Anonymous
TEHRAN—With so many leading reformists sitting in Iranian prisons, two important issues have arisen for Iranians: Has the Green Movement, and the broader opposition that it represents, been crushed by the regime’s latest moves? And, how much time has the regime bought to guarantee its survival?
The greatest challenge facing the opposition movement, which is not only comprised of reformists but a wide diversity of Iranians, is that it is suffering from a lack of leadership. Even if the imprisoned reformists were free today, the movement would appear leaderless because the nationwide protests have given birth to a decentralised and amorphous network of local cells and leaderships.
It is too early to determine how effective and large they are or will become. They spread through the Internet, in homes, and in public places such as parks and teahouses. At night, small groups of Iranians paint anti-Ahmadinejad, anti-Khamenei slogans on walls and street signs, fire green paint balls at posters of Khamenei, and destroy public property.
According to reports, this form of activity is frequently seen in Tehran, Arumie, Shiraz, Ahvaz, Mashad, and Isfahan. The activities of these localized and unorganized groups suffer from lack of overall strategy.
Making the political climate even more complicated is the fact that those Iranians in the opposition cannot be placed into one political or religious category. The majority of the people most actively engaged in politics are from the middle and lower-middle classes with varying degrees of religiosity. The perception that most Iranians opposed to the regime are from the upper-middle, “Westernized” class is wrong. Middle and upper-class youth have the financial and intellectual means to leave the country for study or work abroad and remain relatively unaffected by the growing economic crisis. Many of them have much to lose if they get entangled in political activism. For example, many young activists in Tehran stayed away during the height of the demonstrations because they feared that if they were arrested or photographed by the intelligence services, they would be banned from leaving the country. The youth who are less affluent face economic and political hardships and are unable to leave the country—in other words, they have little to lose.
Researchers on popular politics at one institute in Iran conducted a survey to try to determine the socioeconomic and cultural background of the Green Movement and of those participating in the demonstrations. Their statistics showed that 66 percent of activists in the Green Movement in Tehran came from the middle and lower-middle classes. Sixty-eight percent of these Tehran activists considered themselves religious. Thirty-two percent of the upper-class Tehrani activists considered themselves religious. However, 63 percent of them consider Islam a part of their identity. The survey was conducted by a scholar who wishes to remain unidentified.
These statistics seem like they could be accurate, if we consider the goals of the demonstrators. While there is much talk of replacing the Islamic Republic with an Iranian Republic, the majority of Iranians still favor an Islamic Republic. The demonstrations that rocked the country in the post-election period were not revolutionary in character. People were protesting against perceived cheating in the June 12 presidential election.
Having participated in all the demonstrations after the announcement of the election results, including Black Saturday on June 20, I can say that none of the slogans and none of the many people I spoke with as we marched and chanted, was thinking of a revolution to overthrow the Islamic Republic. They were outraged by the blatant cheating and what they considered an insult to their intelligence, namely the regime’s apparent assumption that we would accept the result of an Ahmadinejad presidency. In addition, the people participating in the demonstrations across the country (due to restrictions on foreign media, the protests in cities such as Ahvaz, Babol, Arumie, Mashad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Ghazvin, and Kermanshah were not reported) represented a societal mosaic. The movement crossed socioeconomic, generational, and cultural-religious boundaries. This diversity surprised the Green Movement’s leadership.
I too was surprised. I found myself marching alongside and chanting with religiously dressed younger and older women, clerics, and middle-aged workers and professionals, along with students of varying socioeconomic and religious backgrounds. Not only did clothing in many instances distinguish these groups from each other, so did their posters and slogans. The more religious people had posters of Mir Hossein Moussavi with Khomeini and Khamenei, and in their slogans they emphasised the fact that Moussavi had been “The Imam’s Prime Minister” (Imam refers to Ayatollah Khomeini). They carried posters saying, “Khomeini where are you? You have left Moussavi alone.” Other demonstrators carried posters and chanted slogans that focused on Moussavi, with little reference to Khomeini. All chanted, “Death to the Dictator,” a reference to Supreme Leader Khamenei.
At the beginning of the demonstration on June 20, the bloodiest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, I found to the right of me three young women dressed in traditional religious clothing, in other words full black chadors. In one hand they had laminated sections from the Quran, which they read as they marched, with the other hand in the air making the V sign. At one point, when a basiji was hitting an older woman with his baton, both young women and men attacked him. At another point, once our group of about a thousand people marching toward Freedom Square had been beaten by police and dispersed, me and about fifty other people found ourselves stuck in a gas station on Freedom Street. Facing us were the basiji and special anti-riot police who were urging us to leave the station so that they could beat us once again. Soon stone throwing began. To the left of me was a middle-aged chadori woman throwing stones at the basiji, while to the right of me were big, strong young guys hurling anything in sight at the basiji. The slogans were the same: “Death to Khamenei” and “Death to the Dogs of Khamenei.”
Such attacks on Khamenei show the great vulnerability of the regime: they undermine the basis of the system Khamenei and Ahmadinejad wish to preserve. But the question now is whether the leaderless and diverse opposition movement has the strength to endure. The major demonstrations on September 18 in Tehran and other cities showed that the opposition movement remains strong and popular, despite the crackdown. Local leaders outside Tehran have emerged and are active.
The author is a scholar living inside Iran