ROME — In 2008, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs held four meetings in Europe that included some Iranian officials as well as some Iranian experts from the West and a few countries from other regions. The scope of the meetings was to address ways to develop discussions with Iran that could bring about a more constructive climate and possibly yield some positive results.

This brief contains informal observations and suggestions on a future U.S.-Iran or EU-Iran dialogue, based on the experience of these four meetings. It should be stressed, though, that this brief reflects solely the opinions of the author. No participant in any of these meetings shares any responsibility for what is written here, since the purpose of the meetings, as is the case for any Pugwash meeting, was not to reach a formal consensus among the participants but rather simply to explore options.

From this experience, I offer some specific observations about negotiations with Iran. These points take into consideration what I perceive as significant concerns on the Iranian side more than the so-called Western concerns or Western redlines, as the West’s position already is well known. The aim here is just to see if compromises may be possible.

1. There is a general philosophical approach by the Iranian political leadership that should be understood. This approach deals with some basic principles, such as justice, on which an agreement is possible, even if opinions can differ on conclusions and implications.

2. A logical conclusion of the basic principles would be the rejection of nuclear weapons (NW) as an acceptable instrument of warfare. Any statement or agreement aimed at rejecting NWs as a legitimate instrument of warfare would be considered positive and important.

3. The specific nuclear problem could be fruitfully addressed if some basic principles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are recalled, assumed, and implemented. The Iranians will stress mainly the principle of “no extra discrimination,” in addition to the (already discriminating) distinction between Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. In particular, there is nothing in the NPT that forbids uranium enrichment. If Iran wants to enrich, the argument goes, it should be allowed to do so. On the other hand, regulating the enrichment capability on a mutually agreed basis, strengthening the international monitoring regime, and implementing multinational fuel cycle units or consortiums are all topics that easily could be discussed, and where a consensus should be possible. The ensuing framework should be reassuring enough for those who are concerned about the risks of Iranian nuclear proliferation.

4. The additional protocol Iran signed in 2003 with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be implemented (even if the ratification procedure will take time). The relationship between Iran and the IAEA is a positive one and could be made better if the additional protocol will be ratified. There should be no obstacle to continuing the review of past Iranian nuclear activities (if continuing such a review will be needed). Of course there is also the possibility of Iran giving up uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication inside Iran, provided that it receives absolute guarantees of a nuclear fuel supply. This is the preferred opinion of many people in the West, and economically it makes sense. Iran, though, seems not to be ready, at this stage, to agree to this option. But is should be pointed out that, if future talks focus on “enrichment in Iran yes versus enrichment in Iran no,” the talks will go nowhere. From the point of view of preventing proliferation, what really matters is monitoring and international control.

5. The argument that monitoring cannot prevent the possibility of secret enrichment facilities is true, but it is also a misleading argument. Nothing can exclude the existence of secret facilities in any country, unless a full-scale military occupation of that country by foreign forces and/or the destruction of its industrial infrastructure is carried out. Forcing Iran to declare that it will no longer enrich will not provide an absolute guarantee against secret enrichment facilities.

6. Isolating Iran will neither improve the situation, nor will it eliminate the risks of proliferation. On the contrary, multiplying opportunities for business, cultural, and scientific cooperation could facilitate confidence-building across the existing dividing lines and enhance mutual understanding.

7. The idea of dealing with selected authorities (such as the Supreme Leader as opposed to, say, the president or his representatives) in Iran is not really a sensible one. In any negotiation, it is not up to one of the two parties to select the representative of the other party.

8. Specific issues of regional security (Iraq, Afghanistan, and so on) could be discussed easily in parallel talks. There is a large commonality of interests in preserving and strengthening regional stability and avoiding the spread of areas of lawlessness where terrorist groups might prosper.

9. One of the most controversial topics is the issue of Israel and Palestine. We have heard very harsh rhetorical statements from all sides. Beyond the rhetoric, in a nutshell, the Iranian position is that a just solution for Palestine should be a state where each citizen (be s/he a Jew, Muslim, or Christian) has the right to vote and to be represented. Namely, Iran supports a one-state as opposed to a two-state solution—a legitimate position to hold, albeit different from the equally legitimate position supporting the two-state solution. The common ground here should revolve around the prospect that every country or (national-political) group can contribute to peace in Palestine. It may be pointed out by the Iranians that to ask that Iran withhold its support of Hezbollah (or Hamas), would be like asking the United States to withhold support of Israel.

10. In order to facilitate the negotiating process, groups of non-officials could develop:

Discussions on disarmament and non-proliferation issues, and on the value of specific safeguards for the nuclear civilian programs. Such discussions could be explored among an international group of scientists, including crucially Iranian scientists.

Dialogue on regional security issues, starting with maritime security in the Persian Gulf and proceeding with Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and so on.

11. Among the other topics discussed in the meetings were the following proposals:

• Proceeding toward the re-establishment of U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations, first by having the respective countries staff interest sections, who should be entitled to issue visas.

• Reaffirming the Algiers accords (1981) that, inter alia, forbid attempts to work toward regime changes in Iran.

• Establishing direct flights between the two countries and solving the relevant security problems by mutual agreement (there are a few hundred thousand passengers travelling annually between Iran and the United States).

• Organizing governmental exchange visits and inter-governmental meetings.

• Discussing economic cooperation in conjunction with the switching off of sanctions.

• Facilitating cultural and scientific exchanges and visits of citizens.

After the elections of June 12, 2009, the situation in Iran is more complicated. Foreign governments certainly can request that the Iranian leadership respect human rights and respect the will of the Iranian people. But, ultimately, managing post-election life in Iran is an Iranian internal problem and should not be used as an excuse to block negotiations between Iran and other countries. Any attempt by the West to apply pressure on Iran and impose some form of timetable may well be counterproductive and lead to an unwanted result. This is particularly true if the timetable refers to the prospect of a military attack—no matter which country is anticipated to perform such an attack.