Dariush Zahedi

ISTANBUL—Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s decision to give unequivocal backing to the demands of hardliners in charge of ensuring Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s reelection and the generals’ monopoly over the nation’s key political and economic institutions is filled with risk. Although his choice in the matter may have been limited, Khamenei’s actions appear irrevocably to have alienated a vast cross-section of the Iranian population from the regime.

Moreover, as the massive anti-regime demonstrations in most of Iran’s major cities erupted again on September 18 (designated officially for the expression of solidarity with the Palestinian cause) illustrate, the formula adopted by the regime for preserving stability has, at best, been only partially effective. Indeed, three-and-a-half months of heavy-handed and repressive tactics, designed to cow the opposition into silence, appear to have backfired. Though the number of demonstrators may have plummeted from a peak of three million on June 15, the demonstrators’ demands have become more radical. If, in the immediate aftermath of the disputed presidential elections, the rallying cry of the demonstrators was the annulment of the election results, they now are casting aspersions on the very concept of rule by the supreme jurist, which lies at the cornerstone of Iran’s constitution.

Nevertheless, although a harbinger of greater social and political unrest, Iran’s current standoff does not mean that a regime collapse followed by a subsequent enduring democratic order is imminent. To the contrary, since both sides in this dispute are endowed with potentially formidable political resources and appear unwilling to back down, confrontation and turmoil appear to be the order of the day for the foreseeable future.

The most important sources of the hardliners’ power are military and economic. Hardliner leadership already controls the state’s security apparatus, notably the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), an elite military force made up of 120,000 draftees and charged with preserving the revolution. And, more importantly, the IRGC’s appendage, the volunteer basij forces (which according to most estimates number up to three million individuals) also is under the control of the hardliners. The basij, who are renowned for their unswerving devotion to Ayatollah Khamenei, up to now have taken the leading role in suppressing demonstrations.

Thanks to the efforts of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during the past four years, the leadership of the IRGC and the basij already control a large portion of the roughly 80 percent of the Iranian economy that is still state-owned. Now, with their consolidation of power over virtually all remaining state organs almost complete, they will add revenues from the crucial hydrocarbon industry to the lucrative rents they already derive from a significant proportion of the country’s legal and illegal foreign trade.

The opposition, meanwhile, makes up for its disadvantages by its sheer numbers as well as its intellectual and managerial capacity. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a vast proportion of the youth, the educated, urbanites, the middle-class, and even segments from the lower class and rural population of Iran sympathize with the opposition’s stated objective of lifting social and personal restrictions, improving ties with the outside world, and liberalizing the nation’s political and economic structures. The youth, who have consistently been at the forefront of demonstrations, constitute the majority of Iran’s 72 million population, roughly 70 percent of whom are under the age of 35.

To a large extent, the regime’s success in educating its population has turned out to be its undoing. Indeed, the number of individuals with college and university degrees, which presently stands at about seven million, is increasing rapidly, with three million students currently enrolled in postsecondary institutions. Moreover, about 97 percent of those between the ages of 6 and 29 are literate, about 70 percent of the Iranian population lives in urban areas.

The disjunction between the majority of the youth and the regime, which is already wide, is likely to expand further during the second Ahmadinejad administration, as social and economic conditions deteriorate. With his erratic, unscientific, and ad hoc fiscal and monetary policies, Ahmadinejad managed to exacerbate all of the structural flaws of the Iranian economy during his first term. As a result, the trajectory of inflation, unemployment, mismanagement, inefficiency, and poverty, as well as the disparity of wealth and income, have all been on the rise.

If anything, these troubles are likely to become compounded during Ahmadinejad’s second term due to rising levels of political risk, brain-drain, capital flight, and international isolation. As in the past, the youth will have to bear the brunt of all of these problems, while being subjected to heightened levels of censorship and repression.

In the meantime, as in the September 18 demonstrations, the leadership of the Green Movement undoubtedly will be on the lookout to tap into rising frustrations by taking advantage of national and religious commemorations to bring its supporters into the streets. At the same time, the position of the opposition could become enhanced if, as seems likely, schisms and fragmentations within the ruling conservative camp continue unabated. The opposition also could become strengthened if the religious establishment, especially grand ayatollahs, becomes vocal in its denunciation of the government’s actions and policies.

Nevertheless, so long as the majority of the leadership and rank and file members of the coercive apparatus remain loyal, they would be able to sustain their hold on power. Thus far, there have been no reports of serious dissidence and insubordination in the ranks of the Iranian armed forces, indicating that the Green Movement has a long and dangerous road to traverse before achieving its objectives. Moreover, the prospects of success will depend not just on the emergence of fissures in the security structure, but the extent of those divisions. An insufficiently large crack easily can lead to a long period of civil strife and internal warfare, which could, regrettably, pave the way for the unleashing of centrifugal forces that can lead to the unraveling of the country, rather than its democratization.

Dariush Zahedi is a research fellow at the Institute of International Studies at the University of California–Berkeley. He is also affiliated with Zirve University in Turkey, where he is establishing a Center for Middle Eastern Studies.