Jamsheed K. Choksy
A preemptive attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities by the U.S., Israel, or both nations has been on the table for quite some time. Yet because Iran has at least a dozen centers related to its nuclear activities, demolishing the program would be extremely difficult. None the less, there is no dearth of war game scenarios by think tanks, universities, government departments, even magazines in the U.S. and Israel. Iran too has conducted its own large-scale defensive and offensive scenarios – including one last November involving actual military exercises.
Ultimately, how events could actually transpire remains anyone’s educated guess. At the very least, Iran will utilize technical knowledge gained over the years to rebuild its nuclear program and work feverishly toward weaponization. It probably also would officially abjure the Non-Proliferation Treaty and bar the International Atomic Energy Agency from any oversight.
Yet there is a far more devastating scenario that needs to be given much greater consideration. Iran could retaliate by actively or tacitly providing low enriched uranium (LEU) to militant and terrorists groups that are targeting the U.S., E.U., and Israel.
When physical incapacitation of nuclear facilities occurs at initial stages of construction, the damage to all parties is both minimal and manageable. Israel followed that trajectory when it struck at Iraq’s Osirak (Tammuz 1) reactor in June 1981 and at Syria’s Al-Kibar facility in September 2007. Iran recommenced its nuclear program during the early 1990s, expanding rapidly as the world dithered. So the window for a surgical strike by the U.S. or Israel has long passed. The scales of attack, devastation, and response have all increased exponentially.
In the chaos that now would surround the aftermath of aerial strikes on its nuclear sites, it is quite likely that Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) could lose control over portions of the nuclear materials inventory. Individuals and groups seeking revenge against attacking nations could spirit away radioactive materials and transfer those to Al-Qaeda via Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. The Taliban and its auxiliaries could be beneficiaries of nuclear elements too. Both terrorist organizations have tried, unsuccessfully so far, to obtain fuel for improvised nuclear devices.
Beyond the actions of rogue scientists and crazy radicals, the Iranian government may seek recourse to similar action as well. Iran’s administration, and especially its IRGC, has played a stealth and uneasy game with both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the basis of the U.S. and Israel being common enemies. Hezbollah and Hamas – Iran’s proxies against Israel – could find themselves in possession of dirty bombs too, courtesy of enraged Iranian military men, scientists, politicians, and mullahs.
Transporting LEU onto the U.S. mainland, while not impossible, will be difficult and so Americans may be the least directly affected by Iranian retaliation through its terrorist cohorts. Smuggling nuclear fuel across highly porous land and maritime borders into Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan for use against coalition forces, western diplomats, and foreign aid-workers may prove harder to prevent. Likewise, from Iran via Iraq and then Syria, LEU may end up in Hezbollah short-range rockets shot into Israel. A similar route overland to the Mediterranean coast and then via boat to Gaza could place LEU in the hands of Hamas suicide bombers entering Israel. Carried by militants across Iran’s border with Turkey and from there into European cities, small dirty bombs could spread terror across the E.U.
Such nightmare scenarios are not merely hypothetical. Intelligence and news reports suggest that Iran’s leaders are preparing an array of responses to possible attacks by the U.S. and Israel. Tehran keeps warning the world of a “devastating” response. As early as 2003, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared: “A military attack against Iran would be suicide for the aggressor.” More recently his aides suggested Iran’s government would retaliate by “blowing up the heart of Israel.”
Despite their belligerent rhetoric, most Iranian clerics, politicians, and generals are not bent on provoking a military confrontation with the U.S. They regard preservation of their power as paramount. Yet, if attacked and weakened, their reactions could be unpredictable and perhaps irrational. So their bellicoseness should not be taken lightly though those words produce a conundrum for the world wherein both inaction and action can have deadly consequences.
Iran lacks the conventional military capacity to retaliate by itself against the U.S., European Union or Israel in an overwhelming manner. Nor does it have nuclear weapons at present. Yet its revolutionary elite remain deeply hostile to the U.S. and Israel. For those reasons, Iran’s leaders may conclude they have nothing to lose by working through terrorist organizations to wreck multiple small-scale radiation havoc on attackers. Even if no such official decision is reached, as noted previously, non-state actors could spirit away some of the radioactive materials from the wrecked sites to assemble and detonate improvised nuclear devices.
So if the U.S. or Israel chooses to go down the martial path vis-à-vis Iran, with or without cooperating together and with or without assistance from the E.U., preemptive planning must be undertaken for a nuclear retaliation. It is absolutely essential to be fully prepared for what could lay ahead if any portion of Iran’s LEU deliberately or accidentally falls into the hands of non-state militants.
Jamsheed K. Choksy is professor of Iranian and International studies and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. He also is a member of the U.S. National Council on the Humanities at the National Endowment for the Humanities. The views expressed are his own.