The following article is based on an ongoing study being conducted by Iranian scholars from Tehran, Qom, and Shiraz. These findings have not been made public, but the authors have chosen to share them with insideIRAN.org
TEHRAN—Since the controversial re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June, determining the degree of his support among the population in rural and small urban areas has been at the center of debates over the issue of electoral cheating. The research presented here is the result of polling and the tracking of political opinion in eleven rural and small urban areas with populations between 8,000 and 34,000 people in Fars and Isfahan provinces in the following periods: two five-month intervals from June 2008 to March 2009; and late April, the first week of June, the middle of July, and the middle of September in 2009.
The polling, done by people local to these areas, was conducted in various places of employment and recreation, via telephone, and face-to-face. Despite organizational difficulties, the total amount of people who participated over this period was 11,529. We tried to reflect the demographic percentages of each town in the sample groups. For example, the largest group polled in most areas was the 20-to-32-year-old age group, which is the dominant age group, according to official records. The methodology for the study was based on theoretical work on polling conducted in non- and semi-democratic polities.
The polls focused on popular opinion of Ahmadinejad. In the two pre-election polls, respondents were asked to state for whom they intended to vote. In the two post-election polls, respondents were asked for whom they had voted in the election and what they thought of the post-election events. Some of the results are revealing and cast doubt on the assumption that Ahmadinejad enjoys great popularity in rural and small urban areas, at least in Fars and Isfahan provinces.
According to poll results, Ahmadinejad enjoyed and continues to enjoy strong support in the 45-plus age group. In the rural areas, this support was running at 80 percent until polling day. In the smaller urban areas, his average support was at 61 percent. While these respondents did complain bitterly about the economic situation, they placed most of the blame on “mafia groups” in the state or on sanctions imposed by the United Nations. Moreover, they believed that in the end he would be able to improve their living standards. Some 34 percent of the respondents had received some form of monetary help from the presidency as part of Ahmadinejad’s policy of collecting letters from people asking for help. There was no real gender divide in this group.
The results of the larger sample group, those between 20 and 32 years old, had different results. In the rural areas, he enjoyed 58 percent support, and in the small urban areas, 44 percent during the campaign. Several interesting points need to be drawn out. Fifty-seven percent of those not supporting Ahmadinejad confessed that they had received their 50,000 tomans from the presidency, their “share of the nation’s wealth.” However, they stressed that with this money Ahmadinejad had not bought their vote. They complained that 50,000 tomans provided “for some fun for a couple of weeks,” but did not provide them with a future. They stressed that under Ahmadinejad, living costs had gone up while finding work was difficult if not impossible. If work was found, the wages were paltry. They blamed Ahmadinejad.
Of this group, an average of 57 percent had worked or was still working in a major urban area, including Tehran. Those belonging to this group stressed two things. First, living and working in a major urban area had changed their political outlook. They increasingly found themselves not sharing the political views of their parents or even of friends. Second, some 72 percent confessed that they were trying to convince family and friends to vote for either Mir Hossein Moussavi or Hojjatol-Eslam Mehdi Karroubi: 56 percent of the anti-Ahmadinejad youth group intended to vote for Moussavi, while 32 percent intended to vote for Karroubi.
The two post-election polls showed that 39 percent of the youth and 23 percent of the older age group who had voted for Ahmadinejad now regretted their vote. The stated reasons for this: the raping, killing, and torture of young men and women who had participated in demonstrations after the June elections and the realization that Ahmadinejad was to blame for the economic situation. Interestingly, the September poll showed that 63 percent of the anti-Ahmadinejad youth group, who were in a major city in June and July due to work, joined demonstrations. Another 22 percent said they would have liked to join but were working, though all said they wore green wristbands. One respondent, a 22-year-old Moussavi supporter, who wore the green wristband that has become the signature of the opposition, told me: “Look, I am not educated and I don’t understand politics the way you do. This village has a population I think of around 8,000. My guess is Ahmadinejad got 50 percent of the votes. He is not as loved in the provinces, or at least here, as much as city folk think he is. I personally know three-hundred people from amongst friends, family, and acquaintances who voted for Moussavi. Now they say in our entire village only 43 people voted for him. Do they take me for a fool?”
One demographic note to keep in mind when mulling over all these results—32 percent of the entire population live in such rural and small urban areas.
