Q: Considering that the parliamentary elections on March 2 and the second round on May 3 produced the desired outcome for the regime and there were no disturbances, does this make it more likely that the presidential election will be held? Especially considering that lately there has been discussion of dissolving the presidency.

A: After the 2009 presidential elections, Khamenei was concerned that the presidential elections may create some security challenges for the regime. This is why the proposal of eliminating the presidential elections in Iran was put forth. However, currently this option seems to have become less urgent. The parliamentary elections, which took place with little controversy, has reinforced the idea for the regime that holding a peaceful presidential election in the future may also be possible. Therefore, the possibility of carrying on with the upcoming presidential election is more likely and the talks of eliminating the position have subsided.

Q: There is speculation that Khamenei will want to hold early presidential elections. Do you agree? If so, does the outcome of the parliamentary elections give him the cover to get rid of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad earlier than scheduled? If not, why would the regime want an early election?

A: Holding an early presidential election has numerous costs for the regime. Early voting would essentially mean the elimination of Ahmadinejad, which would be like spitting in the wind. The negative consequences of this action will harm the system as whole.

The most important reason behind Ahmadinejad’s durability as the president is the Supreme Leader’s personal support. Khamenei has gone as far as eliminating trusted individuals in his circle like Mohseni Ejei, former head of the Ministry of Intelligence, Saffar Harandi, former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and Mostafa Pour Mohammadi, former Interior Minister, in order to support Ahmadinejad. Also, following the 2009 presidential election, the principlists and Khamenei attacked the protesters more harshly than Ahmadinejad. The Iranian president was less harsh in condemning the critics in comparison to other principlists, because during that time period Khamenei believed that if Ahmadinejad loses he would be eliminated too.

Consequently, as Ahmadinejad has mockingly mentioned in the past, the principlists are forced to tolerate him until the end of his presidency. The principlists who oppose him are using an old tactic to keep him contained. During former president Khatami’s administration, the principlists were similarly unable to eliminate Khatami, so they began to get rid of the people around him and stymied the executive branch’s programs through judicial means. Such methods included the arrest of Gholamhossein Karbaschi, former Mayor of Tehran, Abdollah Nouri, former Interior Minister, and banning various reformist newspapers. Likewise, during Ahmadinejad’s administration the opposing principlists have begun to challenge the executive branch and, instead of personally eliminating Ahmadinejad, they started to get rid of the people around him. Arresting individuals close to Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, Iran’s Vice President and a close confident to Ahmadinejad, and preventing him from appearing on news programs were done in order to accomplish this goal. It has been a while since the Iranian state TV broadcasted Mashaei’s picture and he no longer appears in public events.

Concurrently, judicial files were put together for Hamid Baghaie, the president’s executive deputy, and Ali Akbar Javanfekr, the president’s advisor for press affairs. The charges can be pressed against these individuals when necessary. So, it is unlikely that an early election or elimination of Ahmadinejad would be on the regime’s agenda. No matter what, Khamenei and his supporters will tolerate the remainder of Ahmadinejad’s time in office and will continue to further weaken the executive branch.

Q: Has the outcome of the parliamentary elections produced more apathy in society? Do you expect this to discourage the Iranian electorate from being energized for the presidential poll?

There are structural differences between the parliamentary and presidential elections in Iran. With the exception of large cities, the parliamentary elections in many election precincts consist of political, regional, and local calculations. Parliamentary elections in Iran are conducted according to various election constituencies and each constituency consists of a few towns. Such diverse election districts are a prominent characteristic of the parliamentary elections. So, a parliamentary member does not only have to represent his own town, but also a few other neighboring municipalities and villages.

Therefore, the nature of parliamentary elections is different from one district to another. The candidates have to not only be wary of political calculations, but also the people’s regional and local concerns. For the most part, the demand of the people in parliamentary elections is local, such as the need for building a dam or a road. So, the parliamentary elections are important to monitor in order to get a better idea of the potential environment for the presidential elections, but they are different structurally.

Leading up to the presidential election, it appears that the environment in the country is ready for political activity. But, everything depends on the candidates and their ability to get vetted and approved by the Guardian Council. Some personalities may be able to energize the public again if they do decide to run. The regime is also after heating up the political environment prior to the presidential election, but, with the experience of 2009 under their belt, they know that the temperature should not reach a burning point. It would be hard for Khamenei to allow reformist candidates to return to the political arena. Even more moderate personalities close to former president Hashemi Rafsanjani will not have a chance. So, he will try to prevent such individuals from running. Even figures like Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, Tehran’s Mayor, are not going to be able to gain Khamenei’s trust like he might have the past.

This is why individuals like Saeed Jalili, the head of Iran’s National Security Council, will be the ideal type of candidate in the eyes of the Supreme Leader. So, one should not expect traditional candidates like Ali Larijani and Ghalibaf to run.
It is possible for lesser known individuals like Hamid Reza Haji Babaee, the Minister of Education, to run as well. On the other hand, after his success in the parliamentary elections, Ali Motahari, a moderate conservative parliamentary member, may try to run as an independent.

The reformists are also looking for possible candidates in order to change the current political atmosphere, but, naturally, the person selected by them has to have a few key qualities. The reformist candidate has to be able to be vetted and confirmed by the Guardian Council and then he should be able to gain the support of all the reformists and the people. Finding such a candidate for reformists is hard, but not impossible.

Ehsan Mehrabi is a distinguished Iranian journalist who has written about the Islamic Republic’s military, parliamentary politics, and various other socio-political issues for more than a decade. He has worked as the parliamentary reporter for the reformist newspapers Etemad Meli and Tose’eh, and as a reporter and political editor for Hambastegi newspaper. He left Iran a few months ago.

On Monday, 190 MPs signed a statement on the floor of the 290-member Iranian parliament, which clearly indicated the country’s concerns about a potential unity agreement between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

Based on statements by Bahraini officials, during a Sunday gathering in Riyadh, the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) talked about the possibility of establishing a strategic partnership between all six members, starting with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

Bahrain’s Information Minister has clarified the idea of a union by stating that each country will remain sovereign, however decisions about foreign relations, security, military, and economy would be made together.

According to the BBC Persian Service, Hossein Ali Shahriari, an Iranian MP, addressed Ali Larijani, the speaker of the parliament, in an open session of the parliament on Monday by stating, “Bahrain was Iran’s 14th province…but unfortunately due to Shah’s treason and the infamous agreement signed by the parliament Bahrain became independent.”

“If anything is supposed to happen, Bahrain is the Islamic Republic’s right and not Saudi Arabia’s,” added Shahriari.

“Bahrain is not a bite that can be easily swallowed by Saudi Arabia,” responded parliament speaker Ali Larijani.

According to Bloomberg, the GCC leaders met in the Saudi capital on Sunday to discuss December proposals by Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah to strengthen the alliance into a unified entity.

The Iranian MPs’ letter continued by adding, “Bahraini and Saudi rulers must understand that this unwise decision will only strengthen the Bahraini people’s resolve against the forces of occupation.”

According to Tehran Times, the Iranian MPs’ statement continues to add, “The religious and fearless Bahraini people, especially the Bahraini youth and brave women over the past 15 months showed that their Islamic zeal, national loyalty, and shouts of ‘God is the Great’ are more powerful than the invading powers and occupying forces, especially Saudi [forces].”

During the opening ceremony of a flower and plant exhibition in Tehran on Sunday, Qalibaf stated, “Some agreements have been made to move Evin Prison from its current location and turn the land into green space.” He did not provide any further details.

A reported by Fars News, a semi-official news agency affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Qalibaf stressed the importance of having urban green space and controlling traffic by implementing better city planning.

The majority of Evin Prison is under the supervision of the judiciary, but a few sections are managed by the Intelligence Ministry and the IRGC.

Transferring the prison out of the city has been considered on multiple occasions in the past. One of the reasons given for such a move is the prison’s lack of capacity due to a high number of inmates.

Evin Prison is Tehran’s main prison and the majority of arrested individuals are first transferred there, while they await their sentences.

Evin was built in 1971 and it was managed under the Shah’s National Intelligence and Security Organization, famously known as SAVAK. The majority of political prisoners were held and interrogated in Evin prior to the 1979 Revolution, a trend that has continued to this day.

Following the disputed 2009 presidential election, many activists, journalists, and reformist politicians were arrested, and many of them are currently being held at Evin.

According to the BBC Persian Service, the Afghan law makers claimed the Iranian ambassador met with the head of the Afghan senate, Fazal Hadi Muslimyar, and urged him to stymie the approval of the Afghan-U.S. strategic pact.

During a surprise visit to Afghanistan on May 1, U.S. President Barack Obama signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan, which will detail the framework of US-Afghanistan partnership following the end of the war. Reportedly, U.S. troops are scheduled to withdraw from the country starting in 2014, and the Afghan troops will take the lead on security in 2013. However, the Afghan parliament must approve the plan before the implementation process begins.

According to Afghan media, as reported by the BBC Persian Service, the Iranian ambassador used a “threatening tone” during his meeting with the head of the Afghan senate. He stated that if the partnership agreement is passed, all Afghan refugees will be deported from Iran.

The meeting between the Iranian ambassador and head of the Afghan senate was held before president Obama’s visit to the country.

The actions of the Iranian ambassador has created some resentment in Afghanistan and, according to Khaama Press, an Afghan online newspaper, the country’s law makers have urged the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to summon Zohrevand and demand an explanation.

Nisar Haris, an Afghan senator present during the meeting, provided further explanation by stating that the Iranian ambassador characterized the strategic pact between Afghanistan and Washington and long-term U.S. military bases in Afghanistan against the national interest of Iran. According to Haris, the head of the Afghan senate reacted to the Iranian ambassador by stating that “the decisions relating the internal affairs of Afghanistan will be taken based on the Afghan constitution and by Afghans only.”

Iran views the presence of American troops in the neighboring country of Afghanistan as a direct threat to its national security. Ramin Mehmanparast, the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, elaborated during a recent press conference by stating, “The signing of the strategic agreement with America does not solve Afghanistan’s security issues. Just like the past ten years, the trend of insecurity and instability will be exacerbated in this country.”

According to the BBC Persian Service, Morteza Agha Tehrani, the secretary general of the Unwavering Front, a coalition headed by the conservative cleric Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, the speaker of the ninth parliament should not be one of the “quiet seditionists.”

The Unwavering Front is the main competitor of the United Conservative Front, headed by Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, the current Chairman of the Assembly of Experts. Ali Larijani, the current speaker of the Parliament belongs to the United Conservative Front.

Agha Tehrani also emphasized that the next parliament speaker should abide by the concept of the velayate faghih.

The “quiet seditionists” is the term used by the Iranian Supreme Leader during the unrest following the 2009 presidential election. This term refers to influential figures that remained silent during the protests and did not condemn the actions of the reformist candidates, Mousavi and Karroubi.

In the past the political challengers of Larijani have accused him of staying silent during the protests and some have even accused him of sending a congratulatory note to Mousavi acknowledging his victory. Larijani has denied such rumors.

The Unwavering Front currently supports Gholam Ali Haddad Adel, former speaker of the parliament and the advisor to the Supreme Leader.

The speaker and the executive board of the parliament are selected on an annual basis during an internal election process held in the parliament.

The Iranian government has tried to hide its budget deficit by presenting a very optimistic number of available revenues and underestimating the overall expenditure. The lack of transparency and non-compliance with the principles of budget unity and comprehensiveness, the absence of any mention of the shock caused by the elimination of subsidies, and downplaying the effects of external shocks caused by foreign sanctions, has caused a great deal of surprise and regret for economic experts in Iran.

As a result, the parliament began its work in the Persian New Year with Speaker Ali Larijani announcing that the second phase of the government’s subsidy reform program will be stopped due to what he called “failure to acquire permission from the parliament. Larijani followed up by writing a letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, asking him to prevent Ahmadinejad from implementing his “illegal” subsidy program, which has been a hallmark of his presidency.

In an unprecedented move, the parliament’s budget committee rejected this year’s budget bill, citing major issues with its sources, spending, and lack of relevance concerning the country’s five-year development budget. This action could have returned the bill to the executive branch. However, during the next session of the budget hearing, Larijani reversed his position and suddenly encouraged the parliamentary members to take back their votes.

What was the reason behind the shift in the parliament’s decision? Is this a sign indicating that political expediency takes priority over the country’s economic concerns? Or, is the budgetary issue a good excuse for fueling competition within the internal political structure of the country?

The 2012-2013 budget bill contains numerous structural and content problems, which has made it very difficult to even view the document as the government’s official fiscal policy. From ten main principles of budget writing, Ahmadinejad’s budget bill lacks at least 8 principles. This financial document has no logical connection with the country’s broad economic policies. Instead of fulfilling one of its main responsibilities, the executive branch attempted to treat the process as a simple legal obligation it had to meet.

Passing such a bill is accepting the government’s widespread financial indiscipline. The current plan will result in accumulation of debt and cause conflict between the country’ fiscal and monetary policies, which will ultimately produce greater inflation. By presenting a very optimistic number of available resources and underestimating costs, the government is trying to hide its budget deficit. Lack of transparency and non-compliance with the principles of budget unity and comprehensiveness, lack of any mention of the shock caused by the elimination of subsidies, and ignoring the effects of external shocks caused by foreign sanctions, has caused a great deal of surprise and regret for economic experts in Iran.

Based on a study conducted by the Iranian parliament’s research center, which monitored the business environment in Iran, many private business enterprises in the county are convinced that Ahmadinejad’s economic policies have been more destructive than the impact of western sanctions.

Ahmadinejad’s policies have caused great levels of inflation in the country. Widespread unemployment, which according to unofficial statistics is estimate at over 25% in 2011 has been one of the reasons for a rise in inflation. The clash between the country’s fiscal and monetary policies, which has been caused by government’s systematic interference in the Central Bank by borrowing in order to close the budget deficit, has also exacerbated inflation. According to unofficial statistics, the inflation was over 40% in 2011 and the country faced a recession.

Nevertheless, the contradictory positions taken by Larijani in first rejecting and then accepting the budget stems from the political infighting within the power structure of the country rather than concerns about the nation’s economic interests. The broad political interests of the country have caused the parliament to back down from its demands, but Larijani counties to emphasis the country’s national interests as his first priority. However, the current power struggle within the political structure is subject more to the political will of each party involved rather than the national interests of the country. And, the will of Ayatollah Khamenei will be the ultimate deciding factor in the dispute.

This year’s budget bill, or the illegal implementation of the second phase of the subsidy reform program, is an excuse for Larijani to rebuild the challenged authority of the parliament by the executive branch. Larijani wants to respond to Ahmadinejad’s repeated humiliating comments directed at the parliament. He does not want to be known as someone who was unable to defend the authority and independence of the parliament as an institution. Forcing Ahmadinejad to abide by his legal obligations and recognizing the role of the parliament in policy making can also secure his seat as the speaker for the next round of parliamentary elections. In addition, by opposing Ahmadinejad’s economic policies the parliament is trying to distance itself from the consequences and point the finger at the executive branch.

Larijani knows well that in order to achieve victory he has to utilize the power of the Supreme Leader. Doing exactly what Ahmadinejad has done in the past, he has written a letter to Khamenei hoping to use his influence to be the winner in the current dispute. Larijani is trying to at least for once use Khamenei’s decision as leverage to force the executive branch to retreat. On the other hand, in order to secure his seat as the speaker of the parliament and defeat his competition, Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, Larijani has to demonstrate his individual power plus loyalty and complete obedience to the Supreme Leader.

Larijani’s seeming contradictory positions stem from his desire to defend the independence and authority of the parliament, while at the same time demonstrating his obedience to the Supreme Leader. In order to balance the country’s political power centers, Larijani will show as much flexibility as the Supreme Leader is willing to show in combating Ahmadinejad. Therefore, the numerous flaws of the proposed budget became an excuse for Larijani to defend his own political position, weaken the position of his domestic rivals, and settle his dispute with Ahmadinejad; a significant portion of the parliament associate with similar objectives.

Hadi Kahalzadeh served as an economist for Iran’s Social Security Organization from 2003 to 2011. He has received his M.A. in Energy Economics from the Islamic Azad University. He left Iran in 2011 and currently serves as a visiting scholar at the Department of Political Science and History at Fairleigh Dickinson University in New Jersey.

According to Fars News, a semi-official news agency close to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, on April 21, Hashemi Rafsanjani thanked Ahmadinejad for attending the session and expressed hope that the president will regularly participate.

The last time Ahmadinejad attended such a meeting was in the spring of 2009. The Iranian president has previously accused the Expediency Council of “distorting” the responsibilities of the executive branch. Ahmadinejad has gone as far as claiming that the Expediency Council is violating the Constitution and prefers the “expediency of a few over the interest of the public.”

According to the BBC Persian Service, prior to Ahmadinejad’s attendance, Gholam Hossein Elham, the president’s legal advisor, criticized the Expediency Council by stating, “The membership of unemployed individuals in the Expediency Council is to prevent them from disturbing the regime.”

Some political pundits from inside the country believe that Ahmadinejad’s absence could have been interpreted as his implicit dismissal of the Supreme Leader’s orders.

Alef, a conservative political website, called the meeting a test for the president’s degree of “conformity with velyat.” Alef suggested that the president has two paths to follow: “Participation in the Council’s meetings or failing to attend a meeting run by Hashemi, so as to ignore the Supreme Leader’s order.”

Based on anecdotal evidence from many individuals close to the Supreme Leader, Khamenei has repeatedly asked for the president’s attendance during the Expediency Council meetings, but Ahmadinejad had refused thus far.

The Expediency Council is an assembly charged with resolving any conflicts between the parliament and the Guardian Council, which is charged with ensuring the compatibility of laws with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution.

In an interview with the Iranian state television on April 15, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbari Salehi, stated: “We had already repeatedly stated that this meeting will certainly be a step forward.”

The most recent set of talks between Iran and the P5+1 took place on Saturday in Turkey and the decision was made to hold the second phase of the negotiations in Baghdad on May 23.

Saeed Jalili, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme Security Council and the European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton headed the negotiations. Both sides seem content with the way the talks were conducted, which they described as “positive and constructive.”

According to CNN, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton expressed her hopefulness about the outcome of the negotiations and provided further detail by stating, “We have agreed that the nonproliferation treaty forms a key basis for what must be serious engagement to ensure all the obligations under the treaty are met by Iran while fully respecting Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.”

Salehi also added, “They [western countries] correctly or incorrectly state that they have some concerns, the same way that we are demanding our rights, therefore we will think about mechanisms to obviate their concerns and at the same time achieve our rights.”

According to Fars News, a semi-official news agency close to the IRGC, Salehi also announced that Iran and the P5+1 have reached a common understanding in Istanbul.

“We are trying to wrap up this false dossier which has been plotted for the Islamic Republic of Iran. This would benefit both Iran and the West,” Salehi added.

BERLIN – If at one time European governments believed the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran was far more frightening for the United States than for those across the Atlantic, those days are in the past. As talks near on Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran should know that European officials’ views are somewhere in the middle between America’s caution and Israel’s alarm.

This major shift among European states was on display during a recent closed-door meeting in Berlin, organized by the Heinrich Boell Stiftung, the political foundation affiliated with Germany’s Green Party. Not only did officials and experts agree with many in the Obama administration that the policy of containment has failed, all backed the demand that Iran must agree in upcoming talks scheduled for April 13 with the 5+1 permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to stop enriching uranium for a certain period.

European Union officials cited Iran’s lack of transparency with the International Atomic Energy Agency as the reason enrichment should stop immediately and be allowed to resume only when Iran is in full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They also expressed intolerance for Iran’s negotiating strategies — which often involve presenting the same proposals, which have previously been rejected, as if they are something new.

If Iran does not agree to this concession and others, one European policy expert suggested, the renewed diplomatic process must stop immediately.

All of these demands on Iran — including tough EU sanctions — reflect a fundamental shift in the positions of EU member states. Therefore, it would be wise for the Iranian government to realize before attending the upcoming talks in Istanbul, that this time things will be different. The Europeans, like the Americans, will not be content with promises for more talks or the usual conflicting statements coming from Iranian nuclear negotiators or Iranian intransigence. As Catherine Ashton, Europe’s top diplomat, said in a recent interview with Der Spiegel: “We don’t want talks for the sake of talks. We need tangible progress.”

Although the Europeans attending the meeting said they categorically reject a military attack on Iran just as they are not seeking regime change, they also stated that Iran’s political elites, centered around Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, are too unpredictable to be in possession of a nuclear weapon.

So how far is Europe willing to go to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran? Much like the Obama administration, the hope of some states is that tough sanctions and an oil embargo will be enough to persuade Iran to reach a negotiated settlement. The EU estimates the embargo will cost Iran to lose one-quarter of its income.

Public opinion in Europe and the United States also seems to be in sync. The Transatlantic Trends by the German Marshall Fund (GMF) have been showing in the past few years that European and American publics are similarly concerned about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. In 2011, 76 percent of Americans and 75 percent of Europeans said they were concerned about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.

European governments in the past were perceived to be soft on Iran, even though some EU member states’ positions were complex. First, a few years ago, it took heavy lobbying by the Bush administration to get the Europeans on the same page regarding economic sanctions. But at the same time, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany made clear in her speech to the Knesset in 2008 that for her “Israel’s security will never be open to negotiation.” In 2009, European diplomats welcomed the efforts for more diplomacy by the newly elected President Barak Obama. To Europeans, it looked like the U.S. administration was moving closer to their views.

But now, it appears some states have come full circle. The European Union was just as eager to sanction Iran as the Americans. For the Europeans, tightening sanctions is the only option left to avoid an Iranian nuclear bomb and a military escalation.

As all parties approach the nuclear talks in Istanbul, Iran should know that the West stands united and if no resolution is reached, the United States and European states will have two calculations in which to make a decision about a military attack: Is the nuclear clock ticking faster than the effect of sanctions on the Iranian regime? And if so, would the potential damage from a nuclear attack on Iran and the region be less or greater than a nuclear-armed Iran?

A spokesman for EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton announced on Monday that the Iranian government has agreed to negotiations in two rounds, the first of which will happen in Istanbul on April 14. He expressed the EU’s optimism by stating, “We hope that this first round will produce a conducive environment for concrete progress. We are of course aiming at a sustained process.”

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council also confirmed this news by releasing a statement: “Following several rounds of intense negotiations between Dr. Jalili [Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council] and Catherine Ashton, the first round of negotiations will be held on Saturday April 14 and the next round will be held in Baghdad.” According to this statement, the date for the second round of negotiations will be decided after the end of the first phase.

It is unclear if the Iranian government or the United Sates is willing to make any concessions regarding their previous positions, but according to an article published in New York Times, the closing of the controversial Fordow nuclear facility will be one of main demands of the Obama administration. The Fordow facility is located deep under a mountain near the holy city of Qom, and, according to many Iranian military officials, sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles protect it.

The New York Times quotes an unnamed U.S. diplomat in asserting that the United States will also be calling for a halt in the production of high-grade enriched uranium fuel, which is perceived to be a few steps below what is needed to produce a nuclear weapon. The U.S. delegation reportedly will demand that the shipment of the current stockpiles of the high-grade enriched uranium be transported out of the country.

However, such pre-conditions seem to be unfavorable to Iranian officials. In an interview with Iranian state television, Fereydoon Abbasi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, stated, “Why should we close Fordow when all our activities are monitored by the IAEA? Instead of such [demands], the P5+1 should provide us with a suggestion that would allow us to cooperate. They should come and take advantage of our investment. They should give us materials and we will deliver fuel to them.”

During his Sunday visit with the Japanese former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in Tehran, the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, also announced that his country is willing to do all it can to bring about a world free of nuclear weapons.

According to Ahmadinejad, the Iranian government will propose “practical solutions” during the upcoming negotiations and the country will demand “nothing more than what is allowed under the framework of the NPT.”

Moreover, the Iranian Foreign Minister went as far as describing the upcoming negotiations as meaningless if they are conducted with any preconditions. “Setting conditions before the meeting means concluding before talks, that is completely meaningless and none of the parties will accept conditions prior to negotiations,” Salehi declared on Monday.

According to Fars News, a semi-official news agency close to the IRGC, Salehi added, “We hope that the P5+1 comes to the negotiating table honestly…We have our own views in the meeting and P5+1, too, has its own views, but we should find the commonalities.”

Nevertheless, many analysts viewed the remarks by the Supreme Leader on state TV in February as a potential shift in the country’s inflexible nuclear stance. During a meeting with the country’s nuclear scientists Khamenei declared: “The Iranian nation has never pursued and will never pursue nuclear weapons…Iran is not after nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and theoretically, considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.”

In addition to the already convoluted messages coming Iran, Hashemi Rafsanjani, the country’s former president and the current head of the Expediency Council, in a recent interview with an Iranian security studies journal emphasized the importance of negotiating with the United States. Rafsanjani claimed that he has been encouraging a more pragmatic foreign policy toward the United States since the 1980s. In this interview, Rafsanjani highlights the fact that Iran has relations with China and Russia, which are not Iran’s traditional allies, but for some reason the United States is treated differently than other superpowers.

Rafsanjani reiterated that Iran does not need a nuclear weapon, a statement he also famously made during his interview with Mike Wallace in 1997, and hinted at the need for a potential compromise with the United States. Rafsanjani goes on to talk about how he wrote a letter to Ayatollah Khomeini during the last years of his life urging him to rethink Iran’s foreign policy toward the United States.

According to passages translated from Fars News by the USG Open Source Center, Rafsanajani recalls the letter by stating,

“There are difficult passages and if you do not help us pass through them, they will be difficult to pass through after you… Ties with America were one of these issues. I wrote that, after all, our current practice — of not speaking to or having ties with America — could not persist forever. America is the super power of the world. What is the difference between Europe and the US, China and the US, or Russia and the US from our point of view? Why should we not negotiate with the US if we negotiate with them? Talks do not mean that we should surrender to them. We will negotiate and if they accept our positions or we accept their positions, then it would be all over.”

This interview has clearly angered some of the more radical factions within the IRGC. According to Fars News, Major General Seyed Hassan Firouzabadi, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, categorically rejected Rafsanjani’s statements.

“No one has spoken about relations with the United States…One of the gentlemen [referring to Rafsanajni] has talked with reporters and reminisced about Imam Khomeini’s era, saying that he had given a letter to Imam [Khomeini] regarding talks with the U.S.,” Firouzabadi said.

“Imam disagreed with that proposal of Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani and didn’t act upon it; also after Imam’s era this view [negotiating with the U.S.] has never been approved by the Supreme National Security Council and Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution and has never been on the Islamic Republic’s agenda,” Firouzabadi added.

The issues of the nuclear talks and potential opportunity to negotiate with the United States are contentious topics among the Iranian ruling elites. Despite the fact that some pundits often present the Iranian regime as a homogeneous body, the various councils and entities consist of varied and often opinionated individuals. During such contentious times such differences boil up to the surface and result in the declaration of mixed and at times contradictory statements.

According to some reports the Obama administration might have also contributed to the increasingly capricious behavior of the Iranian regime. Evidently, President Obama has signaled to Iran that the United States would accept an Iranian civilian nuclear program if Khamenei can stick with his promise of never pursuing nuclear weapons.