Babak

TEHRAN—It appears that the future of the Islamic Republic, even in the short term, is tied to how the government treats those people who are defined as the Green Movement. In the absence of free and independent media, and when political parties cannot operate legally and freely, these protesters pursue their demands on the streets of Iran’s cities.

The Green Movement is in reality a reaction to the closed political environment during four years of rule by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the political faction that supports him. The Green Movement is a social movement that includes people from all walks of life and all classes of society, but it is the urban middle class that carries the burden of standing up for civil liberties and the basic rights of individuals, just as it did during the days of the reform government under President Mohammad Khatami.

In the first few weeks after the June 12 election, the government reacted blindly to protests using coercive measures. This approach only intensified the political crisis and increased the level of violence on the streets and inside prisons. After these initial weeks, the Islamic Republic started to think of rational ways to get out of the critical situation. It is worth noting that the power structure in the Islamic Republic is not like a pyramid, and there are multiple centers of power. Important centers of power in this system are the judiciary, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Basij, the Guardian Council, and the administration. The amount of power and influence each institution yields has a direct correlation to its level of intimacy with the Supreme Leader. It is these multiple power centers in the Islamic Republic that sometimes take actions that result in problems for the Supreme Leader.

The events that took place after the June 12 election were similar in various degrees and levels to events that took place during the years of Khatami’s reform government. Attacking the student dormitories at Tehran University, awful events at the Kahrizak detention facility, where dissidents were believed to have been tortured and killed, and the waves of attacks by radical conservatives against Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and a number of Grand Ayatollahs are all examples of behavior that was detrimental to Khamenei.

This movement currently is centered in Tehran, but as the government becomes weaker and the economy worsens, the movement can rapidly spread to other parts of the country. The government has chosen two methods to halt or at least slow down the protest movement. The first approach is to intensify its clashes with Iranian society by limiting people’s ability to access the web, controlling e-mails and SMS messages, detaining reformists, political activists and journalists, and increasing the number of security checkpoints on the streets of the city. The second method is an effort to try and unite the political forces of the country and to distinguish between protestors and the enemy. Therefore, they can easily suppress a number of protestors by calling them counterrevolutionaries and then temporarily calming the situation in the country.

A combination of these two methods is being implemented by the government, but the ruling establishment must choose between the two and make it clear to society where it stands. After seven months of suppression and in light of recent executions, the government is frightened of retreating or making any concessions to the leaders of the opposition. It correctly believes that such moves will only expedite its downfall. But the only way to get out of the current crisis is not more suppression. Instead, the government must move toward finding a civil solution to the problem by punishing those responsible for recent events—with the hope that sacrificing a few people in government will satisfy the opposition—while negotiating with the opposition leaders behind closed doors.

This option is being tried now. In addition to Judge Saaed Mortazavi, who has been named in a report written by Iran’s parliament as the main person responsible for the crimes that occurred at the Kahrizak detention facility, Ahmadinejad himself could soon be another victim of the regime because of his administration’s weaknesses in running the country and the actions of his supporters in various arenas creating the new crisis in the country.