population, with women comprising the majority of those taking part in pro-reform activities. The imposition of stricter Islamic teachings could only further alienate the youth who make up the majority of Iran’s 70–million-plus population, officials say.
The regime is not utterly annoyed with the reformist movement, because it serves the purpose of checks and balances. In other words, government strategists believe that it is wrong to grant the conservatives a free hand in running the country. However, those in charge would like to see a new leadership emerge within the reformist movement, casting aside figures such as President Mohammad Khatami and presidential candidate Mir Hossein Moussavi.
With regards to violence, the authorities are convinced that anti-revolutionary elements, rather than government security forces, were behind the killing of Neda Soltan, the young woman killed randomly in June as she attended a protest, and the assassination of Ali Moussavi, who was the nephew of Mir Hossein Moussavi. This belief is based on the argument that violence only aggravates an already charged environment. One source disclosed to me that members of the Iranian intelligence community visited Mir Hossein Moussavi several times to prove the government’s innocence in his nephew’s death.
The authorities believe that state security forces are the ones who are most exposed to violent attacks, when unrest occurs, not the demonstrators. They particularly point to the Ashura demonstrations in late December, with images showing protestors assaulting security forces. It is suggested that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei had demanded that the security forces exercise maximum restraint for the December 27 protests in particular because Ashura is regarded as one of the holiest days in Shiite Islam.
The authorities contend that supporters of presidential candidate Moussavi lack a particular agenda. It is suggested that Moussavi and his supporters merely take advantage of special events and occasions like Ashura to create unrest. A close aid to Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told me in Tehran on January 17 that he thinks the demonstrations largely will be contained by the end of this year. The state’s strategy focuses on neutralizing opposition leaders Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi by denouncing the violent protests on one hand and pressing for solutions within official circles on the other. Indeed, this is happening to some degree: on January 25, Karroubi recognized Ahmadinejad as president.
The way forward can be summed up from the words of one official, namely “talking tough but not necessarily acting tough.”
Dr. Jasim Husain Ali visited Iran three times since June 2009 presidential election.