Editor’s note: This week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released its latest report on Iran’s nuclear program to member states. The report shows that Iran has mastered the critical steps needed to build a nuclear weapon. InsideIran’s Reza Akbari conducted an interview with Ali Vaez, a fellow for science and technology and director of the Iran project at the Federation of American Scientists.
Q: The IAEA says Iran is now significantly closer to weaponizaton and has nuclear capability. Should the regime decide to pursue this option? Do you agree with this assessment?
A: The fact that Iran is seeking nuclear latency has been well-known to the intelligence and non-proliferation communities for a long time. Both the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate and the 2009 IAEA report stated, “Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons, if it decides to do so.” For one thing, the new IAEA reports shows that Iran’s progress on nuclear arms experiments has been much milder than alarmists claim. The new IAEA report clearly demonstrates that since 2003 weaponization efforts have become dispersed and are pursued with diminished vigor.
The report contends that the information package Iran received from A.Q. Khan’s illicit nuclear network was more sophisticated than the starter kit that Libya obtained from the same supplier. Nevertheless, the agency does not claim that Iran has been able to master this technology. The IAEA simply highlights Iran’s research and development efforts, which does not readily translate to actual weaponization. Therefore, there is still time for diplomacy to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. In 2003, the Europeans convinced Iran through diplomacy to admit to its past wrongdoings. The goal should now be to revitalize the diplomatic engagement process and provide Tehran with guarantees that it will not be penalized if it comes clean of its past activities and cooperates with the IAEA. The same approach was successfully employed in the case of Libya.
Q: What evidence in the IAEA report do you find most compelling regarding Iran’s nuclear capability?
A: I think, much like the hype and the fallout surrounding the release of iPhone 4S, the new IAEA report failed to surprise. The report is unprecedented in the scale and scope of the detailed information that it has revealed to the public eye, but contains no new information. Since the agency had pierced Iran’s cloak of nuclear secrecy numerous times in the past, most of the information in the 12-page annex of this report was referenced to previous IAEA publications. Moreover, the report has failed to scrap the word “possible” from the often-used construct “possible military dimension” of Iran’s nuclear program; at best it has rendered the word “probable,” more diplomatically relevant. Nonetheless, evidence on the possibility of ongoing nuclear arms experiments is extremely thin and mostly based on information received from one or two unnamed sources. The agency also does not make a compelling case when it gets to dual-use technologies that could be use for non-nuclear arm related experiments. This part of the report requires more scrutiny from the experts; as for example the exploding bridge-wire detonators have many civilian applications contrary to what the IAEA contends.
For more substance, see page 8 of the annex:
The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured program. There are also some indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.
Q: The report also indicates that Iran has relied upon foreign materials to develop its program. Do you believe this is accurate?
A: Almost all nuclear weapon states benefited from external assistance to develop their atomic arms. Israel enjoyed the US support, while India used American and Canadian technology to obtain the ultimate weapon. Soviet Union aided China in getting the atomic bomb, and in turn helped Pakistan to develop its nuclear weapons program. The fact that Iran has had extensive ties with Russia, Pakistan and North Korea to develop its nuclear program has been public knowledge for a long time. The exact nature of these relations, however, is still opaque, despite the IAEA’s effort to shed more light on it. The new IAEA report is thus not a game-changer.
Q: The IAEA report states that Iran’s program is far more ambitious and advanced than was believed to be the case. Do you agree with this assessment? In what ways it is ambitious and advanced?
A: The Iranian nuclear program is extensive, ambitious and advanced; but it is not a crash program towards nuclear weapons. In fact, the new IAEA report reveals that the pace of Iranian uranium refinement has continued to stagnate. Iran’s antiquated IR-1 machines continue to underperform and five years after Ahmadinejad promised to deploy a new generation of indigenous centrifuges, Iran has yet to set up a complete cascade of them. Yet, the fact that Iran has been willing to pay such a huge price for a program that has virtually no economic rational and energy benefits increases concerns about Iran’s true intentions. Iran’s only reactor in Bushehr merely provides less than two percent of the country’s energy needs, which pales in comparison to 18 percent waste in Iran’s electrical transmission lines.
